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The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in 
Egypt and Tunisia since 2011
Rationale and Impact
Sebastian Sons and Inken Wiese 
 
Summary  This study documents the various forms and measures of political and 
economic assistance provided by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
and Qatar to Egypt and Tunisia since the upheavals of 2011. It also analyzes the 
impact Gulf donor countries had on political and economic development within 
Egypt and Tunisia, particularly with regard to democratization and inclusive socio­
economic change. Economically, efforts undertaken by the Gulf states were inten­
ded to stabilize the two countries, for example by helping them overcome budget 
deficits. While their business investments are not trickling down to the economi­
cally marginalized segments of society, some of the Gulf­funded development 
projects have been geared toward fueling more inclusive growth. Due to limited 
coordination between Arab and Western donor countries, however, there has thus 
far been little alignment of projects taking place in the same sectors. As a result, 
the potential for synergies between these projects has remained untapped. In po­
litical terms, as was expected, the Gulf states did not engage in efforts to promote 
more democratization. Indeed, in Egypt the assistance provided by Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE even contributed to a return to the pre­2011 order. For Germany and 
its partners to engage the Gulf states more intensively on governance matters and 
to create incentives, deeper knowledge is required about how political decisions 
are made in the Gulf. This is also essential for developing Germany’s much­needed 
general strategy toward the Gulf states, which is currently lacking. The Deauville 
Partnership is a useful forum for improving and increasing future coordination.
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In the past decade, and long before the 2011 uprisings, the 
Middle East and North Africa (the MENA region) saw the 
rise of multiple regional actors with considerable politi­
cal, economic, and financial weight and influence. The 
power of countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Qatar became even more apparent after 
the 2011 upheavals. Their record is often one of intense, 
albeit controversial engagement in different countries 
and conflict settings. 
Egypt is a case in point, as it has witnessed an exponen­
tial inflow of billions of dollars from the Gulf since the 
military took power in July 2013. The magnitude of Gulf 
support has made the issue of the political and economic 
impact of this engagement more pressing than ever – espe­
cially as Egypt continues to struggle with alarming socio­
economic realities, a huge state deficit, high unemploy­
ment, widespread poverty, and appalling social services. If 
anything, the frustration and despair of large parts of the 
population has only increased. The closure of the public 
sphere further aggravates the situation. Two questions – 1) 
how outside actors are helping or harming the most popu­
lous nation in the region recover socially and economically 
and 2) what approaches and rationales guide this external 
assistance – are core not only to the stability of the country 
itself but also to the region as a whole.
Tunisia is the only Arab country thus far to have made 
genuine, if rocky, progress toward democratic transformation. 
The country’s experience therefore poses a different question. 
How have the region’s major financial heavyweights contrib­
uted, if at all, to the country’s socioeconomic and political 
development? The matter of Gulf aid is especially important 
as Europe finds itself enmeshed in financial crisis and a loom­
ing refugee crisis, essentially cutting off the prospects of more 
comprehensive assistance from Tunisia’s European neighbors. 
The MENA’s small pioneer in democracy has been hailed for 
offering the only glimpse of hope in a region in turmoil, but 
Tunisia remains extremely fragile, particularly in economic 
and social terms. Its security situation is deteriorating, as 
instability and violence in neighboring Libya and Algeria spill 
over the shared borders and as the threat of terrorist attacks 
increases at home.
These two North African countries, Egypt and Tunisia 
– which have witnessed different but historically unique 
transformations and managed to avoid the bloody civil 
wars fragmenting other Arab countries – are each in their 
own way of particular significance, not only to the region 
but also to Europe. Repercussions transcend national 
borders and clearly resonate north of the Mediterranean. 
For European countries, the stakes are very high indeed. 
Germany in particular has an important role to play. Not 
only is it an economic and political power in the EU but 
it also has been chair of the G7 since June 2014, which 
also makes it chair of the Deauville Partnership – a forum 
established by the G8 in 2011 to respond to the transfor­
mations underway in the MENA region.
The Deauville Partnership’s goal is to provide politi­
cal and financial support to Arab countries in transition 
and to better coordinate international support among 
several types of actors: the G8 countries, international 
and regional financial institutions, the OECD, and the 
regional actors of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, 
and Turkey. Reflecting on previous channels of coopera­
tion with the Gulf, reassessing the EU Neighborhood 
Policy (a process currently underway), and exploring new 
and more effective avenues for integrating more partners 
– from the Gulf, for example – became essential tasks for 
policy makers. This is especially the case today, as estab­
lished measures and the institutional framework seem to 
function inadequately when it comes to concrete political 
and economic support for the MENA countries.
Against this background the German Council on Foreign 
Relations (DGAP) launched its project, which concludes 
with this publication.*
Sebastian Sons and Inken Wiese elaborate here on 
the major economic and political engagement of Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE in Egypt and Tunisia. They 
scrutinize the impact of these countries on efforts to 
promote more inclusive economic growth and political 
Preface
The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in 
Egypt and Tunisia since 2011
 * Early phases of the project consisted of field visits to Egypt, Tunisia, Qa­
tar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, debriefings for German officials, and three 
workshops in Cairo, Tunis, and Berlin. Although Kuwait fully deserves care­
ful scrutiny as well – not least for its significant role and assistance – the 
country was ultimately not included in the project for technical reasons.
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1. General Remarks 
After the outbreak of the so­called Arab Spring in 2011, 
the wealthier Gulf states quickly responded to the new 
political developments in the MENA region, especially 
North Africa, and leveraged considerable political and 
economic power to shape regional politics in their inter­
est. Through this intervention, they affected the course 
of the uprisings and presumably also their outcomes.1 
The scope and intensity of their engagement merits an 
investigation into the concrete interests of the respective 
Gulf countries. Before analyzing the individual interests 
of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and 
Qatar and highlighting the differences between them, it is 
worth noting some of the factors they have in common. 
It is first of all important to keep in mind that the Gulf 
states were active political and economic players in the 
region long before 2011.2 Especially following the rapid 
rise in the price of oil that began in 1999, Gulf conglomer­
ates had started to invest heavily in other Arab countries.3 
Increased Gulf investment in neighboring Middle East­
ern countries was related to a decrease in investment in 
Western countries, as mistrust of Gulf investment capital 
– particularly in the US after the attacks of September 11 
– increased in the West. Investment in the MENA region 
also stemmed from the Gulf states’ interest in stabilizing 
the Middle East economically and politically.4 The Gulf 
states also attributed more stability to Arab markets than 
Western states and companies did. This positive estima­
tion presumably also rested on close personal networks 
and the involvement of Arab expatriates working in the 
Gulf states who had intimate knowledge of their home 
countries’ economies.5
However, concerns among the Gulf states about the 
stability of the region grew in early 2011 with the oust­
ing of longstanding rulers and Gulf allies such as Zine 
el­Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. 
As will be explained in detail in the following chapter, 
these political developments created a political, security, 
and economic vacuum that Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
viewed with great anxiety. Qatar, however, perceived 
the situation as an opportunity to enhance its political 
impact as a regional player through cooperation with new 
political players in these countries. Albeit differently, all 
three of these Gulf states used the void created by the 
regional political upheavals – and by the ongoing reluc­
tance of Western states – to offer meaningful political and 
economic incentives to the countries in transition that 
could help them embark on radical political and economic 
reforms. This void provided especially the smaller Gulf 
states with the opportunity to substantiate their demands 
for more political influence, which had grown out of their 
increased economic influence.6 
The Gulf states also acted in response to the growing 
perception that they themselves would have to shoulder 
the main burden of responsibility for the region’s stabil­
ity. Their trust in both the power and interest of Western 
states to ensure stability and security in the greater Arab 
region had already been considerably diminished by 
the low consideration the West paid to Gulf sensitivities 
during the 5+1 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.7 
Mistrust in security alliances of the past – despite massive 
Western sales of arms to the Gulf states – was com­
pounded by the refusal of Western states to follow­up on 
their lofty proclamations with action with regard to the 
crises in Libya and Syria.8 As a response to these experi­
ences, Gulf states made greater use of their enhanced 
international profile and clout for regional power politics 
in North Africa and beyond without first seeking con­
sent from their Western allies.9 This was reflected in the 
UAE’s military actions in Libya as well as in the Saudi­led 
military coalition in Yemen.10 Furthermore, deepening 
economic, political and security relations with non­West­
ern powers in Asia such as China push the Gulf states to 
realign themselves.11 This has further diminished West­
ern influence on regional politics while opening up new 
opportunities to non­Western powers.12 
The uprisings and the subsequent political deteriora­
tion in Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Iraq have also clearly 
shown that the Arab League is not able or willing to man­
age or solve the crises that several of its member states 
are going through.13 It could be argued that, as a result of 
the Arab League’s paralysis, the importance of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) as a regional organization 
for inter­Arab coordination and conflict mediation has 
increased.14 This comes as a surprise, given that the GCC 
was itself strained by internal conflicts and different strat­
egies toward Arab countries undergoing political transi­
tions after 2011.15 While discord – especially between 
Qatar and the UAE – has been resolved on a superficial 
level, tension still lurks below the surface. It is currently 
muted as a result of pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia, 
which wishes to form a united front against the Houthis 
in Yemen and regionally against the so­called Islamic 
State (ISIS). However, tension within the GCC is likely 
openness in Egypt and Tunisia, and they identify ways in 
which Germany and Europe can enhance their relations 
with the Gulf states. Finally, they pinpoint overlapping 
interests and places where joint engagement in the region 
would be highly productive. Sebastian Sons worked on 
the passages relating to Saudia Arabia, while Inken Wiese 
focussed on the UAE and Qatar.
The publication delves first and foremost into factors 
driving the three countries’ foreign policy in the region, 
and in Egypt and Tunisia in particular, also highlighting 
the internal political dynamics within the Gulf states. 
European decision makers should take this material 
into account as they forge policies toward the Gulf that, 
among other things, foresee an inclusion of the respec­
tive countries – be it within a forum such as the Deauville 
Partnership, within the framework of the EU, or on a bi­
lateral level. Only policies grounded in an informed posi­
tion toward the Gulf states, one sensitive to their interests 
and needs, stand a chance of bearing any fruit.
Up until now, atomization and lack of coordination 
have sadly characterized European initiatives and poli­
cies toward the MENA region. Despite intense demands 
for more harmonization, the strikingly divergent interests 
of individual member states have often weighed heav­
ily. EU countries have thus hardly furnished examples of 
coherent policy or well­coordinated activities involving 
other actors within or beyond the EU. But two facts re­
main: first, in order to “fix” Egypt and to prevent a relapse 
in Tunisia – but also to make progress in other troubling 
conflict fronts such as in Syria, Libya, and Iraq – it is 
paramount for different actors to find common denomi­
nators, carefully coordinate action, bundle resources, 
complement each other, and share burdens. Second – in 
light of the US pivot to Asia and its decreased appetite 
for interventionism in the region, coupled with Europe’s 
preoccupation with its own financial malaise – the MENA 
region is more or less left to its own devices. That leaves 
matters mainly to key regional powers and non­Western 
states over whom Europe has very little, if any, leverage.
This reality necessitates the identification of common 
interests between Germany and Europe on the one hand 
and regional powers such as the Gulf states on the other. 
Among other things, this analysis seeks to classify entry 
points for building more trust and eventually ameliorat­
ing cooperation. But just as important is the need to agree 
on the approach and means to further those interests. 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have never supported the 
popular uprisings and have strong interest in excluding 
political players such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar 
is more ambiguous; it selectively supports groups in exter­
nal territories under the banner of the right to self­deter­
mination while at the same time maintaining  
an autocracy at home. 
The West, too, has muted its democratization agenda 
(to be sure, an agenda that has for decades been plagued 
by double standards) in response to the region’s almost 
paralyzing common security threats: terrorism, civil war, 
and failing states. Once again, security is pushing other 
desperately needed political and economic reforms to 
the margins. In the near future we are likely to see more 
multilateral, ad hoc coalitions involving the West and 
regional actors to address these acute common security 
threats. The immense challenge for German and Western 
policy makers is to embed these short­term measures into 
mid­ and long­term political and economic strategies and 
a stable security architecture for the region and for indi­
vidual countries respectively. This is of course an enor­
mously complex diplomatic endeavor. Germany and the 
EU must on the one hand reassure the Gulf states, who 
are rattled by the recent Iran deal, and at the same time 
try to give them an incentive to consent, at least partially, 
to a common plan of action – a plan for sustainable, last­
ing stability. 
This is a historic moment. Relations in the region are 
being renegotiated and realigned that might offer a win­
dow of opportunity for Germany and the EU as well. Seiz­
ing that opportunity would make it possible to acquire 
new standing with, and enhanced access to, key regional 
players – for these Gulf players are capable of altering 
conflict settings and economic as well as political dynam­
ics within countries like Egypt and Tunisia. But Germany 
and Europe should not abandon the long­term perspec­
tive and the key pillars of promoting sustainable stability: 
pluralistic and open societies and socioeconomic equal­
ity. For, even when it comes to confronting hard security 
threats such as terrorism, opening up political space is 
vital to absorbing anger and channeling it into peaceful 
means of expression. Without these pillars, the entire 
structure could collapse.
Dina Fakoussa, Editor
Head of Program, Middle East and North Africa 
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
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2. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy
2.1 The Pillars of Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy
For decades, Saudi foreign policy was based on three 
pillars: 1) Safeguarding the domestic power of the Saudi 
royal family as the kingdom’s only legitimate ruler, 2) 
safeguarding the influence of Saudi economic players in 
North Africa, the region, and beyond, and 3) safeguard­
ing the supremacy of religious leadership based on Wah­
habism, with strong anti­Shia tendencies.21 
1) Safeguarding the domestic power of the Saudi royal 
family as the only legitimate ruler of the kingdom: Since 
King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud (r. 1932–1953) founded the 
modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, diverse internal 
and external struggles have tested the power legitimacy 
of the ruling family.22 However, the royal family always 
showed its ability to preserve its leadership.23 Consisting 
of around 8,500 princes and different power centers, the 
family has never ruled as a monolithic bloc. Instead, a 
small inner circle is responsible for a decision­making 
process in which several kings have served merely as first 
among equals.24 From time to time, struggles over access 
to political, economic, and ideological power and influ­
ence caused inner rifts between family fractions or older 
and younger generations among the princes.25 Neverthe­
less, despite all fragmentation, the ruling family acted in 
a united manner in order to survive.26 In alliance with the 
Wahhabi clergy, an apparatus of technocrats, and several 
clienteles of merchant elite, the Saudi leadership has as­
serted its leadership until now.27 
2) Safeguarding the influence of Saudi economic players 
in North Africa, the region, and beyond: Saudi Arabia’s 
role as an influential regional and global economic player 
has also characterized its foreign policy in recent years.28 
Although still based mostly on oil revenue, the Saudi 
economy was considerably diversified under the late King 
Abdullah (r. 2005–2015). Industrialization and foreign 
investment were intended to offset dependence on oil 
revenue – measures that intensified after the country’s 
WTO accession in 2005.29 Unlike other Gulf states such 
as the UAE, the Saudi business community has been only 
to a small extent co­opted and integrated into the royal 
sphere of influence, based on “segmented clientelism.”30 
Of course, patronage and clientele networks have over 
time been established to integrate influential merchants 
and tribal players into the bureaucratic system, also due 
to the way the kafala system can foster state­legitimized 
corruption.31 However, traditionally strong merchant 
families still have preserved their autonomy vis­à­vis the 
royal family. Saudi political decision makers thus need to 
balance political and economic interests particularly in 
times of external trouble in order to sustain a win­win­
situation for both partners.32 Saudi politics often relied on 
the strong and well­connected networks of business fami­
lies and conglomerates who have established interwoven 
fields of influence in political and economic spheres 
abroad.33 In a nutshell, both players could cooperate 
either as allies or compete with each other as rivals; for 
example, business families can act as promoters of Saudi 
foreign policy but also as veto powers if they perceive that 
their own business interests are at risk due to controver­
sial political decisions of the ruling family.34
3) Safeguarding the supremacy of religious leadership 
based on Wahhabism with strong anti-Shia tendencies: 
The Saudi identity is based on the strong alliance of the 
ruling family with the Wahhabi establishment (ulama) 
which was established in the middle of the 18th century.35 
In this regard, Saudi foreign policy political decision 
makers need to take the interests of religious leaders into 
consideration not only in order to satisfy them but also 
to legitimize their political decisions ideologically. As 
“Guardians of the Two Holy Shrines” – Mecca and Medina 
– the Saudi royal family presents itself as a role model of 
Sunni Islam within the Middle East and beyond. This is 
particularly apparent in its anti­Shia foreign policy, which 
is mainly directed against Iran. Anti­Shiism has been 
used to demonize Iran, the arch­rival and competitor for 
regional hegemony since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.36 
Although the official ulama still constitute a relevant 
power in the Saudi system, they have in recent decades 
lost their undisputed decision­making role. Since the rule 
of King Faisal (r. 1964–1975), the religious establishment 
was transformed into a co­opted state clergy.37 The more 
it was integrated into the state apparatus, the more it lost 
its influence as a veto power, thereby becoming a “junior 
partner.”38
2.2 Saudi Arabia and the Arab Uprisings
After the outbreak of the 2011 uprisings in neighbor­
ing Arab states, these foreign policy pillars came under 
pressure as democratically legitimized forms of Islamist 
rule in Tunisia and Egypt directly undermined the raison 
d’être of the Saudi regime and took Saudi Arabia out of its 
“comfort zone.”39 The uprisings came as a shock and have 
been characterized as “the most severe test for the King­
dom since its creation.”40 Starting in late 2010, the Saudi 
political establishment has watched the destabilizing 
developments in the region with growing concern, fear­
ing possible spillover effects that might threaten the royal 
family’s legitimacy.41 Hence, Saudi Arabia’s behind­the­
scenes diplomacy approach and its strategy of “riyalpoli­
to rise again as Qatar and the UAE continue to cham­
pion different political players in various Arab countries. 
Furthermore, the Saudi dominance within the GCC is 
increasingly being challenged by both the UAE and Qatar, 
causing the GCC itself to become multipolar.16 The grow­
ing importance of the GCC is thus not to be confused with 
a regionalization of the Gulf states’ foreign policy cen­
tered within the GCC, as most of its members still show 
clear tendencies toward more bilateralization.17
Analysis of the foreign policies of each of the Gulf 
states – and of concerted efforts on the part of the GCC – 
must therefore take into account the ways in which the 
foreign policies of GCC states diverge. This is a highly 
complex endeavor due to the personalization of foreign 
policies in these states and the restriction of decision 
making to a very small number of members of the elite. 
Multilevel and multi­contextual analysis is nonetheless 
needed; it must examine both inside and outside factors 
such as a given leader’s personality, idiosyncrasies, and 
individual threat perceptions, or tribal alliances and the 
balance of power domestically.18 Increasingly, domestic 
socioeconomic challenges – such as unemployment and 
the limitations of the rentier­based welfare system – also 
shape the foreign policies of individual GCC states.19 Due 
to its much lower GDP (see fig. 1), Saudi Arabia is more 
affected by such challenges than Qatar and the UAE. 
Figure 1: Key economic data in 2014
Saudi Arabia UAE Qatar
GDP growth 3.6 % 4.6 % 6.2 %
GDP �in bil�
lion USD) 752.5 416.9 216.4
GDP per 
capita �in 
USD)
24,454 43,427 94,450
Source: Germany Trade and Invest, “Saudi­Arabien, VAE und Katar im Fokus 
2015,” February 2015 <https://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/Maerkte/
tagungsmagazine,t=saudiarabien­vae­und­katar­im­fokus­2015,did=1196082.html>  
(accessed June 4, 2015)
Socioeconomic obstacles combined with other aspects 
have thus led to rising radicalization among Gulf popula­
tions, especially in Saudi Arabia (see fig. 2). 
The Internet’s penetration of the Gulf states, and with 
it social media (see figs. 3–4), has also helped increase 
popular discourse on foreign policy, although general 
popular interest in foreign policy is still limited.20 How­
ever, all political decision makers in the Gulf region have 
to take these phenomena into consideration in order to 
preserve the legitimacy of their rule.
Figure 2: Estimated number of foreign ISIS fighters in 
2015 �selection of sending countries) 
Tunisia 1,500–3,000
Saudi Arabia 1,500–2,500
Russia 800–1,500
Jordan 1,500
France 1,200
Lebanon 900
Libya 600
Germany 500–600
Egypt 360
Kuwait 70
Qatar 15
UAE 15
Bahrain 12
Source: Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; 
surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,” King’s College London’s International Centre for 
the Study of Radicalisation, January 26, 2015, http://www.icsr.info/2015/01/foreign­fighter­
total­syriairaq­now­exceeds­20000­surpasses­afghanistan­conflict­1980s/ (accessed June 
11, 2015)
Figure 3: Percentage of Facebook users in Gulf  
Cooperation Council member states
UAE 42%
Qatar 34.38%
Kuwait 26.75%
Bahrain 25.09%
Saudi Arabia 18.26%
Oman 16.22%
Source: Nadine Sayegh, “Who’s the King of the GCC Social Media Ring?,” September 11, 
2014 <http://www.kippreport.com/fcs/king­of­the­social­media­ring/>  
(accessed June 4, 2015)
Figure 4: Number of active Twitter users in 2014
Saudi Arabia 1,900,000
UAE 401,000
Kuwait 225,000
Qatar 74,400
Bahrain 64,300
Oman 38,800
Source: Arab Social Media Report, “Twitter in the Arab Region” <http://www.arabsocialmedi­
areport.com/Twitter/LineChart.aspx?&PriMenuID=18&CatID=25&mnu=Cat>  
(accessed June 10, 2015)
Finally, it is important to point out that the insight of 
Western political decision makers into the dynamics of 
Gulf foreign policy making has up until now been quite 
limited. This has contributed to a paucity of suitable strat­
egies toward this region. As this study shows, moreover, 
this has complicated coordination and cooperation in the 
framework of the Deauville Partnership.
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cal change across the region.”59 Compared to the UAE, 
however, Saudi Arabia shows more interest in restoring 
inter GCC­unity in order to build a strong Gulf alliance 
against common threats such as ISIS and Iran. While the 
UAE strongly opposed Qatar’s support for the MB, Saudi 
Arabia has shown a more pragmatic stance toward Qatar; 
as a result of the GCC reconciliation prior to the GCC sum­
mit in Doha in December 2014, Qatar joined the Saudi­led 
military alliance to fight the Houthis in Yemen. Nonethe­
less, Saudis fear that Qatar’s strong ties to the MB will 
continue in the future because such ties are believed to 
be built on complex but robust ideological, political, and 
economic similarities.60
2.3 Outlook: Saudi Foreign Policy under King Salman
While the late King Abdullah avoided direct military 
intervention in neighboring countries, the military action 
in Yemen of his successor, King Salman, indicates a shift 
in Saudi foreign policy strategies. The goals of this more 
interventionist, military, and non­diplomatic approach 
are to 1) portray Saudi strength in times of regional 
trouble both to its Arab­Sunni allies and to its own popu­
lation, 2) overcome animosities with Qatar, while provid­
ing proof of Saudi power to the US in times of US­Iranian 
rapprochement, and 3) help divert attention away from 
domestic socioeconomic obstacles in times of decreasing 
oil prices.61
1) Portraying strength: The 80­year­old King Salman, 
who has been often characterized as too old and too ill, 
wanted to show that he is able to rule the country, togeth­
er with his closest allies, in times of external and internal 
challenges.62 Furthermore, both Muhammad bin Nayif, 
the new crown prince and minister of interior, and the 
“wunderkind” Muhammad bin Salman63 – King Salman’s 
son, who was designated as new minister of defense 
and deputy crown prince and is in charge of the Yemen 
operation – want to prove that they are resolute military 
leaders in order to position themselves as possible future 
kings.64 From a Saudi pro­governmental perspective, the 
“Kingdom needs political and military noise to prove it is 
there and that it is not asleep…. Saudi Arabia cannot be 
accused of being weak” in times of external pressure and 
rising internal challenges.65
2) Overcoming differences with Qatar and proving power 
to the US: In terms of overcoming tension with Qatar, 
that country’s participation, however restrained, in the 
anti­Houthi alliance is a clear indicator of the joint will 
of both Saudi Arabia and the new Qatari emir, Tamim, to 
overcome recent struggles by fighting together in Yemen. 
Furthermore, King Salman wants to send a clear signal to 
the US that Saudi Arabia cannot be ignored as a regional 
leader. Thus, the Saudi Arabian military action based on 
a Sunni coalition against the Houthis, widely perceived as 
Iran’s “fifth column” in Yemen, aims to reassure the US­
Saudi alliance at a time of US­Iranian rapprochement and 
to finally overcome animosities with Qatar.66
3) Distracting domestic attention from socioeconomic 
problems: In times of falling oil prices, the military opera­
tion in Yemen – called Operation Decisive Storm– cre­
ated a “rally around the flag” effect, encouraging strong 
patriotism and acceptance of the rulers’ decision to go 
to war among the majority of the Saudi population. This 
neatly diverted attention from domestic challenges such 
as high unemployment and the absence of diversification 
within the Saudi private economy, which has led to rising 
frustration among Saudi youth.67 King Salman presents 
himself as a promoter of gradual and slow change “in a 
Saudi way” and focuses more on foreign policy, while his 
predecessor King Abdullah had the image of a “reformer,” 
though he acted as a “modernizer” at best.68 Most prob­
ably, King Salman will continue to address domestic 
problems with the traditional “carrot­and­stick”; in addi­
tion repressing mutual opposition groups such as bloggers 
or the Saudi Shiite minority in the eastern province, he 
also announced spending 34 billion USD on employees in 
the public sector69 – a typical instrument of the tradi­
tional welfare state aiming at calming the tense domestic 
situation without implementing any genuine structural 
reforms.70
To sum up, King Salman aims to diversify Saudi Ara­
bia’s external alliances in order to prove that the kingdom 
can act as a sovereign regional power – and to pres­
ent himself and his government as strong and decisive 
leaders in tumultuous times. Although the US remains 
a reliable ally, other coalitions and ad hoc partnerships 
will become more important, as the joint operation in 
Yemen has shown, while bilateral relations with the 
US have cooled significantly.71 Finally, King Salman’s 
military engagement in Yemen has also shown that his 
foreign policy is focused on nearby hot spots, while North 
African countries such as Egypt and Tunisia are of less 
interest as for now and will become a priority only if the 
security situation deteriorates or if serious economic 
crisis in these countries threatens to harm Saudi inter­
ests. King Salman’s current foreign policy seems to lack a 
coherent strategy based on long­term goals, however. As 
Al­Rasheed puts it, “the more the Saudi regime wanted to 
appear hegemonic, the less its actions reflected thought­
ful strategies that might have resulted in desirable 
outcomes.”72 
tik”42 have reached its limits, and shifted its strategy from 
a non­interventionist, mediating foreign policy toward a 
status quo policy aimed at stabilizing allied regimes and 
focused on several fields of interest.43 As Madawi Al­
Rasheed argues, “the uprisings bewildered Saudi Arabia’s 
foreign policy and eventually led to the creation of more 
enemies than friends.”44 This is reflected in an evolution 
of Saudi foreign policy from a “consensual pattern to a 
confrontational assertive one”45 to address different goals: 
1) the containment of Iranian regional influence, 2) the 
containment of ISIS, and 3) the containment of Qatar’s 
influence in the Middle East in order to reestablish unity 
within the GCC under Saudi leadership.
1) The containment of Iranian regional influence: From 
a Saudi perspective, all uprisings around the kingdom – 
such as in Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, and Syria – have been 
initiated and fostered by Iranian anti­Sunni forces or by 
pro­Iranian Shiite proxies, with the aim of toppling the 
Saudi government and establishing an Iran­dominated 
sphere of influence within the Arab world.46 Saudi leaders 
thus feel besieged by Iranian “fifth columns.”47 As Prince 
Turki al­Faisal (former director general of the intelligence 
agency from 1977 to 2001 and former ambassador to the 
US from 2005 to 2006) already stated in April 2013, “Irani­
an leaders’ meddling and destabilizing efforts in the only 
two other countries with Shiite majorities, Iraq and Bah­
rain, as well as those countries with significant minority 
Shiite communities, such as Syria, Yemen, Kuwait and 
Lebanon must … come to an end.”48 This perception is to 
some extent highly exaggerated and based on “Iranoia” or 
“Shianoia.”49 Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, 
both phenomena have become integral parts of Saudi 
Arabia’s political culture. Today, the image of Iran as the 
archtypical rival has become an influential ingredient of 
Saudi political discourse. This has to some extent ham­
pered a pragmatic Saudi foreign policy approach, as can 
be seen in the Saudi reaction to the US­Iran rapproche­
ment on the Iranian nuclear issue. In the eyes of the 
Saudi leadership, this could further turn Iran from a US 
enemy into a US partner at the expense of Saudi Arabia’s 
longstanding relationship with Washington. This would 
negatively affect the Saudi government’s stability as well 
as the security structure within the kingdom.50
2) The containment of ISIS: Influenced by Saudi Wahha­
bi imams in local mosques and private sermons, the ultra­
conservative Salafi ideology has become an alternative 
to social values and norms blurred and undermined by 
rising socioeconomic challenges such as youth unemploy­
ment and inadequate job opportunities for both male and 
female graduates. With the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, a 
considerable component of Saudi society showed sympa­
thy for the movement and its ideology. Currently 1,500–
2,500 Saudi jihadists are fighting in the ranks of ISIS. (See 
fig. 2 on p. 6.) They are inspired by ISIS’s interpretation of 
a “pure” Salafi Islam to wage a war against the “corrupt” 
and “Westernized” Saudi ruling family.51 After a first 
phase of internal terrorism from 2003 to 2005, the Saudi 
government had to deal again with “homegrown terror­
ists” fighting in Iraq and Syria. Since June 2014, the King­
dom reacted with counter­ISIS measures by implementing 
a royal decree to impose severe punishments on anyone 
joining, funding, or openly sympathizing with ISIS.52 The 
replacement of the head of intelligence, Prince Bandar bin 
Sultan, with Minister of Interior and newly designated 
Crown Prince, Muhammad bin Naif, in April 2014 was 
also interpreted as a signal of the reformulation of the 
policy vis­à­vis militant Islamists.53 In July 2014, 30,000 
Saudi troops, including well­trained National Guard 
units, were sent to the Iraqi border to protect the kingdom 
against potential attacks of ISIS insurgents.54 However, 
rumors about small jihadists’ cells on Saudi soil are also 
discussed in the media.55 In May 2015, two suicide attacks 
on Shiite mosques in the Eastern Province for which ISIS 
claimed responsibility killed at least 25 people. 
Nevertheless, the Saudi government underestimated 
the real threat emanating from ISIS for quite some time; 
when it emerged, it was seen as a manageable tool for 
containing Iran’s influence in Iraq. Although no proof 
of direct support to ISIS on the part of the ruling family 
exists, private donors, Wahhabi clerics, charity organiza­
tions, and influential members of the business community 
have most likely been supporting ISIS with financial, 
ideological, and logistical assistance to use the movement 
against the Shiite government in Iraq, channeling cash 
money via Kuwait to Iraqi and Syrian jihadists.56
3) The containment of Qatar’s influence in the Middle 
East in order to reestablish unity within the GCC under 
Saudi leadership: Saudi Arabia aims to normalize intra­
GCC relations, which were brought to a brink after Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassa­
dors from Doha in March 2014. The three states strongly 
opposed Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) in Egypt and elsewhere in the region. They also 
objected to anti­Saudi statements made on the Al Jazeera 
news network.57 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
competed intensely for influence over different Syrian 
opposition groups fighting Bashar al­Assad.58 In gen­
eral, “Qatar’s strained relationships with its Gulf neigh­
bors have become a microcosm for the broader tensions 
between status quo advocates and supporters of politi­
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closed.87 The ruling families have thus been referred to as 
“dominant local capitalists,” and the Gulf states as “state 
capitalists,” respectively.88 This is particularly obvious 
in the strong engagement of the ruling families in local 
real estate, which rests on their considerable ownership 
of land in the UAE, although companies like Emaar also 
engage in international real estate projects.89 As a result, 
the UAE does not have a well­developed private sec­
tor, and there are no actors who would seek to limit the 
economic influence of the ruling families. From the outset 
– unlike Saudi Arabia or Kuwait – only a small number 
of merchant families had existed in the UAE, and their 
economic influence was already minimal prior to the dis­
covery of oil in the region.90 Their influence was curbed 
further when members of these non­ruling families were 
co­opted into the overall system, effectively making them 
a class of notables with vested interests in that system’s 
continuity.91 Political and economic power and authority 
in the UAE has consequently remained embedded within 
small circles clustered around the senior members of the 
ruling families.
Such a high concentration of wealth in the hands of 
a few carries a potential for social dissatisfaction, and 
the country is not exempt from domestic problems such 
as increasingly high unemployment rates and rising 
inequality – even among Emirati nationals. The result­
ing political conflicts often revolve around the concept 
of “national identity.” Emirati nationals prefer to work in 
the well­paid public sector, which places a large burden 
on the UAE budget, while leaving the country’s huge 
service sector to be filled by foreign workers. In 2013, 
only around 1.4 million of the UAE’s 9.2 million inhabit­
ants were nationals; their share is constantly declining 
despite a growth rate among nationals of three percent.92 
The share of Arab foreign workers in the overall labor 
force is estimated to be less than 10 percent. While this 
number is quite low, Michael Herb claims that foreign 
Arab workers appear to make Emiratis rather uneasy.93 
This might have its roots in the political activism of Arab 
migrants who had come in the 1960s and 1970s, but, as 
the Qatar­based political scientist Mehran Kamrava 
points out, most current Arab migrant laborers are 
professional and non­ideological.94 The poignancy of the 
debate demonstrates, however, that politicizing identity 
issues is one of the few avenues available for indirectly 
criticizing the political leadership.95 
2) Securing the UAE’s territorial integrity: Since it 
achieved independence, the UAE has frequently seen its 
territorial integrity threatened by its neighbors, specifi­
cally by Saudi Arabia, which has questioned the demar­
cation of shared borders, and by Iran, which occupies 
a number of islands that the UAE considers part of its 
territory.96 Efforts to build and maintain reliable security 
alliances with third states thus receive strong political 
attention. Over the past decade, the fight against terror­
ism and violent extremism has also become an important 
matter, as the UAE has long been a potential target of  
Islamist terrorism due to its tolerant policies, e.g. regard­
ing alcohol. The fact that no terror attacks have (officially) 
occurred is most certainly the result of a strong security 
apparatus and tight surveillance mechanisms.97 It is also 
widely assumed, however, that the country are being 
spared such attacks as long as Islamist organizations 
have been able to enjoy useful services in the UAE. These 
include, for example, banking services and trading.98 Al­
though threats to the UAE’s security are undoubtedly real, 
M. H. Ilias is correct in pointing out that the discourse of 
security is also used as a tool because it “offers the rulers 
a chance to assert their authority by enhancing their 
legitimacy through this, instead of relying more on their 
traditional sources.”99
With regard to Saudi Arabia, the recent rapprochement, 
especially since 2011, should not mask the fact that Saudi­
UAE relations have, according to the Emirati scholar 
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, never been “problem­free.”100 
Border conflicts led as late as 2010 to military clashes be­
tween the two countries’ naval forces, and Saudi Arabia 
has frequently been accused of meddling in the affairs 
of the smaller and poorer emirates. The actions of the 
younger UAE leaders, President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed 
Al Nahyan and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Rashid Al Maktoum, who took power in 2004 and 2006 
respectively, increasingly reflect the desire to be treated 
as Saudi Arabia’s equal and not its junior partner.101 Theo­
retically speaking, the UAE shares this interest with Qatar, 
which similarly feels that Saudi Arabia underestimates its 
economic and political power. In practice, however, this 
seems to be one of the factors that has increased competi­
tion between the smaller Gulf states.
One other area of tension between the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia is the question of how to contain Iran. Religious­
ideological differences are of notably less importance to 
the UAE than they are to Saudi Arabia. In addition, the 
UAE also enjoys closer economic relations with Iran.102 It 
is Iran’s biggest non­oil trading partner, with exports to 
Iran worth over €23 billion in 2013, while imports from 
Iran involve relevant food items.103 Hopes are particularly 
pronounced in Dubai that trade will be boosted once the 
sanctions on Iran are lifted as part of the international 
agreement on the Iranian nuclear program. The emir­
In addition to these external challenges, King Salman 
also has to deal with the growing roster of socioeconomic 
problems hinted at above. These include high youth 
unemployment, obstacles due to gender segregation, a 
widening generational rift, increasing frustration and 
religious radicalization, a lack of economic diversification 
and privatization, apparent Islamic opposition, and social 
media activism. Taking the low oil price into consider­
ation, King Salman and his new administration might be 
challenged not only by external crises but also by internal 
dissatisfaction from several social groups that cannot be 
co­opted through welfare services – or simply suppressed 
– in the long run.73 The new king is thus under pressure 
to transform the traditional carrot­and­stick policy of the 
Saudi leaders vis­à­vis internal and external opposition 
groups into a coherent, sustainable and inclusive policy of 
dialogue. However, this seems out of his sight so far.
3. The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates
3.1 The UAE’s Vital Interests
The general foreign policy of the UAE as well as its reac­
tion to the Arab uprisings can be best understood by 
reflecting on the state’s vital interests. These consist of 
1) maintaining the stability of the country’s political and 
social order and 2) securing its territorial integrity. 
1) Maintaining the stability of the UAE’s political and 
social order: The UAE is considered to be a stable country 
in a politically instable region.74 Nevertheless, its leader­
ship faces constant challenges to maintain the country’s 
political and social order. The state is made up of seven 
constitutive emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Fujai­
rah, Ajman, Ras al­Khaimah, and Umm al­Quwain). The 
political dynamics of decision making in the UAE differ in 
many ways from those of its GCC neighbors, as most po­
litical affairs are regulated individually by the respective 
emirates; foreign policy and security policy are a notable 
exception to this rule and are the responsibility of the fed­
eral government, which is headquartered in Abu Dhabi. 
However, traditional rivalries as well as ideological 
conflicts among the emirates’ ruling families have led to 
a number of severe internal conflicts since the country’s 
independence in 1971.75 These conflicts have been further 
fueled by growing inequalities in living standards due to 
an uneven distribution of wealth across the emirates, and 
due to Abu Dhabi’s political and economic dominance as 
the richest of the seven emirates.76 According to Anoushi­
ravan Ehteshami, there are thus “a myriad of forces 
within the country” that need to be balanced and, as a 
result, “generate apparently contradictory policies.”77 
The dominant political players in the UAE are the sev­
en ruling families (with the ruling family of Abu Dhabi’s 
Al Nahyan at the top, followed by Dubai’s Al Maktoum), 
whose members assume all relevant political positions. 
Their power is hereditary. The constitution stipulates that 
each emirate’s natural resources and land belongs to its 
respective ruling family, which then contributes to the 
emirate’s and to the federal state’s budget from its private 
wealth.78 Through this system, the ruling families finance 
an all­encompassing welfare system (again with Abu 
Dhabi shouldering the lion’s share79), which also “incor­
porates” Emirati nationals into the “family­state.” Mean­
ingful possibilities for political participation within the 
general population are absent.80 This “neopatrimonial” 
state structure secures the rulers’ political acquiescence 
and popularity and enhances their legitimacy, which is 
mainly based on traditional rather than religious grounds 
– unlike the royal family’s dominance in Saudi Arabia.81 
Economic diversification played an important role 
in the ruling families’ efforts to consolidate their politi­
cal standing and thus secure the system as a whole in 
preparation for the post­hydrocarbon era. They invested 
in infrastructure to transform their emirates into hubs of 
regional and international trade and transport, tourism, 
and financial services, but also in sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs) and state­owned enterprises (SOEs). By 2014, 
the non­oil sector already contributed 68 percent to the 
country’s GDP.82 While initially focusing on domestic turf, 
enterprises were able to invest globally with increasing 
vigor, thanks to large accumulations of capital during the 
years of the oil price boom prior to 2009. They were even 
able to bail out needy Western economies and companies 
during the global financial crises that started in 2009.83 
However, in recent years Emirati SWFs and SOEs have in­
creasingly shifted their investments to neighboring Arab 
countries as well as to Asian countries like China, Japan, 
and South Korea.84 This shift reflects the wish to shape 
globalization processes in the region as well as the grow­
ing economic importance of Asian markets. But it is also a 
response to what were considered “political humiliations” 
suffered in international bidding processes.85 
Matthew Gray correctly points out that this economic 
diversification is rather a “redesigning of the rentier ar­
rangement [which] is not fundamentally at variance with 
earlier oil and gas­based rentier dynamics.... Only the 
type of rent and how it flows have changed; the rentier 
bargain beneath remains in place.”86 In fact, Emirati 
SWFs and SOEs have further strengthened the economic 
and thus the political role of the ruling families, although 
their exact financial share in them is usually not dis­
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Consequent efforts were geared toward strengthening the 
economic stability of countries of strategic importance 
for the UAE and thus potentially the Middle East as a 
whole – efforts that the UAE did not feel were sufficiently 
appreciated, especially by European states.117 In general, 
the UAE used a “carrot­and­stick­policy.” This involved, 
among other things, offering aid, e.g. in the form of 
grants and loans, and creating mutually beneficial invest­
ments through projects that involved the UAE’s SWFs 
and SOEs. It also involved resorting to sanctions in order 
to shape politics in the countries affected by the Arab 
upheavals in a way that suited the interests of the UAE; 
it even shored up military capabilities, as for example in 
the UAE’s engagement in Libya and Bahrain. In Egypt the 
UAE furthered policies of economic liberalization in the 
interest of future UAE investments, while it simultane­
ously hoped that improving the economic situation would 
politically marginalize Islamist movements. (See chapter 
2, section 3.) 
Although it remains correct that SWFs follow primarily 
financial and not political interests, the example of Egypt 
also highlights the fact that the UAE is increasingly will­
ing to leverage its economic power and its economic enti­
ties – namely SWFs and SOEs – for political purposes.118 
Because it took a “quieter approach” than Qatar, the full 
extent of UAE engagement only emerged over time. It has 
also been pointed out that the UAE has benefited econom­
ically from the regional turmoil since 2011 due to an influx 
of wealthy and professional expatriate Arabs relocating 
to the UAE to take advantage of its relative stability and 
opportunities. The real estate and banking sectors have in 
particular profited from this development.119 
3) Containing Qatar’s regional influence: The UAE’s 
engagement in countries affected by the Arab protests 
must also be interpreted as an effort to counter Qatar’s 
activities in these countries. The UAE reached out actively 
to Saudi Arabia, establishing among other things a joint 
committee in spring 2014 that intended to adopt a com­
mon foreign policy. This had the effect of highlighting 
the failure of a unified GCC foreign policy.120 Probably 
somewhat counter to Saudi interests, it also responded to 
Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood on religious 
grounds by establishing the “Muslim Council of Elders” 
(MCE) in Abu Dhabi in summer 2014. While Doha is home 
to the headquarters of the “International Union of Muslim 
Scholars,” headed by Yusuf al­Qaradawi, Abu Dhabi has 
become home to the headquarters of the MCE, headed 
by Abdullah Bin Bayyah and the Grand Imam of Al 
Azhar, Ahmed al­Tayeb.121 Unlike Qatar, the UAE does not 
adhere to Wahhabism. Given this, and the fact that Saudi 
Arabia has no interest in strengthening rival religious au­
thorities beyond its own, it is hardly surprising that Saudi 
Arabia seems to be keeping its distance from both of these 
institutions.122 
4) Countering the threat of (Islamist) terrorism and 
extremism to the UAE’s security: The UAE sees domestic 
and regional security as well as its political and economic 
stability as threatened by violent Islamist extremism and 
terrorism. Reflecting the leadership’s threat perception, 
however, it considers not only organizations like ISIS and 
Al Qaida to be terrorist and/or extremist groups but also 
sees threats in a large number of other organizations, 
among them the MB and its various regional and local 
affiliates. An official list of 80 such organizations was pre­
sented in November 2014. It incriminates not only these 
organizations but also the countries that support them – 
including, in the UAE’s understanding, Qatar.123 
In its efforts to fight Islamist terrorism, the UAE also 
presents itself as a moderate voice of Islam. It does this 
through activities that develop Islamic narratives coun­
tering arguments made by movements like Al Qaida and 
ISIS. One notable example is the Sawab Center, which 
opened in Abu Dhabi in July 2015 in cooperation with the 
US, to fight terrorist online propaganda through develop­
ing real­time content in response to events in Syria and 
Iraq.124 Similarly, a “Forum for Promoting Peace in Mus­
lim Societies” has been engaging since 2014 with Muslim 
scholars from all over the world “to clarify to the world 
that Islam is a religion of peace and justice.”125 Although it 
does not do so openly, the UAE at least partially uses such 
initiatives to challenge the Saudi­Wahhabi narrative on 
how Islam ought to be lived and interpreted. By present­
ing its efforts as being in line with resolutions passed by 
the UN Security Council, it stresses the country’s will­
ingness to assume international political responsibility 
but also signals its expectation that it should be properly 
consulted.126
3.3 Outlook for UAE Foreign Policy
Under its current leadership, the UAE is expected to con­
tinue a regional policy that follows the model of “stability 
above all” and to rely increasingly on the assumption 
that other countries – for example, China – will follow a 
similar rationale in the region.127 This is likely to increase 
the existing economic and growing political alignment of 
the UAE with Asian countries. While the UAE’s regional 
engagement showed its basic willingness to leverage its 
economic power for its political interests, low oil prices 
may change its calculations and increase its willingness 
to engage more actively with its Western allies, especially 
ate hosts a large Shiite and Iranian community and has 
already been serving as a hub for Western companies to 
do indirect business with Iran.104 Moreover, the fact that 
the UAE has built a number of nuclear power plants with 
South Korean help to meet its energy demands may have 
also had an impact on the UAE’s Iran policy, which is 
clearly more pragmatic than Saudi Arabia’s.
Another factor contributing to the UAE’s increasingly 
influential position in international affairs is the profes­
sionalization of its foreign policy and relevant personnel. 
Assured by the country’s economic success, the leadership 
has become sufficiently self­confident to act politically 
and even intervene militarily – as was recently the case in 
Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen for example – without seeking 
prior consent from the US and its other Western allies.105 
The UAE also seeks to counter political criticism preemp­
tively, for example through public relations campaigns 
with names like “United for a Better Future,” which are 
meant to call Emirati contributions to global political 
and economic stability to the attention of Western audi­
ences.106 It is nonetheless important to realize that the 
ever­closer economic ties with Asian countries also carry 
the potential for closer political cooperation, which could 
further decrease Western political leverage over the 
UAE.107 Indeed, discussions are underway both in Asian 
and in Gulf capitals as to how Asian countries might con­
tribute to maintaining security and stability in the MENA 
region in the future.108
On the whole, most UAE foreign policy initiatives 
continue to focus on bilateral relations – despite all the 
rhetoric that draws on the importance of the GCC as a 
unified power bloc.109 While the UAE has unquestionably 
been paying close attention to the GCC and its various 
committees in recent years, the pro­GCC rhetoric seems 
to have been especially pronounced when it served the 
aim of sidelining Qatar. Since the GCC’s reconciliation 
with Qatar in late 2014 and the new political line of the 
Saudi King Salman, this rhetoric seems to have cooled 
down somewhat. Saudi Arabia, moreover, seems to be 
less courted than was previously the case.
3.2 The UAE and the Arab Uprisings
The UAE identified four challenges and threats in the 
dynamics of the 2011 Arab uprisings, even though the 
country as a whole experienced only very small protests, 
to which it reacted with domestic and international mea­
sures. These were: 1) the ideological threat posed by the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) – and by political Islam more 
generally – to the stability of the UAE’s political and social 
order; 2) the threat of economic instability to UAE invest­
ments in Arab countries; 3) the challenge to the UAE’s 
regional role resulting from Qatar’s growing regional 
influence; and 4) the threat posed by (Islamist) terrorism 
and extremism to the UAE’s security (which partially 
combines elements of the other three threats). 
1) Countering the ideological threat posed by the MB and 
by political Islam to the stability of the UAE’s political and 
social order: Using the name Al Islah, the MB had been 
able to organize members and activities in the UAE for 
decades, though not as a political party. From the 1960s 
on it attracted Arab expatriates who had fled their home 
countries, but also Emiratis who had studied abroad.110 
Despite the fact that Al Islah had not displayed revolution­
ary inclinations previously, and despite its small mem­
bership, fears arose among the UAE leaders in early 2011 
that the movement would instigate unrest, especially in 
the less wealthy emirates, which were referred to in the 
local press as a “potential ticking time bomb.”111 What 
followed was not only a crackdown on Al Islah itself but 
also on pro­democracy activists who had demanded 
citizenship for stateless people born in the UAE (bidoun). 
Also affected were the signatories to a petition requesting 
the right to vote for all UAE citizens and that the Federal 
National Council be vested with legislative powers. Doz­
ens of people from every emirate and all socioeconomic 
and political backgrounds – including judges, academics, 
lawyers, and even a member of the ruling family of Ras 
al­Khaimah – were consequently put on trial for “break­
ing laws and perpetrating acts that pose a threat to state 
security, undermining the public order, opposing the 
government system, and insulting the President.”112 
The state’s responses were widely criticized and seen 
as an overreaction.113 They make a certain amount of po­
litical sense, however, when one considers them, as Karen 
Young puts it, as “efforts to ‘bind’ the political community 
at the exclusion of those who challenge its authority.”114 
It may also be helpful to accept the threat perception 
among the UAE leadership as real, if not overwhelming, 
no matter how “imagined” the actual threat posed by Al 
Islah and other protestors may be or may have been. This 
would make it a further example of the above­mentioned 
phenomenon of Gulf states’ policies often mirroring the 
idiosyncracies of their rulers.115 
2) Securing UAE investments in Arab countries: Because 
the UAE’s investments abroad are central to keeping the 
country’s political and social order intact and to main­
taining the UAE’s international economic and political 
clout, securing these investments as well as stabilizing 
returns on them was a major concern driving the coun­
try’s reaction to the political upheavals in the region.116 
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for the parliament (also referred to as the Shura Council) 
provided for in Qatar’s constitution have been repeatedly 
postponed since 2005. This limits political participation of 
citizens to the election of municipal councils. 
Actual political power and influence is thus vested in 
the hands of a small number of people, making Qatar a 
total autocracy that does not offer more political partici­
pation to its citizens than Saudi Arabia does.145 Despite 
that, public criticism rarely addresses the political system 
as such but tends to focus on public spending.146 Accord­
ing to a 2013 survey, 77 percent of the Qatari population 
feels that “the state should spend more resources inside 
the country.”147 Consequently, Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al 
Thani stressed spending on domestic development in his 
initial speech to the (appointed) members of the Shura 
Council after his father, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, 
handed over power to him in July 2013.148 
The consentaneous accession of Emir Tamin bin Ha­
mad demonstrates Qatar’s remarkable political stability. 
According to Mehran Kamrava, this stability “is rooted in 
the country’s comparative social cohesion (lack of sectar­
ian tensions, as in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia), its unitary 
polity and small size (compared to the United Arab Emir­
ates and Oman), and a relatively apolitical, small national 
population (compared to Kuwait).” He argues that “these 
factors have combined to give the state relative latitude in 
pursuing foreign policy agendas it may not have other­
wise been able to pursue.”149
Christopher Davidson assumes that the reigning fam­
ily’s political future will remain largely unchallenged as 
long as the state can actually sustain high spending and 
distribute wealth to its population.150 Securing the econ­
omy is thus of central importance for the future stability 
of the current political regime of Qatar. But Qatar has 
not yet diversified its economy to the extent that the UAE 
has.151 The country’s wealth is mostly based on revenues 
from liquefied natural gas (LNG) coming from the consid­
erable gas field beneath the Persian Gulf that Qatar shares 
with Iran. Oil and gas still account for roughly 92 percent 
of export earnings and for 62 percent of government 
revenues, although other sectors have pushed the non­oil 
component to just over half of Qatar’s nominal GDP.152 
For the moment – and despite shrinking fiscal surpluses 
as a consequence of the recent low energy prices – Qatar’s 
economy can still be considered strong and stable because 
it is secured through long­term contracts with Asian coun­
tries that receive 71.4 percent of Qatar’s gas exports.153 
Qatar can thus be expected to rely as much on foreign 
policy to pursue its economic interests in the future as 
it did in the past. Its economic and, with it, its political 
focus on Asia and Africa is likely to increase further.154 
But Qatar’s power to negotiate gas contracts and to insist 
on high prices is likely to decrease as the number of LNG 
exporting countries that can cater to Asian markets rises. 
Experts point out that Qatar thus needs to secure market 
shares elsewhere, and in this regard, the Middle East and 
Europe should be of central interest for Qatar.155 It has 
been argued that the search for routes for gas pipelines 
that could serve new markets might be one of the key 
rationales for recent Qatari foreign policy initiatives, in­
cluding Qatar’s interventionist policy in Syria.156 Further­
more, the country should also have an interest in reaching 
an agreement with its GCC neighbors, whose continu­
ously rising gas demands could to a great extent be met 
through additional Qatari deliveries via the existing 
Dolphin pipeline.157 Ever since the 1990s, however, Qatar 
and its GCC neighbors have been unable to agree on a 
mutually acceptable gas price.158 This contentious issue is 
often overlooked in analyses of Qatar’s strained relations 
with other GCC countries.159 
The close alignment of Qatar’s foreign policy and 
economy is also apparent in its international investment 
policy. Like its GCC neighbors, albeit considerably later, 
Qatar had set up a sovereign wealth fund with a number 
of sub­entities to invest revenues from its natural wealth 
internationally and thereby diversify the economic basis. 
Like the UAE it also uses state­owned enterprises to 
re­channel revenues through the creation of new pub­
lic wealth both inside and outside the country.160 Qatar 
Diar Real Estate Investment Company, which is one of 
the investment arms of the Qatar Investment Authority 
(QIA), has for example made major investments in Egypt, 
Lebanon, Oman, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Such invest­
ments were often made in the context of Qatari media­
tion efforts in these countries. Diar’s activities thus often 
straddle “investment” and “aid,” and making the QIA as a 
whole one of the more overtly political of the Gulf’s sover­
eign wealth funds.161
2) Protecting Qatar’s territorial integrity: The percep­
tion that Qatar’s territorial integrity is threatened by 
external powers is historically rooted in the Al Thani. Its 
force and extent should not be underestimated. Qatar 
feels threatened by Saudi Arabia and by Iran. The fact 
that it relies on Saudi Arabia to hold Iran at bay, on the 
one hand, while on the other hand depending on good 
working relations with Iran, due to the shared gas field, 
poses considerable challenges.162 This translates into Qa­
tar’s more nuanced and less confrontational position  
vis­à­vis Iran compared to other GCC countries. It also 
with regard to a broader regional crisis management.128 
While internal discord in the GCC, both with Qatar but 
also with Saudi Arabia, are pushed to the background 
for the moment, the UAE should be expected to act on its 
interests ever more self­confidently – if not aggressively 
– as its leadership prepares for the successor to the ailing 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan; this may contribute, 
as Karen Young puts it, to “reinventing the power dynam­
ics of the GCC.”129 
4. Qatar’s Foreign Policy
4.1 Qatar’s Vital Interests
In recent years, Qatar’s foreign policy has exhibited a 
number of surprising moves and shifts. It nevertheless 
reflects how the country’s leadership attempts to pursue 
the vital interests of the country and of the ruling family 
under sometimes difficult conditions. These interests 
consist of 1) stabilizing the political regime, which had in 
the past been challenged mainly from within the ruling 
family of the Al Thani itself, and 2) protecting the state’s 
territorial integrity, which Qatar’s leaders perceive to 
be threatened mainly by Saudi Arabia and Iran. These 
interests are strongly interconnected, for example be­
cause Saudi Arabia has tried to use intra­family rivalries 
within the Al Thani to affect the succession to power.130 
Economic concerns are thus part and parcel of Qatar’s 
vital interests, since satisfying the financial and economic 
expectations and demands of members of the ruling fam­
ily and of the Qatari population contributes to keeping 
the country politically stable. It is important to consider 
such connections in order to understand Qatar’s foreign 
policy strategy and especially its initiatives in response to 
the Arab uprisings. The cornerstones of that strategy have 
been to foster close political relations with various, often 
rival international and regional actors and to diversify 
Qatar’s economy and its economic partners.131 Especially 
during the reign of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani  
(r. 1995–2013), foreign policy was used as a tool to “brand” 
Qatar as different from its neighbors and to make itself 
valuable (if not indispensable) to multiple regional and in­
ternational actors.132 Since 2013, Emir Tamin bin Hamad 
Al Thani has seemed to follow a similar strategy, albeit 
in a less confrontational manner and in closer alignment 
with Saudi Arabia. 
1) Stabilizing the regime of the Al Thani politically and 
economically: According to the Qatari constitution, the 
rule of the state rests with the family of the Al Thani, who 
have acted as representatives of the people settling on the 
Qatari peninsula since the middle of the 19th century.133 
Nevertheless, the Al Thani’s hereditary political author­
ity was precarious from the outset, as most tribes grazing 
on the peninsula were not indigenous but transient and 
owed allegiance to the Wahhabis ruling nearby.134 This 
only changed when economic conditions on the water­
scarce peninsula improved with the discovery of oil in the 
late 1930s. The result was a massive population increase 
from around 28,000 in 1939 to around 300,000 Qatari 
nationals plus slightly less than two million foreigners 
today.135 Zahra Babar has calculated that around 281,000 
non­Qatari Arab nationals also reside in Qatar, around 
150,000 of whom are employed – a figure that differs from 
other estimates. Arab foreign workers make up about 12 
percent of the total Qatari work force and are concentrat­
ed in the knowledge­based sectors.136 
Unlike in Kuwait or Dubai before the discovery of oil, 
however, Qatar’s early and highly fluid social structures 
had not generated any enduring political institutions 
except for the Al Thani ruling family itself. Due to the fact 
that the Al Thani had loomed large even among the small 
number of merchants, no other social or economic groups 
with sufficient power existed to challenge the Al Thani’s 
legitimacy when the country achieved independence in 
1971.137 The ruling family treated oil revenues as its own 
and used the political weakness of the population to fur­
ther increase the family’s economic and political power.138 
Simultaneously, however, oil revenues further divided the 
already contentious ruling family, as can be seen from the 
various palace coups through which most rulers acceded 
to power.139 Oil wealth thus added a new bargaining chip 
to intra­family negotiations.140 Even more than in other 
Gulf states, cabinet positions and other offices were and 
continue to be distributed to members of the ruling fam­
ily, resulting in a large number of relatively insignificant 
institutions and “offices for salary­drawing, patronage­ 
dependent, older and relatively marginalized Al Tha­
nis.”141 In order to neutralize remaining demands for suc­
cession, around 25 percent of the revenues from the state’s 
natural wealth and resources go into financing the ruling 
family, which is estimated to have at least 15,000 mem­
bers, while the ruler himself receives another 25 percent. 
The remaining 50 percent are allotted to the treasury.142
Public debate about this division of revenues is hardly 
existent, not least because Qatari citizens receive their 
shares indirectly through an all­encompassing welfare 
system, similar to that of the UAE.143 Citizens can receive 
additional benefits and gifts through direct appeal to the 
ruler’s court, which reinforces the ruler’s patronage sym­
bolically and practically.144 Demands for more political 
participation are almost unheard of, although elections 
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of the League’s traditional power brokers (Egypt, Syria, 
and Libya) due to the uprisings – gave Qatar prominence 
that was readily embraced by Emir Hamad and his closest 
advisor, Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, the country’s prime 
and foreign minister during that period.177 
Under Emir Hamad, Qatar’s response to the uprisings 
was based on several rationales that followed the well­
established Qatari strategy of differentiating itself from 
other Arab Gulf states. Through its new interventionist 
policies, Qatari leadership was able 1) to portray itself 
domestically and regionally as champion of the people’s 
right to self­determination while simultaneously divert­
ing attention from its own poor democratic record, 2) to 
brand Qatar internationally as an interlocutor between 
the “Arab street” and the West while distinguishing itself 
from the one­sided position taken by Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE, and 3) to seek new investment opportunities.
1) Portraying Qatar domestically and regionally as 
champion of the people’s right to self-determination: 
Publicly, Qatar based its engagement during the Arab 
upheavals on its constitution, Article 7 of which demands 
support for all people’s right to self­determination.178 
Emir Hamad seems to have felt that taking a principled 
stand at a critical point in Arab history would help Qatar 
achieve a greater regional role – and potentially divert 
international attention away from his country’s own poor 
democratic record.179 Qatar argues, however, that it did 
and does not favor parties or factions but that it works 
with legitimated governments. Where such legitimation 
is lacking – or questioned – Qatar offers its good offices 
to facilitate dialogue in order to enable the representa­
tion and political inclusion of relevant stakeholders.180 
However, it is beyond doubt that Al Jazeera’s manner of 
reporting on the events helped raise the profile of the ini­
tial uprisings as a whole and of certain actors in particu­
lar, while the matter of Qatar’s direct financial support for 
certain groups remains disputed.181 
A central question addressed in analyses of Qatar’s 
“siding” with the Muslim Brotherhood and similar Is­
lamist groups during the early phase of the Arab protests 
is whether Qatari leaders had ideological inclinations 
toward these movements. While some see Qatar’s shift 
in strategy as a rather opportunistic move that lacked 
long­term strategy, others point out that Qatar had little 
choice but to side with the MB, which had not partnered 
with other regional powers.182 Kamrava argues that Qatar 
chose what it considered “the lesser of two evils” with 
less potential for undermining Qatari stability in the long 
term.183 Andrew Hammond, however, draws attention 
to an important ideological aspect rooted in domestic 
politics: Although members of the Brotherhood had been 
living in Qatari exile for decades and were engaged in 
various sectors of the state, such as education, it was 
especially Emir Hamad who had used them to moderate 
the impact of the country’s own clerical base, which leans 
toward Wahhabism. According to Hammond, the 2011 
naming of Doha’s central mosque after Mohammed Ibn 
Abdul Wahhab (1703–1792) should not be interpreted as 
an effort on Qatar’s part to appease or flatter Saudi Arabia 
but rather as an attempt to represent “Qatar’s moderate 
Wahhabism – its Salafi­Brotherhood hybrid – as the true 
representative of Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s mes­
sage as a mujaddid [renewer] of the faith.”184 
Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that a 
relevant number of Qatari citizens as well as members of 
the ruling family are deeply religious and conservative 
and even sympathetic to the goals and ideas of Islamists 
and more radical Islamist groups.185 As in neighboring 
GCC countries, critics of the ruling family often target 
its Islamic credentials, which puts the leadership under 
pressure to conform to moral and religious expecta­
tions.186 Support for Islamist movements during the Arab 
uprisings offered Qatari leaders an opportunity to brand 
themselves as religious and moral donors, as with previ­
ous initiatives in favor of Islamic concerns like Palestine 
and on behalf of the Muslim poor via Islamic charities. 
Religious legitimation of Qatari foreign policy has helped 
the leaders divert attention from their dependence on 
and cooperation with non­Muslim powers and to thereby 
deprive domestic and regional critics of such ideological 
and religious arguments.187
2) Branding Qatar internationally as an interlocutor: 
Up until 2011, Qatar was perceived as more neutral than 
other Arab and Gulf states, for it had been less unilater­
ally engaged on behalf of the old regimes. Because Qatar 
enjoyed good relations with many representatives of Is­
lamist movements, the regional upheavals provided Qatar 
with an opportunity to present itself in Western eyes as 
an interlocutor with moderate Islamists. While countries 
like Saudi Arabia favored more conservative Salafi move­
ments, Qatar promised to encourage stability by using its 
influence on the Muslim Brotherhood and its offspring, 
which, as they argued, offered a stronger popular base 
than any other Islamist or secular or group.188 Through 
this, Qatar aimed to adopt a leading political role in the 
Arab world.189
3) Seeking new investment opportunities: Compared 
to countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar had 
not been overly engaged in investing revenues from its 
natural wealth in Arab countries prior to 2011. Especially 
means that Qatar actively pursues other security partner­
ships in addition to those with the US and Saudi Arabia.163
Changing alliances have been a trait of Qatari – or 
rather Al Thani­led – foreign policy for more than a 
decade, driven by the wish to maintain the country’s 
autonomy and protect its security. This was demonstrated, 
for example, by the family’s conversion to Wahhabi Islam 
in the early 20th century in order to receive support from 
the Saudi royal family against the Ottomans and against 
Abu Dhabi’s Al Nahyan. Shortly afterward, in 1916, it ac­
ceded to the British Trucial System.164 After the country’s 
independence in 1971 – but especially since the Iraqi inva­
sion of Kuwait in 1990 – Qatar has increasingly sought 
military support from the US.165 More recently, it has also 
been turning to Turkey and China in order to diversify its 
political and security partnerships.
Animosities between Saudi Arabia and Qatar can easily 
be understood when viewed against the background of 
repeated Saudi interventions in matters of Qatari suc­
cession. Tensions have grown further as a result of Emir 
Hamad bin Khalifa’s initiatives since 1995 to increase Qa­
tar’s regional role, differentiating itself for example from 
other regional powers by portraying Qatar as a progres­
sive force in the region.166 Qatar’s television network Al 
Jazeera, which enjoyed a large audience throughout the 
Arab world until the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, was 
an important instrument for this “branding” policy.167 
However, similar Qatari efforts to exert regional influ­
ence, for example via conflict mediation in Arab countries 
like Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen, were not seen favorably 
and were even undermined by Saudi Arabia, which is un­
willing to be overshadowed by Qatar or any other smaller 
GCC country. Qatar, very much like the UAE, does thus 
not feel that Saudi Arabia treats it as an equal, despite its 
economic growth and social achievements. With Saudi 
princes referring to Qatar not as a state but rather as “a 
family of 250,000–300,000,” Saudi Arabia does little to 
change this perception.168
Saudi­Qatari relations seem to have improved since 
power was handed over to Emir Tamim bin Khalifa in 
summer 2013. The new emir had previously been respon­
sible for the Saudi dossier for several years and – unlike 
his father – enjoyed good standing in Riyadh. Qatar’s rati­
fication of a contentious GCC security pact in August 2013 
and references by Qatar’s new foreign minister, Khaled Al 
Attiyah, to the importance of good relations with Saudi 
Arabia are signs of rapprochement, for these policies are 
better aligned with regard to Syria.169 However, differ­
ences on the Muslim Brotherhood (see chapter 2, sec­
tion 4) and Iran are also likely to challenge Saudi­Qatari 
relations in the future. Several recent references to these 
issues by Khaled Al­Attiyah foreshadow this.170 Similarly, 
intra­GCC tensions could continue, not least because 
the UAE in particular is not satisfied with the reconcilia­
tion reached with Qatar prior to the GCC Summit in late 
2014.171 In times of low oil prices, however, economic con­
siderations could well cause all GCC states to reconsider 
their positions on regional politics.172
4.2 Qatar and the Arab Uprisings
An analysis of Qatar’s response to the Arab uprisings and 
its policy toward the affected countries calls for differen­
tiation in two phases: the early phase of interventionist 
initiatives taken by Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani 
starting in early 2011 and lasting until his abdication 
in summer 2013; and the second phase of scaled­back 
policies under Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. The 
first of these two phases seems to have demonstrated a 
temporary shift away from Qatar’s prior foreign policy 
strategy, whereas the second shows a return.173 Already 
in 2011, analysts of Qatari politics pointed out that the 
Qatari leadership was showing signs of overstrain due 
to a lack of long­term strategies and a lack of a profes­
sional and sufficiently large diplomatic corps to follow up 
effectively on Emir Hamad’s initiatives.174 The transfer of 
power to Emir Tamim thus facilitated a readjustment of 
Qatar’s politics, the necessity of which had become appar­
ent before. Today Emir Tamim acts with the understand­
ing that Qatar’s leaders need to coordinate their actions 
more closely with Saudi Arabia and obtain that country’s 
approval. Qatar also invests in improving relations with 
other political actors in the region while continuing to 
stand firm on its demands for the political inclusion of 
Islamist forces in countries affected by the Arab uprisings.
Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar under Emir 
Hamad did not see the 2011 regional upheavals as a threat. 
The country enjoyed greater domestic stability than its 
GCC neighbors. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood – de­
spite the residence in Qatari exile of some of its influential 
representatives – did not have an active cell in Qatar. 
This might have led Qatar to underestimate the extent to 
which its GCC neighbors perceived the threat.175 Instead, 
Qatar viewed the uprisings as a unique opportunity to in­
crease its political and economic leverage in and beyond 
the MENA region.176 This led the country to shift abruptly 
toward a strategy of proactive intervention. But Qatar’s 
policies regarding the Arab countries experiencing upris­
ings did not take place in a vacuum; rather, they followed 
Qatar’s vital interests. The fact that Qatar held the presi­
dency of the Arab League – plus the concurrent weakness 
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in Egypt, Qatar did not have relevant financial and eco­
nomic stakes in influencing politics and political actors. 
The events of 2011 and the removal of former strongmen 
thus provided Qatar with new investment opportunities 
for its sovereign wealth fund QIA, and these were ex­
pected to result in more political influence in the affected 
countries.190 The fact that Qatar had not invested heavily 
in Egypt before summer 2013 also meant that limiting its 
engagement in Egypt after the removal of President Morsi 
from power hardly harmed Qatar’s economic stakes in 
Egypt.
4.3 Outlook: Qatari Foreign Policy under Emir Tamim bin 
Hamad Al Thani
Domestically, Qatar seems more stable than ever, as 
demonstrated by the smooth accession to power of Emir 
Tamim. In terms of regional politics, however, it still 
struggles with its “brand,” which suffered from Emir 
Hamad’s interventionist response to the Arab protests 
between 2011 and 2013. Shedding some of this newer 
political baggage will be necessary in order to continue 
its foreign policy strategy resting on good relations with a 
large number of states and non­state actors.191 
Despite the recent rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, 
which is pointing to a closer alignment of Qatar’s for­
eign policy with the GCC, the country’s foreign policy is 
nevertheless likely to remain somewhat unpredictable to 
outsiders due to the country’s aspirations to be a regional 
power and ultimately a player in international politics.192 
A lack of insight into tight­knit Qatari decision­making 
circles on the part of outsiders further complicates predic­
tions. The Saudi influence on Qatar will remain restricted, 
for Qatar, much like the UAE, is interested in carving out 
its role as a regional actor independent of Saudi Arabia’s 
influence. Qatar is thus likely to continue– to a certain 
extent – to pursue policies that question Saudi political 
hegemony and Saudi claims to represent the GCC as a 
whole.193 Furthermore, the leverage of Western states 
on Qatar will be limited as long as the country’s main 
economic partners – and, as a consequence, its political 
partners – are in Asia. Qatar’s search for new gas markets, 
however, could provide windows of opportunity for closer 
dialogue with Western states.
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1. Gulf Support for Egypt prior to 2011
Egypt has always been a country of great importance 
to the Gulf states. Its geostrategic position, its political 
influence in the Arab world, the size of its military, and 
the potential of its market are all contributing factors. 
In some of these fields, Egypt and the Gulf states have 
formed strong and sustainable partnerships, whereas in 
others they have viewed each other as rivals. 
The following chapter analyzes the interests of Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar in Egypt and 
contextualizes their efforts and measures in Egypt since 
2011. This forms the necessary basis for the assessment 
at the end of this chapter of the impact of these mea­
sures on democratization and inclusive socioeconomic 
change. Due to its geographic and demographic size – 
with a population of almost 90 million (see fig. 1) – but 
also because of its shared borders with Israel, Egypt has 
always enjoyed financial and political support from Gulf 
countries.1 This was even the case under Egypt’s Presi­
dent Gamal Abdel Nasser (r. 1952/54–1970), when political 
ideologies were supported that conflicted with those of 
the Gulf states.2 In general, financial assistance from the 
Gulf in order to support Egypt’s economic stability never 
stopped, although political tension has occurred several 
times in recent decades. As Arab donors consider Egypt to 
be a middle­income country, official financial assistance 
to Egypt by Gulf states in the past was offered mainly in 
the form of loans.3 In addition to providing development 
assistance, Gulf businesses, both private and state owned, 
have become heavily invested in Egypt’s economy over 
the past decades. These investments were driven on the 
one hand by the expectation of high financial returns due 
to the sheer size of the Egyptian market. On the other 
hand, Gulf states sought to influence economic globaliza­
tion processes in the region in their interest by diversify­
ing their domestic economies, which are driven by oil, 
and to strengthen their business relations with countries 
such as Egypt in order to overcome dependence on West­
ern partners such as Europe or the US.4 
While Saudi Arabia established close business ties to their 
Egyptian counterparts as early as the end of the 19th century, 
the smaller Gulf states such as Kuwait and the UAE have been 
relatively new economic players on the Egyptian market. Qa­
tar only became a significantly active player on the Egyptian 
market when Hosni Mubarak was removed from power and 
the Muslim Brotherhood­dominated government of President 
Mohamed Morsi was in place between 2012 and 2013.
Figure 1: Demographic data for Egypt in 2014
Population 86,895,099
Age structure
0–14 years: 32.1% 
15–24 years: 17.8%
25–54 years: 38.4%
55–64 years: 6.7%
65 years and over: 5%
Median age
Total population: 25.1 years
Male: 24.7 years
Female: 25.4 years
Population growth 
rate 1.84%
Life expectancy at 
birth:
Total population: 73.45 years
Male: 70.82 years
Female: 76.2 years
Total fertility rate 2.87 children born per woman
Source: The World Factbook, “Egypt,” May 27, 2015 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publica­
tions/the­world­factbook/geos/eg.html> (accessed June 11, 2015)
2. Saudi Arabia and Egypt after 2011: 
Interests, Efforts, and Future Prospects
2.1 Saudi Interests in Egypt after 2011
The Saudi government under the late King Abdullah  
(r. 2005–2015) viewed the fall of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak 
in 2011 and the subsequent electoral victories of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) with great concern because it 
threatened Saudi interests in Egypt. Those interests are: 
1) stopping the expansion of democratically legitimized 
political Islam, 2) containing Iran and Shiism, 3) main­
taining Egypt’s ability to offer protection to Saudi Arabia 
through military manpower, 4) preserving Saudi eco­
nomic interests, and 5) reinstating Saudi supremacy as a 
regional power broker.5
1) Stopping the expansion of democratically legitimized 
political Islam: For decades, political Islam has been a 
challenge to the ideology of Saudi­Wahhabi rule. Saudi 
Arabia’s leadership under the late King Abdullah thus had 
an interest in the Morsi government’s failure in Egypt 
because of “the triple combination of Islamic governance 
based on forms of electoral representation, nonsectarian 
ideological commitments, and possible American sup­
port,” to quote Bernard Haykel.6 A sustainable Islamist 
government under Morsi could have resulted in anti­ 
monarchical spillover, destabilizing the Saudi rulers’  
legitimacy at home. This perception is widely shared 
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Morsi instituted mutual cooperation with Qatar, which 
had presented itself as a strong supporter of the MB for 
decades, especially after 2011. Saudi rulers perceived 
this with great concern, intensifying the rift with Qatar 
within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).23 Although 
Egypt’s rapprochement with Iran took place at a very low 
and non­strategic level, King Abdullah was not able to 
overcome his deep skepticism about the new Egyptian ad­
ministration, although Morsi tried to build up a relation­
ship of mutual trust with the Saudi leadership, as evident 
in his visit to Riyadh soon after his election.24 
3) Maintaining Egypt’s ability to offer protection to 
Saudi Arabia through military manpower: Both countries 
have closely cooperated in the military sector for decades, 
particularly during Mubarak’s reign. Egypt has served as 
a military protective shield for Saudi Arabia in times of 
external challenges such as the Iranian threat. This is due 
to its large quantity of soldier manpower and its reputa­
tion as the only functioning and efficient army in the Arab 
world. The strong military cooperation continued even 
after 2011 and despite tense relations with the Morsi ad­
ministration. The annual exercises “Morgan” and “Faisal” 
(the biggest joint military exercise in May 2013 during 
Morsi’s rule), as well as joint military training in Tabuk in 
the northwest of Saudi Arabia, testified to Saudi Arabia’s 
pragmatism over political and ideological ambiguities 
when security concerns come into consideration.25 
4) Preserving Saudi economic interests: The fall of 
Mubarak in Egypt also had widespread consequences for 
the Saudi business community’s interests. Saudi business­
men had been active in Egypt for decades, as Egypt is 
the largest consumer market in the region, geostrategi­
cally well situated as a logistical and economic hub to 
the Sub­Saharan countries and Europe. Egypt is also 
geographically close to the Hijaz region of western Saudi 
Arabia, which includes the city of Jeddah, the kingdom’s 
most important trade center. Some bilateral business 
networks can be traced back to the end of the 19th cen­
tury, when members of important Egyptian merchants’ 
families came to the Hijaz in order to visit Mecca and 
Medina for pilgrimage (hajj), and then settled in Jed­
dah and started trade activities from there.26 Since then, 
close trading networks have been established through 
intermarriages (e.g. of the Babtain or Juhayni families), 
migration to or from Egypt, and joint projects in the 
construction or agricultural sector. Also noteworthy is the 
tremendous involvement of Egyptian businessmen in the 
infrastructural development of Mecca and Jeddah since 
the middle of the 20th century, e.g. by Talaat Pasha Harb 
(1876–1941), the founder of the Egyptian Misr Bank, who 
initiated many economic projects in Saudi Arabia in the 
1930s and 1940s.27 On the Saudi side, famous merchant 
families such as the Jamjun clan initiated trade projects 
with Egypt as early as the 1870s. These longstanding ties 
have stood the test of time no matter what diplomatic 
conflicts occurred between the two governments. Saudi 
businessmen, especially entrepreneurs operating from 
Jeddah, have generally followed their business interests 
independent of political decisions and government inter­
ests. These days, they often use direct access to Egyptian 
political decision makers.28
5) Reinstating Saudi supremacy as a regional power 
broker: The fall of the MB in Egypt also meant an end to 
Qatar’s strong influence in Egypt. Saudi Arabia welcomed 
this as an opportunity to reinstall itself as the “true 
leader” of the Muslim world as well as within the GCC.29
2.2 Saudi Efforts in Egypt after 2011
Under the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF) until June 2012, and especially after the 
removal of Morsi in July 2013 by the Egyptian military 
under General Abdel­Fattah el­Sisi, Saudi Arabia became 
the strongest partner of post­Mubarak Egypt.30 It did so 
by 1) providing financial support for regime stabilization, 
2) through private economic activities, 3) via the poli­
tical and economic influence of non­governmental and 
semi­governmental Saudi players, 4) through measures to 
solve legal disputes on economic transactions, and 5) by 
securing Wahhabi influence.
1) Financial support for regime stabilization: In order 
to preserve the interests mentioned above, Saudi Ara­
bia disbursed tremendous sums in financial assistance 
in the form of loans, grants, and energy subsidies. This 
began even soon after the removal of Mubarak in order 
to prevent Egypt’s insolvency.31 Of course, financial 
assistance was aimed at stabilizing the current regime 
rather than supporting political transition toward more 
political freedom and democratization. To this end, the 
Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) granted soft loans 
in 2011 and 2012 such as 430 million USD for financing 
development projects in Egypt in different sectors. These 
included housing, water, irrigation, sanitation, electricity 
supply, energy, health, and a credit line to finance non­oil 
products worth 750 million to bridge the budget deficit 
in May 2011;32 a deposit of 1 billion to the Central Bank 
in May 2012; and a further 500 million as treasury bonds 
and bills in June 2012.33 A sum of 200 million aimed to 
foster SME establishments was also provided by the SFD 
in the Egyptian Development Program supervised by 
the Ministry of International Cooperation as well as 250 
among the Saudi elite because millions of Egyptian  
migrants live and work in the kingdom and have injected 
the ideology of the MB into parts of Saudi society in re­
cent decades.7 It should be also noted that migration from 
Egypt to Saudi Arabia is a historical phenomenon.8 All in 
all, Saudi Arabia is the primary destination for about 37 
percent of all Egyptian migrants (see also fig. 2).9 
Figure 2: Egyptians living abroad
Male Female
Gulf Cooperation Council �GCC) 54% 59%
Other Arab countries 12% 4%
Europe 17% 7%
Other OECD countries 17% 30%
Source: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre, 2014
These Egyptian migrant workers account for 5.7 billion 
USD in remittances from Saudi Arabia to Egypt, while to­
tal revenues of remittances of 18 billion in 2013 constitute 
roughly eight percent of the Egyptian GDP.10 The same 
year, Saudi Arabia ranked first, with a share of 42.7 per­
cent of remittance­sending countries, followed by Kuwait 
(21.3 percent) and the UAE (12.2 percent).11 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, young Saudis were edu­
cated with school curricula inspired by Egyptian teachers 
affiliated with MB ideology when the movement had been 
banned under Egypt’s President Nasser.12 As Nasser’s 
strong Egyptian nationalism – which was combined with 
secular elements of socialism and expansionist pan­
Arabism, including anti­monarchical tendencies – posed 
a viable ideological threat to Saudi Arabia during this 
time, bilateral relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
deteriorated. This went hand in hand with a massive 
influx to Saudi Arabia of Egyptian dissidents who had to 
flee abroad – including members of the MB. After their 
arrival in the kingdom, MB members started to establish 
a Saudi­based network. They created the “backbone of 
the modernization of the kingdom” by working as teach­
ers, engineers, and political advisors throughout the 
newly founded state institutions such as ministries and 
investment authorities.13 The influx of Egyptian Islamists 
was thus for some time perceived in positive terms by the 
Saudi leadership, as the lack of qualified Saudi teachers 
and administrative officials was gradually corrected by 
highly qualified Egyptian migrants (and other Sunni 
Arabs from across the region). Furthermore, “the Saudis 
needed an Islamic ideology to systematically oppose 
Nasser’s Arab Nationalism, yet the Wahhabi ulama were 
too traditional to build one out of Wahhabism. So the MB 
were put in charge of the whole Saudi counterpropaganda 
apparatus”14 against rising Baathist, Socialist, and nation­
alist influences within Saudi Arabia.15 
The MB’s ideology has nonetheless aimed from the 
start at removing Arab monarchies and hereditary dynas­
ties from power and replacing them with an Islamist 
transnational political system.16 Hence, the Saudi leader­
ship subsequently began to perceive the growing sympa­
thies for the MB – led by Sayyid Qutb’s brother, Mohamed, 
who was professor of the Umm al­Qura University in 
Mecca from 1971 onward17– with suspicion and as a chal­
lenge to its own legitimacy. In the 1990s, a rising Islamist 
opposition within Saudi Arabia (al-Sahwa al-Islamiya, or 
“Islamic Awakening”) was accused of being influenced by 
Muslim Brothers in Saudi Arabia.18 The Sahwa movement 
demanded political reforms such as the installation of a 
constitutional monarchy, more individual freedoms, and 
the removal of corrupt administrators. As Haykel states, 
“the regime saw these claims not only as a form of betrayal 
by a former protégé but more significantly as an attempt 
by the Brotherhood to seize the reins of power in the 
name of Islam.”19 The Saudi rulers’ relationship with the 
MB further deteriorated in 1990 after Saddam Hussein 
invaded Kuwait, an action supported by the Islamists but 
strongly opposed by the Saudi royal family.20 
Since 2011, influential and prominent religious figures 
inspired by the MB such as Salman al­Awdah, the leader 
of the Sahwa movement, have expressed their sympathies 
with the Arab uprisings. In 2012, al­Awdah called for a 
“hybrid discourse that engages with the inevitability of po­
litical change,” which the late King Abdullah harshly sup­
pressed when he prohibited the publication of al­Awdah’s 
book Asilat al-Thawra. According to Madawi Al­Rasheed, 
“unlike the majority of official Salafi ulama, al­Awdah 
anchored peaceful collective revolutionary action in an 
Islamic framework and reached out for humanist inter­
pretations that assimilate Western intellectual positions 
with this Salafi background.”21 The royal family regarded 
this as a threat to its power and supremacy.
2) Containing Iran and Shiism: Highlighting Egypt’s 
role as part of an axis of Sunni­Arab nations has always 
been important for Saudi Arabia in order to contain Iran’s 
influence in the region. Thus, the cautious Egyptian­Ira­
nian rapprochement initiated by Morsi seriously worried 
Saudi Arabia, as this conflicted with Saudi geopolitical 
reasoning in which Saudi religious and political rivalry 
with Iran features prominently. For instance, this rap­
prochement was demonstrated by successive high­level 
meetings between officials of both states.22 In addition, 
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Figure 5: Egypt’s trade volume with selected Gulf coun�
tries �in million USD) 2014–15
Country Total Exports Imports
Saudi Arabia 3,305.2 595.2 2,710.0
UAE 3,016.6 1,285.5 1,731.4
Kuwait 1,509.2 58.0 1,451.2
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Statistical Bulletin, March 2015
In 2014 total Saudi investment in Egypt amounted to 
27 percent of the Arab total investment in Egypt, invested 
in 2,743 projects, which means that the kingdom is the 
second largest investor in Egypt from the Gulf (see also 
fig. 6) after the UAE.48 Saudi Arabian companies hold the 
largest proportion of investments from the Gulf. Due to 
the structural set­up of these investments, however, their 
scope is often not visible.
Figure 6: Net foreign direct investments from Gulf coun�
tries in Egypt �in million USD) from 2009–10 to 2013–14
Country 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14
Saudi 
Arabia
323.4 206.3 240.4 191.7 284.4
UAE 303.5 410.8 559.8 480.6 410.2
Kuwait 188.7 58.6 63.5 46.4 129.6
Qatar 70.4 191.5 34.9 375.6 109.1
Bahrain 64.1 66.2 152.5 262.7 193.7
Oman 9.8 11.9 13.3 10.9 13.4
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Statistical Bulletin, January 2014
They are mainly investing in projects in industry, real 
estate, finance, tourism, construction, agriculture, petro­ 
chemicals, services and telecommunications. Official 
statistics for sector­related Saudi investment are not avail­
able, however. When non­official estimates are taken into 
consideration, it seems most likely that Saudi investors 
are more than 60 percent engaged in tourism, real estate, 
and construction projects, while tourism and agriculture/
agribusiness constitute another 25 percent, followed by 
the remaining sectors such as petrochemicals or finance, 
with 15 percent.49 
The most controversial Saudi­initiated mega projects 
have been the installation of a common electricity grid 
between both states, the construction of a connecting 
bridge between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the involve­
ment of the Saudi investor Prince Alwaleed bin Talal in 
the agricultural project Toshka. All of these projects were 
announced under Mubarak several years ago. However, 
substantial progress on them has not yet been achieved 
due to legal disputes, lack of financing, bilateral political 
disputes, and unrealistic expectations. As a result, these 
“white elephants” show little sign of being sustainable, 
well­planned projects. (For an overview of Saudi­initiated 
projects in Egypt see fig. 7, p. 28.) 
Although it sounds surprising, some Saudi business­
men even expressed their discontent with the removal 
of Morsi. They had hoped for efforts by the MB to fight 
corruption and cronyism, as the Saudi private business 
community enjoys considerable political independence. 
The MB’s willingness to vigorously fight the lack of trans­
parency, corruption, and Mubarak­fashioned patronage 
networks by putting long­lasting contracts under test 
generally met with sympathy within the Saudi business 
community, which hoped to benefit from reforms within 
the economic and bureaucratic structure. 50 Hence, pri­
vate Saudi investments did not stop during the Morsi gov­
ernment. At the end of 2013, Saudi investments in Egypt 
amounted to 2.5 billion USD, while the trade volume was 
5 billion – indicating no fundamental change in compari­
son to the period before 2011.51
3) The political and economic influence of non-govern-
mental and semi-governmental Saudi players: In addition 
to Saudi private businessmen, non­governmental players 
and semi­governmental players (with strong involvement 
of influential Saudi private business players) are also 
exerting influence via their longstanding ties to members 
of the old elites within the Egyptian business community, 
the military, and the current government. “In general, 
the Saudi government is not involved directly when the 
chambers of commerce bring partners together,” ex­
plained a Saudi businessman.52 
Among these organizations are the Jeddah Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries (JCCI); the Riyadh Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries (RCCI); and the Federation of 
Saudi Chambers; the bilateral Egyptian­Saudi Business 
Association (ESBA), founded in December 2013 by JCCI 
and the General Federation of Egyptian Chambers of 
Commerce (FEDCOC)53; and Saudi conglomerates owned 
by prominent merchant families such as az­Zamil, Bin 
Ladin, Salih Kamil, or al­Juffali. The Saudi business com­
munity’s strong influence on the Egyptian economy was 
also shown in the lead­up to the EEDC in Sharm el Sheikh 
in March 2015. 
Together with the UAE, the Federation of Saudi 
Chambers and ESBA, chaired by Saudi business tycoon 
Sheikh Salih Kamel, were involved as co­organizers of 
the conference.54 At the end of the conference, a total 
of 142 billion USD were mobilized by the Egyptian side 
in forms of investment agreements of 33 billion, memo­
randums of understanding (MoUs) with a volume of 92 
billion, and aid and grants of 17 billion (including 12.5 
million as oil subsidies.34 In February 2014, the Egyptian 
administration stated that the influx of Gulf financial 
assistance had increased economic growth to 3.5 percent, 
while economic growth was only one percent in the sec­
ond half of 2013.35
After Morsi’s removal, Saudi Arabia pledged financial 
assistance of 5 billion USD to stabilize Egypt’s deteriorat­
ing economy. Aid took the form of a non­interest deposit 
of 2 billion (with a five­year duration) to the Central 
Bank of Egypt (CBE), donations of 1 billion, and gas and 
oil support of 2 billion.36 In 2014, a 350­million bilateral 
energy deal was signed. 37 Additionally, 4 billion have 
been pledged as 1 billion in deposits to the CBE and 3 
billion toward development assistance and investment. 
These pledges were made during the Egyptian Economic 
Development Conference (EEDC) in March 2015 at Sharm 
el Sheikh (see fig. 3).38 
Figure 3: Financial Assistance to Egypt, 2011–15 �in USD)
Total) Form of assistance
2011–12: 
4 billion 
Deposit in CBE: 1 billion
Treasury bonds: 500 million
Line of credit for non­oil products: 750 million
Oil subsidies: 250 million
SME support: 200 million
Development assistance loans: 430 million 
2013–14:  
5 billion 
Interest­free loan in CBE: 2 billion
Oil and gas subsidies: 2 billion
Cash: 1 billion 
2014:  
350 million 
Financing of two electricity stations projects in 
Damietta and El­Shabab: 100 million
Petroleum exports: 250 million 
2015:  
4 billion at EEDC
Deposit in CBE: 1 billion
Investments and development aid: 3 billion 
Source: see endnotes 32–38 
The influx of Saudi money was to a large extent part 
of a political understanding between Saudi Arabia’s 
and Egypt’s leaders, as both were interested in crack­
ing down on the MB.39 For a certain period of time, the 
financial assistance was thus judged to be a “win­win 
situation” for both Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s new leader­
ship.40 However, taking money from abroad became a 
double­edged sword for Egypt’s economic recovery. On 
the one hand, Sisi bought time to manage the currency 
depreciation smoothly, but on the other hand, future 
economic recovery could be hampered if Egypt’s gov­
ernment is to avoid cutting subsidies and implementing 
other economic reforms.41 Furthermore, criticism has 
spread among Egyptian social media activists and re­
searchers who have accused the government of “selling” 
the country to the Gulf region.42 
Similar reservations about ongoing financial sup­
port have also emerged in Saudi Arabia. Challenged by 
decreasing oil revenues due to the low price of oil, high 
domestic energy consumption,43 and rising discontent 
within the domestic population, which suffers from 
high youth unemployment (30 percent), financial as­
sistance to the Sisi administration is seen as a “financial 
burden” from the Saudi perspective.44 There is a degree 
of alarm at the extent of Saudi financial and economic 
assistance and a sense that Egypt may turn out to be 
a “bottomless pit” requiring constant and long­term 
support.45 Calls for halting assistance to Egypt were 
widespread and are manifested for example in a Twit­
ter campaign in summer 2013 called “Salaries are not 
enough.”46 
2) Private economic activities: Saudi Arabia’s private 
business community has a keen interest in a stable, 
secure, and investment­friendly Egyptian market in the 
long term. Demands for economic reforms of the type 
made by the UAE are less important for Saudi Arabia. In 
total, 3,302 Saudi companies are said to have been ac­
tive in the Egyptian market in 2014, most of them work­
ing via local sub­contractors, middlemen, or branches 
of multi­sectoral conglomerates.47 In fiscal year 2013–14, 
the trade volume reached 3.25 billion USD (exports: 420 
million, imports: 2.83 billion) and rose to 3.31 billion in 
fiscal year 2014–15 (exports: 595.2 million, imports: 2.71 
billion) (see fig. 4). Saudi Arabia is thus Egypt’s main 
Gulf trade partner (see fig. 5).
Figure 4: Egypt’s trade volume with Saudi Arabia �in mil�
lion USD) from 2013–14 to 2014–15
Fiscal Year Total Exports Imports
2013–14 3,251 420 2,831
2014–15 3,305 595.2 2,710
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Statistical Bulletin, March 2015
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billion from Gulf States).68 Over 1,500 delegates from 52 
countries attended the conference. With 414 delegates 
participating, Egypt had the largest participation, reach­
ing 41 percent of the total. The UAE came next, with 141 
delegates or 14 percent of the total, while Saudi Arabia 
had the third largest participation, with 57 delegates 
attending, reaching six percent of the total number of 
participants.69 
4) Measures to solve legal disputes on economic transac-
tions: Under Morsi, several Saudi infrastructure and con­
struction projects started under Mubarak were brought 
to a halt when the Morsi government decided to nation­
alize them. From one day to the next, billions of dollars 
of Saudi investment were in danger – a situation unac­
ceptable to both the Saudi business community and the 
Saudi political elite. In total, there were 28 legal disputes 
between the Morsi government and Saudi entrepreneurs, 
which has caused bitter resentment from the Saudi side.70 
The concerned firms controlled nearly 2.15 billion USD 
in Saudi assets, accounting for around 61.6 percent of all 
stalled Saudi investments in Egypt.71 The businessmen 
were accused of bribery to manipulate Egypt’s tenders 
and auctions law. For their part, Saudi investors demand­
ed compensation for the nationalization of their assets 
and threatened to otherwise withdraw their invested 
capital from Egypt. These included five Saudi investors 
who established the Foras Company at the end of 2013 
with a paid up capital of 2.67 million USD. They intended 
to raise it to roughly 20 million should the Egyptian 
government satisfy their requests and abolish the legal 
disputes.72 As a consequence, the Egyptian ministry of in­
vestment and the Saudi embassy set up a joint committee 
to solve legal disputes between Saudi investors and the 
Egyptian government. In addition, the Egyptian ministry 
of investment and the Saudi embassy closely cooperated 
and opened a special office to examine complaints and 
worries of Saudi investors.73 As a result, all these cases 
were settled out of court by March 2014. Nine additional 
cases have been resolved since the Sisi administration 
took office, showing the deep involvement of Saudi busi­
nessmen in the Egyptian market and their strong ties with 
Egypt’s political institutions.74 As one Saudi businessmen 
stated, “if I have a legal problem in Egypt, I will meet my 
Egyptian partners in politics and they will resolve the 
issue as I wished to.”75
5) Securing Wahhabi influence: Several governmental 
and non­governmental actors from Saudi Arabia have 
been active for decades in spreading Wahhabism through­
out the Islamic world and beyond.76 Nonetheless, the 
precise extent to which the Saudi government plays an 
active part in promoting the Wahhabi discourse in Egypt 
is not clear.77 However, Egyptian Islamic scholars as well 
as migrant workers influenced by Wahhabism during 
their work stays in Saudi Arabia have inspired segments 
of Egyptian society. Over time, the influence also grew 
within the prominent theological university Al Azhar, as 
Laurent Murawiec stated: “Toward the end of the 1990s, 
it was hard to find an Azhari who had not enjoyed Saudi 
largesse.”78 Saudi Arabia feared that this influence might 
be curtailed by initiatives of the MB in power. It is likely 
that Saudi Arabia exerted pressure on its Egyptian reli­
gious and political partners not to curtail the influence 
of Wahhabism within Al Azhar (whatever its extent may 
be). No information on such steps is available, making it 
difficult to substantiate concrete efforts. However, there 
is a widespread discourse within the Egyptian population 
that Saudi Arabia is working to “Wahhabize” Egyptian 
Islam via various religious and non­religious channels, 
including the media.79 
2.3 Future Prospects for the Egyptian-Saudi Relationship 
King Salman and his closest political partners – these 
include his son Mohammed (who was designated Minister 
of Defense in January 2015 and deputy crown prince in 
May 2015), and the new Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Nayef (interior minister and first grandson of the state 
founder in line of succession) – will not generally turn 
away from their traditional partner, Egypt.80 However, 
the bilateral relationship with Egypt may undergo sev­
eral modifications under the new Saudi monarch, King 
Salman. There are several contributing factors: King 
Salman’s interest in a possible reintegration of the MB, 
Egyptian disapproval of Saudi military action in Yemen, 
the shift from unconditional Saudi financial assistance 
to more conditional, project­focused support, personal 
animosity, and, finally, mutual skepticism within society.
King Salman is interested in a possible reintegration of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. King Salman wants to cooperate 
with Turkey and Qatar in order to counter ISIS in Iraq and 
Bashar al­Assad in Syria.81 Hence, he might be interested 
in reintegrating Egypt’s MB in order to appease pro­
Islamist Qatar and Turkey.82 In March 2015, King Salman 
received Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in  
Riyadh to discuss further security and military coopera­
tion and the support for insurgents fighting Assad in 
Syria.83 The Turkish­Saudi settlement resulted in found­
ing a joint command center in the northeastern Syrian 
province of Idlib.84 By May 2015, Saudi Arabia had started 
to coordinate with groups affiliated with the MB in Syria, 
with Turkish support, in order to fight Assad’s troops.85 
Figure 7: Saudi�initiated projects in Egypt �overview)
Project Name Detailed 
Information
Volume �in USD) Saudi Project 
partner
Egyptian project 
partner
Date of 
agreement 
Announced 
Completion
International Ten­
der offer for Joint 
Saudi­Egyptian 
Electricity Grid55
A 20­km under­
water transmissi­
on line to transfer 
gas between the 
two countries at 
peak times for 
each country at 
a maximum of 
3,000 MW
Egypt:  
570–600 million
Saudi Arabia:  
1 billion56
n/a n/a August 2014 2015–1657
Bridge 
Construction58
3 billion Saudi Binladin 
Group
Arab Constructors 
Toshka / New 
Valley Project59
A system of ca­
nals to carry water 
from Lake Nasser 
to irrigate the san­
dy wastes of the 
western desert of 
Egypt60
Investments of 
KADC: 
52.21 million
Planned 
investments: 
7.8 million per year 
until 201961
Kingdom Agri­
cultural Develop­
ment Co. (unit of 
Kingdom Holding 
Co.) (owner: Saudi 
businessman 
Prince Alwaleed 
bin Talal)
Egyptian 
government
1997 n/a
MoU to develop 
4,000MW of coal­
fired power gene­
ration facilities62
The coal facilities 
will be developed 
under an indepen­
dent power pro­
ject (IPP) model
7 billion Acwa Power Egyptian Elec­
tricity Holding 
Company (EEHC)
March 2015 
(at EEDC)63
2022
MoU to develop 
combined­cycle 
and renewable 
energy projects64
The projects 
include 2,000MW 
of conventional 
combined­cycle 
power plants, 
1,000MW of solar 
power facilities 
and also wind 
power facilities
6 billion Acwa Power 
(together with 
Masdar, UAE)
Egyptian Elec­
tricity Holding 
Company (EEHC)
March 2015 
(at EEDC)
n/a
MoU for two major 
mixed­use and re­
sidential projects 
on the outskirts of 
Cairo65
A 500­acre real 
estate project in 
New Cairo
A 470­acre real 
estate project in 
6th of October 
City 
3 billion
2.7 billion
Sisban Holdings Mountain View, 
Ministry of 
Housing (land 
acquisition)
March 2015 
(at EEDC)
n/a
Suez Canal Corri­
dor Development 
Project (SCCDP)66
Development 
of logistics and 
industry in Suez 
Canal Zone 
(SCZone)
4bn USD Saudi branch of 
Jordan­Lebanese 
consultancy Dar 
Al­Handasah 
(Shair and 
Partners)
Egyptian Army August 2014 2016
Dairy 
investments67
Most of the money 
would come from 
equity injections 
by the joint 
venture partners 
in line with their 
ownership ratios
345m USD Dairy Company 
Almarai
US PepsiCo June 2014 by 2019
Source: See endnotes 55–67
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Vice­king (Khedive) of Egypt, and the devastating defeat 
of the Saudi troops followed by the Egyptian capture of 
the Najd from 1818–22 and 1838–43.106 Thus, “Good and 
bad things come from Egypt.”107 While Saudis are some­
times described as “the Brits of the Middle East” (charac­
terized as conservative and reserved), the Egyptians are 
seen as “the French,” somehow talkative, enthusiastic, 
and not very well organized.108 Beside this critical view of 
Egyptians, Saudi people certainly also show deep appreci­
ation for Egyptian culture, have been influenced by Egyp­
tian TV shows in the past, and rally around the Egyptian 
soccer team during international tournaments.109
3. The United Arab Emirates and Egypt after 2011: 
Interests, Efforts, and Future Prospects
3.1 Emirati Interests in Egypt after 2011
The UAE viewed the political developments in Egypt 
starting in 2011 with the fall of the Mubarak regime and 
leading to the electoral victories of the Muslim Brother­
hood (MB) with great concern. This is because those 
changes challenged and even threatened a number of 
UAE interests. Due to the UAE’s longstanding strategic 
financial and political investments in Egypt, complex in­
terdependencies between the two countries had evolved 
that affected how the UAE chose to engage in Egypt after 
2011.110
The UAE’s engagement in Egypt has been led by 1) a 
desire to undermine the potential influence of political 
Islam as a competing political ideology, 2) a need to safe­
guard the UAE’s security in the face of regional instability, 
3) a wish to strengthen the role and image of the UAE as a 
power broker in the region, and 4) an interest in securing 
pre­existing investments and to open new markets.
1) The desire to undermine political Islam’s potential 
influence as a political ideology: Political Islam as repre­
sented by the MB is perceived by the UAE leadership as a 
threat to its political order (see chapter 1, section 3). Rela­
tions between the UAE and the MB deteriorated quickly 
after the outbreak of protests in Egypt in early 2011, dur­
ing which the UAE sided with Hosni Mubarak.111 But in 
fact, relations with the MB had been tense ever since the 
1980s. The UAE had become concerned about the MB’s 
influence within the educational and religious sector of 
the UAE, where many political dissidents from Egypt had 
found work. UAE leaders perceived this as a form of be­
trayal because they had expected loyalty and gratitude for 
the asylum they had provided to members of the MB.112 
As a response, they cracked down on the MB’s Emirati 
branch, Al Islah, in the early 1990s; members of Al Islah 
were removed from governmental and teaching positions 
and banned from preaching in mosques.113 Those notions 
of betrayal by the MB were quickly revived in the light of 
the developments that began in 2011 and have reentered 
the UAE’s political discourse.114 
In order to contain the influence of political Islam, it 
is in the UAE’s interest to either prevent the movement 
from acceding to power again or cause it to fail when it is 
in power. In fact, by framing the conflict with the MB as 
a problem of “if you win, we lose,” as Sultan al­Qassemi 
puts it, the UAE has been less accommodating in its re­
sponse to the MB than Saudi Arabia.115 Domestically, the 
UAE fears that Emirati nationals, especially in the poorer 
emirates, will be instigated by political Islam through 
transnational propaganda – but also through migrant 
Arab workers in the UAE, although these only constitute 
8.7 per cent of the overall migrant population in the coun­
try.116 Among these, however, Egyptians figure promi­
nently and are estimated to number between 300,000 
and 400,000.117 Both sides denied rumors that the UAE 
temporarily restricted the renewal of residence permits 
of Egyptian workers when the MB was in power in Egypt. 
Given the strong negative reaction to the MB by UAE of­
ficials, however, this was clearly held to be plausible, and 
the rumors thus caused widespread alarm.118
2) The need to safeguard UAE security against regional 
instability: The UAE views regional stability as central to 
its security. It is therefore in its interest to keep Egypt  
and its social and political conflicts under control in order 
to prevent spillover effects to countries closer to the Gulf 
region or the Gulf itself. This also frees UAE capacities 
to deal with other, potentially more urgent crises in the 
region. 
Furthermore, the UAE views Egyptian stability as 
central to its economic growth, which is significant for 
upholding the UAE’s political and social order (as out­
lined in chapter 1, section 3). Many goods going through 
Emirati harbors are also passing through the Suez Canal, 
and UAE enterprises are strongly invested in infrastruc­
ture and companies that offer services along the Suez 
Canal and the Egyptian Red Sea Coast.119 Stability in 
and around Egypt is also important to the UAE because 
Egypt serves as a hub for UAE economic activities in other 
African countries, especially for agribusinesses in Sudan 
and Ethiopia.120
Finally, Egypt figures prominently in the UAE’s politi­
cal discourse on security, power, and hegemony. This 
discourse is targeted against Iran as well as against Arab 
actors and movements that challenge the existing geopo­
litical order of states and regimes in the Gulf region. The 
With regard to Qatar, King Salman is considered to be a 
friend of Qatar’s new emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. 
This could also change the former Saudi anti­MB policy 
because their personal friendship could further lead to 
a Saudi­Qatari modus vivendi by dealing with Islamist 
movements across the region. At present, the Egyptian 
side regards this new Saudi pro­MB strategy with great 
concern; it has caused rifts in the bilateral relationship.86
There is Egyptian disapproval of Saudi military ac-
tion in Yemen. In comparison to his predecessor’s policy, 
King Salman’s military action in Yemen, which started 
in spring 2015, indicates a shift in Saudi foreign policy 
toward a more interventionist and non­diplomatic ap­
proach. With regard to the Saudi­Egyptian relationship, 
Operation Decisive Storm has further caused animosity 
between both governments.87 While Egypt favors a joint 
military force under the supervision of the Arab League, 
with strong Egyptian leadership, King Salman is more 
interested in forming ad hoc coalitions under his own 
control.88 The establishment of the joint Arab League 
military force, comprising roughly 40,000 soldiers, was 
announced at the Arab League summit in Sharm el 
Sheikh in March 2015 on Sisi’s initiative.89 As the larg­
est army in the region (with 400,000 active soldiers and 
500,000 military reservists) Egypt is seeking to recover its 
regional clout by commanding this joint military force90 
and taking the lead in the Yemen operation that was 
denied by King Salman.91 At the time of writing, Egypt 
was only involved in Yemen with four war vessels.92 With 
regard to the pro­MB stance of King Salman, Saudi Arabia 
seeks to find a post­military conflict solution in its favor 
and is thus looking for an alliance with Yemen’s branches 
of the MB such as the Islah Party, which is of great con­
cern for Egypt.93
There will be a shift from unconditional Saudi financial 
assistance to more conditional, project-focused support. 
Due to decreasing oil revenues, rising discontent within 
the Saudi domestic population, and the new king’s more 
pragmatic approach toward the MB, unconditional 
financial assistance in terms of loans, grants, and energy 
subsidies might go down under King Salman, focussing 
more on the financing of concrete investment projects.94 
Already in September 2013, the former Saudi Foreign Min­
ister Saud al­Faisal stated, “Every beginning has an end. 
Saudi Arabia offered grants and loans to Egypt, but will 
not continue to support it forever…. We cannot support 
Egypt forever.”95
Personal animosity exists on both sides. Furthermore, 
the leaking in February 2015 of telephone conversations 
between Sisi and his advisers disparaging Saudi Arabia 
and other Gulf states caused extremely negative reactions 
in Gulf media and social networks.96 Although the au­
thenticity of these leaks has not yet been confirmed – and 
although Sisi tried to calm the waves by immediately call­
ing King Salman97 – the Twitter campaign “Sisi ridicules 
the Gulf” started calling for the abandonment of Saudi 
financial support of Egypt.98 Furthermore, King Salman 
and other high­ranking members of the Saudi royal fam­
ily are worried about Sisi’s decreasing popularity among 
his own people.99 Soon after he was elected president, Sisi 
raised tremendous expectations to solve the economic 
crisis, create jobs for unemployed youth, and reinstall se­
curity. However these goals have yet to be met. Thus, the 
image of Sisi in Saudi Arabia has further declined.
Mutual skepticism extends to society at large. Tradition­
ally, skepticism in wide segments of Egyptian society re­
garding the country’s close relationship with Saudi Arabia 
never disappeared and will probably not diminish in the 
foreseeable future. The kingdom is widely perceived as an 
“artificial construct” based on a strong alliance between 
the ruling family, the Wahhabi ulama, and co­opted 
tribes and bureaucrats, while Egypt is regarded as the 
cradle of Sunni Islam, playing an extraordinary role by 
contributing to Islamic culture over centuries. This means 
that most Egyptians cherish their country as a cultural 
nation, whereas Saudi Arabia is widely held to be an 
artificial monarchy created in the desert – the middle of 
nowhere. In addition, Wahhabism’s puritanical, ultra­or­
thodox interpretation of Islam contradicts most Egyptians’ 
understanding of their faith. Therefore, Saudi Arabia has 
the image in Egypt of being backward.100 In addition, the 
deportation of Egyptian migrant workers by the Saudi 
authorities since the beginning of the “regularization 
process” of the Saudi job market in November 2013 has 
brought about widespread criticism in social media and in 
the public media.101 By March 2014, almost 300,000 Egyp­
tians had been deported.102 This hurt remittance flows to 
Egypt and raised severe criticism of the Saudi deportation 
policy, giving rise to protests of Egyptian workers and, in 
turn, crackdowns by Saudi security forces.103
From a Saudi perspective, the kingdom has replaced 
Egypt’s role as the leading Sunni state, as a viable eco­
nomic global player, and as a cultural leader within the 
Islamic world.104 “Egypt is not a center of power any more 
because Nasser’s policy failed and [so did] the sympathy 
for Egypt rooted in the admiration for Nasser,” stated a 
Saudi political analyst in December 2014.105 Furthermore, 
in the collective memory of the Saudi national narrative, 
the fall of the first Saudi state is closely connected with 
the military raid of Muhammad Ali, the former Ottoman 
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ment of Sokhna Port (south of the Suez Canal) by the 
Dubai­based company DP World since 2008 has been 
key to that strategy.
Before 2011, UAE investments existed in key sectors 
of the Egyptian economy. These included real estate and 
land development, agriculture and agribusiness, banking 
and finance as well as tourism. While initial investments 
were made decades ago, they increased tremendously in 
the 2000s as part of the UAE’s wish to internationalize 
revenue during the times of high oil prices. The UAE’s 
faith in the Egyptian economy resulted from intricate 
networks with Egyptian businessmen in the UAE but was 
also rooted in strong connections involving the ruling 
families of the UAE, Egyptian politicians, and influential 
Egyptian families.134 It is thus not surprising that the UAE 
was strongly associated with Mubarak’s crony capitalism 
and in the course of the political upheavals faced with 
numerous lawsuits for bribery.135 
The exact extent of UAE investment in Egypt prior to 
2011 is difficult to determine, partially because of the high 
number of Egyptian­Emirati joint ventures. According to 
Karen Young, 400 Emirati firms were active in Egypt in 
2009.136 However, most figures quoted in the literature 
relate to GCC investments in general and not to invest­
ment in individual countries. It is said that Gulf capital 
comprised at least 25 percent of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Egypt in 2007 and 2008, with some estimates 
going up to 47 percent. Meanwhile 50 to 75 percent of the 
stocks in the Egyptian stock market are said to be owned 
by Gulf investors.137 
As for land and real estate development, in the decade 
before 2011, the UAE through its SOEs and SWFs had 
become one of the largest investors in this sector as a con­
sequence of the privatization of state­owned land under 
Mubarak. Gulf­based investors like Dubai­based Emaar 
and its offshoot Emaar Misr were the chief beneficiaries 
of land auctions but also participated indirectly in real 
estate projects through stakes in Egyptian companies 
like SODIC.138 The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development also 
provided loans for a number of real estate projects, for 
example in Sheikh Zayed City near Cairo.139 
UAE investors and companies have also come to domi­
nate Egyptian food production, processing, and retailing 
both directly and indirectly.140 These investments are 
based on economic considerations but also on the UAE’s 
policy to ensure its own food security. UAE investors in 
this sector include the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, 
Al­Qudra Holding Company, owned by members of the 
UAE royal family and well connected Emirati business 
families, and Al Dahra Agriculture, owned by Sheikh 
Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan.141 The UAE also has stakes 
in the food retail chain via investments by UAE business­
man Majid Al Futtaim in Carrefour supermarkets and 
by UAE’s Abraaj Capital in Spinney’s Supermarket.142 
The country also has a number of indirect stakes in the 
Egyptian agribusiness sector through investments of UAE 
wealth funds in Egyptian private equity firms that are 
invested in Egyptian agricultural companies like Dina 
Farms and Egyptian Fertilizers Company.143
Like other Gulf states, the UAE is highly invested in 
Egyptian private equity firms and banks. In 2006, the 
UAE­based Abraaj Capital became the largest shareholder 
in the Egyptian EFG­Hermes but sold its shares in 2007 to 
two other UAE­based investment funds, the Dubai Group 
and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. Similar invest­
ments from the UAE have been made in Citadel Capital 
and Beltone Financial.144 A number of Egyptian banks 
also have UAE investments.145
With regard to the Egyptian tourism sector, the Abu 
Dhabi Tourist Investment owns three five­star hotels – in 
Cairo, Sharm el Sheikh, and Hurghada – as well as shares 
in the Arab Egypt Company for Hotels.146 
Such investments were not only of economic impor­
tance but also have social and political relevance, for they 
provide jobs, although the exact number they create is 
not known.147 Moreover, Gulf investments had a strong 
impact on the reproduction of capitalist and political 
structures in Egypt because merging Egyptian with 
Gulf capital strengthened a number of Egyptian families 
and power brokers that served as a powerbase for the 
Mubarak regime.148 
3.2 Emirati Efforts in Egypt since 2011 
Like other Gulf states, the UAE responded immediately 
after the outbreak of political unrest in 2011 by promising 
large­scale financial support to Egypt. The UAE pledged 
3 billion USD to create job opportunities for Egyptian 
youth.149 It was said that the money would be channeled 
through a newly established financing facility called the 
Khalifa bin Zayed Fund. Until the end of 2012, however, 
less than 50 million was actually delivered, and this went 
mainly for housing projects that had been agreed upon 
before 2011 but also for medical supplies, support for Hajj 
pilgrims, and to help refugees at the Egyptian­Libyan 
border.150 
The “delay” in disbursing the pledged funds was unof­
ficially related to disagreements over the transfer mecha­
nism via the Khalifa bin Zayed Fund but also to unsettled 
legal disputes pertaining to private UAE investments in 
Egypt.151 Gulf donor states were also said to have been 
UAE portrays Egypt as a potential security provider and 
as a central member of an axis of strong Sunni nations; 
the relationship with Egypt is constructed as “bound 
within the same security complex.”121 However, alliance­
building measures from the early 1990s on had been 
pursued more by way of positive propaganda than actual 
reliance on the Egyptian military for the UAE’s defense. 
In fact, UAE leaders severely mistrusted Egypt’s military 
capabilities.122 This public relations strategy also seems 
to be behind numerous references to the “decisive” role 
Egyptian ground troops played in liberating Kuwait from 
Iraq in 1991, which have been made in recent years in UAE 
media and in speeches of UAE representatives.123 One can 
also analyze information about recent joint military exer­
cises, presumably leaked by the UAE, as part of PR efforts 
to fortify the image of mutual cooperation and solidarity 
between Egypt and the UAE and to sustain the concept of 
strategic balances within the region.124
3) Strengthening the role and image of the UAE as a 
regional power broker: Egypt is a stage on which the UAE 
can prove its political leadership capabilities. It competes 
on this turf with Egypt itself but also with Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia. 
On an intra­Arab level, Egypt’s need for financial sup­
port from the Gulf signaled the country’s weakness and 
hurt its regional standing (and self­perception) as one – if 
not the – major Arab power. By injecting huge amounts of 
money into the Egyptian economy – funds that were not 
offered by Western states – the UAE proved its willingness 
to take up political responsibility not only for Egypt but 
also for the region. Egypt was not in a position to reject 
money from the Gulf but clearly signaled that it would not 
easily subordinate itself politically. The Egyptian govern­
ment indicated it would not necessarily align its foreign 
policy with its Gulf sponsors. This, combined with its offer 
in 2014 to take a leading role in setting up an Arab League 
intervention force, was meant to reduce the perception 
of the country’s client­like dependency on Gulf money.125 
Egypt was, moreover, opposed to the UAE’s growing 
influence in Egypt’s direct neighborhood, for example in 
Sudan and Ethiopia.126
With regard to regional political competition, the 
UAE and partners like Saudi Arabia used their financial 
support to roll back the political and financial influence 
of countries like Qatar, Turkey, and presumably Iran.127 
The UAE used its efforts to help Egypt and the Egyptian 
people in order to brand itself as a responsible and gener­
ous regional power and to simultaneously delegitimize 
Qatar’s efforts – during President Morsi’s brief period in 
power – as self­interested and unsound.128 Signs of (exist­
ing) competition involving the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and 
Kuwait were muted – at least on the surface – by the fact 
that all three made equally high pledges to Egypt. At the 
same time, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular vied 
for the honor of supplying additional help in the form of 
grants, loans, investments, trade, and technical assis­
tance.129
In addition to participating in this intra­Gulf competi­
tion, the UAE uses its support for Egypt in its competition 
with Western powers for regional influence. It portrays its 
help in terms of Arab solidarity and as a measure to pre­
vent “Western interference” in Arab affairs.130 The coun­
try is also interested in building alliances for the future 
of Egypt with other international actors such as Russia, 
which allows the UAE to consequently diversify existing 
partnerships. Moreover, military interventions by the 
UAE in neighboring Libya signal the UAE’s willingness to 
increase its sphere of influence even without backup from 
its traditional political partners like the US.131
4) Securing investments and opening new markets: 
Through investments made by state­owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), but also by 
private Emirati businesses with whom the UAE ruling 
families maintain close relations, the UAE was an impor­
tant player in Egypt’s economic affairs long before the 
2011 upheavals. Measures to stabilize the Egyptian econ­
omy have always been driven by concerns about existing 
investments and future financial returns. Furthermore, 
the UAE has an interest in securing Egypt as a market for 
future investments and to use Egypt for penetrating other 
markets, for example in Sub­Saharan Africa. UAE invest­
ments in Egyptian private equity firms like Citadel and 
Beltone act as vehicles for acquiring farmland in Africa, 
most notably in Sudan, and thus form a stepping stone for 
the expansion of Gulf­based capital into the wider Africa 
region.132 Similar regional activities in Egypt by competi­
tors such as Qatar and Turkey are thus seen as a threat to 
UAE interests. 
The UAE’s economic interests in Egypt also relate 
to the future of the Suez Canal. The country is keen 
to influence Egypt’s plan regarding the expansion of 
the Suez Canal and infrastructure development on 
Egyptian shores and to protect the central position of 
UAE harbors in regional trade and transport. The UAE 
is also eager to expand its position as a regional hub 
along the “New Silk Road” linking China, Europe, and 
Africa.133 It thus has an interest in influencing Chinese­
Egyptian economic relations in general and Chinese 
investments made into and along the Suez Canal in 
particular. The operation, development, and manage­
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technical matters were dealt with in the UAE by employ­
ees of various UAE ministries and enterprises and in 
Cairo by additional expert consultants, who were paired 
with Egyptian ministries.160 
The UAE­Egypt Task Force was essential for the timely 
organization of the 2015 EEDC in Sharm el Sheikh. This 
conference was not meant for facilitating new business 
deals, as most contracts had been finalized – with the 
help of the task force – before the conference. Rather, the 
presence there of dozens of heads of government was 
meant to portray international recognition of the Egyp­
tian government under President Sisi and to signal to the 
international community the importance of Egypt for the 
region.161 The date fixed for the conference also added 
pressure on the Egyptian government to conclude legisla­
tion processes in time instead of protracting them further. 
3) Project-based support to quickly benefit the Egyptian 
population: The UAE­Egypt Task Force has also been 
responsible for implementing development projects “with 
immediate impact on the lives of everyday Egyptians” in 
sectors like housing, healthcare, food security, educa­
tion, and transport.162 A total of 78 healthcare clinics 
are to serve 780,000 people, and 50,000 new residential 
units are to house 300,000 Egyptians and create 230,000 
construction jobs.163 Additional jobs in construction are 
planned to result from projects in the transport sector, for 
example the supply of 600 buses for public transport in 
Cairo and the construction of four bridges and 41 railway 
crossings in six governorates.164 Although not specifi­
cally mentioned in the task force’s brochure, a loan of 200 
million USD provided by the Khalifa Fund for Enterprise 
Development to the Egyptian Social Fund for Develop­
ment falls into this category. Through this loan, microfi­
nance loans will be provided in order to create more than 
200,000 jobs.165 
Through such measures, the UAE seeks to increase 
the confidence of the Egyptian population in its military 
authorities and in the Sisi government.166 This makes 
quick implementation all the more important. The UAE 
therefore tasked Egyptian military enterprises with 
implementing some of these projects – a step that ex­
presses more trust in the efficiency of the military than 
in that of the private sector. It is noteworthy, however, 
that this decision somewhat contradicts the UAE inter­
est in deep reforms of the Egyptian economy because 
for the moment, revenues of military enterprises are 
not channeled into the state’s budget but remain with 
the military. The Egyptian economy will only make 
meaningful progress when the military enterprises are 
fully integrated into the state’s economy.167 Eventually, 
the UAE will have to weigh this against its interest in a 
strong Egyptian military.
Relying on Egyptian resources and companies, in­
cluding the military, for implementation is also a way to 
portray the UAE’s engagement more strongly in terms of 
mutual cooperation than in terms of the UAE acting as yet 
another donor country to help “miserable Egypt.”168 Early 
framings of the March 2015 EEDC as a “donors confer­
ence” and domestic campaigns within the UAE with titles 
like “Egypt in Our Hearts” that were meant to “raise 
money for the forgotten people in the nation” were not 
well perceived in Egypt. These were most probably not 
meant to actively patronize Egypt but were instead part 
of a UAE strategy to brand itself as generous supporters of 
the Egyptian people.169 Increased sensitivity in the UAE 
to how Egyptians perceive the country’s engagement is 
apparent in recent speeches by Sultan Al Jaber and other 
UAE representatives that stress the efforts of the task 
force as “hand­in­hand” work done in the “spirit of col­
laboration” and “camaraderie.”170 
Having become aware that UAE engagement in Egypt 
also raised overly high expectations among Egyptians, 
the UAE was also obliged to make clear that a number of 
its activities were not targeted at the poorest and neediest 
but were in fact more in line with the UAE’s own eco­
nomic interests. One such example seems to be the project 
“One Million Homes for Egypt” undertaken by the Dubai­
based construction firm Arabtec.171 Marketed at the 
outset as an initiative for young, low­income Egyptians, 
the project in time became portrayed more and more as 
a real estate development catering to a middle­income 
bracket.172 
It is also important to realize that a number of other 
projects that are part of the task force’s portfolio of grass­
roots development projects serve the UAE’s economic 
interests in Egypt as neatly as they serve Egypt’s econom­
ic growth. This applies for example to the building and 
refurbishing of 25 wheat silos as well as to the construc­
tion of railway crossings, especially in the Nile Delta 
region and along the Mediterranean coast. The wheat 
silos are billed as an effort to improve Egypt’s food secu­
rity by doubling Egypt’s wheat storage capacity, cutting 
spoilage and reducing grain imports.173 But these efforts 
also reduce Egypt’s public spending on food subsidies, 
which are currently sustained through macroeconomic 
support from the UAE and other Gulf states; such reduc­
tions also enable Egypt to increase public spending for 
more sustainable purposes and to pay back outstanding 
loans, which in turn also relieves the budget of another 
hefty burden, currently partly financed through the Gulf 
worried about the transitional government’s refusal to 
sign loan agreements with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) before the spring 2012 elections, but Egyptian 
government representatives remarked unofficially that 
the conditions of some of the loans offered by the Gulf 
states were unattractive when compared to market­ 
based loans.152 
Since Morsi’s removal from power in July 2013, howev­
er, the UAE has taken a number of measures in support of 
the interim government backed by the Egyptian military 
and later of Abdel­Fattah el­Sisi, who was elected presi­
dent in May 2014. According to an official UAE informa­
tion brochure on its foreign assistance program for Egypt, 
UAE support to Egypt consists first of aid to grassroots 
development projects with immediate impact on the daily 
lives of Egyptians and second of technical assistance for 
the development of an economic recovery plan.153 Accord­
ing to the brochure, a total amount of 10 billion USD had 
been allocated for these measures, consisting of a grant 
of 1 billion and a loan of 2 billion to the Central Bank of 
Egypt as well as 7 billion for energy needs and various 
social and economic development initiatives.
The actual amount spent on each measure is difficult 
to determine because an official breakdown for the years 
2014 and 2015 has yet to be released. It is thus unclear 
if the 4 billion pledged by the UAE during the Egypt 
Economic Development Conference (EEDC) at Sharm el 
Sheikh in March 2015 was already included in the afore­
mentioned 10 billion. However, remarks by the ruler of 
Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, dur­
ing the conference that the UAE has invested 14 billion in 
Egypt over the past two years seem to signal that the 4 bil­
lion came on top of the originally planned 10 billion.154 It 
also seems that some of the investment deals announced 
during this conference are included in the amount of 7 
billion for social and economic development initiatives, 
since the projects announced in the conference over­
lap with initiatives mentioned in the brochure several 
months before. The following remarks will thus focus less 
on the monetary value of the UAE’s financial and techni­
cal assistance to Egypt, and more on the purposes of the 
measures through which assistance by official UAE state 
entities, UAE state­owned enterprises, and private UAE 
companies is provided. In any case, the money spent by 
the UAE on Egypt since the summer of 2013 made the 
UAE the most generous donor of official development 
assistance (ODA) globally in 2013 and 2014, which further 
contributed to the UAE’s international standing.155 
The measures through which the UAE has been en­
gaged in Egypt since 2013 include: 1) financial support for 
economic and regime stabilization, 2) technical assistance 
for policy reforms and their implementation with support 
from the UAE­Egypt Task Force, 3) project­based support 
to quickly benefit the Egyptian population, 4) military 
cooperation, 5) support for education in general and for 
religious education in particular, and 6) investments by 
state­owned and private UAE companies.
1) Financial support for economic and regime stabiliza-
tion: After the removal of Morsi and his government from 
power in July 2013, the UAE announced it would provide 
3 billion USD assistance to Egypt of which 2 billion would 
come as an interest­free deposit with Egypt’s central bank 
and 1 billion as a grant. This financial support was meant 
to prevent Egyptian insolvency due to depleted reserves 
and to secure loans from the IMF.156 It appears that the 
3 billion provided in 2013 was a reiteration of the (undis­
bursed) pledges announced in 2011, so the two amounts 
should not be added. In addition, 1 billion was provided 
in 2013 for oil and gas products to allow the Egyptian 
government to sell these products locally at subsidized 
prices.157 
In 2014, the UAE provided assistance to Egypt amount­
ing to 3.2 billion USD, but the concrete breakdown of this 
amount is not yet released.158 It is thus unclear how much 
of that amount was used on macroeconomic stabilization 
measures mentioned above and how much went to other 
projects. The same applies to the amount of 4 billion USD 
that had been announced by the UAE as assistance to 
Egypt during the Egypt EEDC in March 2015.
2) Technical assistance to support policy reforms and 
project implementation: The UAE quickly realized that 
pure financial support for Egypt would not be a solution 
to Egypt’s economic malaise but that underlying prob­
lems like energy subsidies and overbearing bureaucracy 
needed to be tackled. The UAE thus set up the so­called 
UAE­Egypt Task Force to speed up legislation, reforms, 
and other measures meant to attract more investments 
that were to be announced during the EEDC in March 
2015. At the center of the legislation efforts was the invest­
ment law to which amendments were made. So were 
tax and subsidy reforms. Presumably, the task force also 
helped settle pending disputes with Gulf companies that 
had not been subjected to international commercial arbi­
tration in order to increase the willingness of UAE­based 
companies and enterprises to invest in Egypt.159
The task force was headed by Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, 
UAE minister of state and chairman of Masdar, a major 
Emirati state­owned enterprise specializing in renewable 
energy. Al Jabar was in charge of the political coordina­
tion with the UAE and the Egyptian government, while 
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already in May 2015 rumors erupted about the cancella­
tion of the MoU due to disagreements about UAE funding 
and the provision of military­owned land.184 Insistence 
that Emaar Properties is not itself involved in the deal 
and rumors about UAE objections to involving other state­
owned funding into the project suggest that this project 
is more financially than politically interesting to the UAE. 
The same financial reasoning seems to apply to another 
real estate deal announced during the conference that in­
volved the development of a new city west of Cairo. This 
is expected to cost 20 billion USD and was agreed by the 
Abu Dhabi­owned investment firm Aabar and the Egyp­
tian property development firm Palm Hills Development, 
which is partly owned by Aabar. The UAE’s construction 
firm Arabtec is also involved, as Aabar owns a third of it. 
There has also been talk about the development of a new 
city near Fayoum through UAE investments.185 
As for the Energy Sector, UAE’s Dana Gas announced 
a 350­million USD gas deal that involves drilling nearly 
40 new development wells, workovers on existing wells, 
building new pipelines, and making an existing plant 
more efficient. Dana Gas Egypt has already been one 
of Egypt’s largest gas producers.186 UAE’s Masdar an­
nounced investments in wind and solar energy plants, 
and the UAE’s Al­Nouwais Investment announced plan to 
invest 4.5 billion USD in coal­based energy.187 The UAE 
is thereby highly involved in Egypt’s energy sector in 
general but also in the management of energy demand 
in order to increase regional energy security. Coal­based 
energy is especially labor­intensive and is thus seen as a 
source for job creation.188
In terms of the Transport Sector, the above­men­
tioned projects for the Egyptian railway system, partly 
financed by the Al­Suwaidan Group, are noteworthy in 
that they are planned to better connect Sokhna Port with 
ports at the Mediterranean coast and other parts of the 
country. The project also seems to include the China 
Harbour Engineering Company and the Chinese AVIC 
International Holding Company, again highlighting the 
UAE’s interest in securing its position along the “New 
Silk Road” to East Asian markets. Another deal worth 415 
million USD was signed with DP World to construct liquid 
bulk terminals at the Sokhna Port in order to handle the 
anticipated increased demand for the storage and ship­
ping of fuel and petrochemicals.189
With regard to Food Production, Storage, and Retail, 
the UAE is highly involved in the 6­billion USD deal with 
the Al­Suwaidan Group to invest in silos and grain logis­
tics in Damietta. Furthermore, the UAE­based company 
Canal Sugar announced plans to invest 850 million USD 
to set up a sugar factory and reclaim agricultural land in 
Minya province.190 The private Emirati businessman Ma­
jid Al­Futtaim, who manages Carrefour’s activities in the 
Middle East, announced plans to invest 590 million USD 
in Egypt in the coming years.
A further financial investment in various other sectors, 
including Health, Waste Management, and Renew-
able Energy, was made by the private Emirati invest­
ment group Khalifa bin Butti Bin Omeir (KBBO). Egypt’s 
Ministry of International Cooperation was also eager to 
point out that a number of deals were struck that involve 
joint financing from the UAE, Egypt, and France that had 
resulted from negotiations between the UAE and France 
prior to the EEDC.191
3.3 Future Prospects for the UAE-Egyptian Relationship
The kind and extent of UAE support for Egypt, especially 
since summer 2013, speaks clearly to the importance 
the UAE attaches to Egypt and to its interests in Egypt. 
The following developments can therefore be expected: 
Strong UAE engagement in Egypt in the future is not only 
likely but also possible because the UAE does not face 
the same domestic financial constraints as Saudi Arabia. 
Financial support will, however, increasingly come with 
conditions attached. The UAE will expect the Egyptian 
government to implement administrative and economic 
reforms. The UAE will discourage political steps such as 
a reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, but this 
decision depends more on Saudi considerations of how to 
engage with the MB and on the MB’s international sup­
porters, Qatar and Turkey.
Long-term financial support is possible. Already in 2013 
the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia signalled to Egypt that 
their support would not be permanent.192 But given that 
the UAE does not face the same domestic financial con­
straints as Saudi Arabia, support for Egypt may continue 
as long as there is the political will in the UAE. This will 
is rooted in an interest in Egypt’s economic stability, due 
to the large UAE investments in Egypt but also based on 
calculations and personal convictions of Emirati foreign 
policy decision makers. Generational leadership changes 
in the UAE might thus impact the UAE’s Egypt policy, but 
as long as the current leadership identifies the transna­
tional network of the MB and its Egyptian headquarters 
as a threat to its domestic security, the UAE is likely to 
raise the necessary funds to influence Egyptian politics.
In order to reduce costs, the UAE is more likely to di­
rect its future support into loans and technical assistance 
rather than additional grants. UAE enterprises and SWFs 
will also continue to invest in sectors like real estate, ag­
countries. The wheat silos are thus part of a larger eco­
nomic reform plan for Egypt, but one should not neglect 
the involvement of UAE firms in Egypt’s food production 
and in regional food trade either. In that regard, the an­
nouncement of a 6 billion USD investment by the UAE­
based companies Al­Suwaidan Group and Al­Ghurair 
Group during the March 2015 EEDC is noteworthy. This 
amount is to be spent on silos, new marine and river piers 
in Damietta Port, and a 600­km railway from Damietta 
passing through Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez to Safaga 
on the Red Sea.174 Nevertheless, during the conference, 
Ahmed Al­Suwaidan referred to these investments as 
“non­profitable.”175 Efforts like these are thus an example 
of how the UAE government is able to incorporate Emirati 
private and state­owned companies into its economic 
and development engagement in Egypt. Similarly, the 
UAE­based bus company Hafilat Industries benefited from 
the UAE’s pledge to provide buses to Egypt by winning a 
400­million USD bid to supply half of them. (The remain­
ing 300 buses are to come from an Egyptian supplier.)176 
4) Military cooperation: Several joint military naval 
maneuvers seem to have been undertaken since 2013.177 
Apart from the military benefits of these exercises, they 
also served to show the depth of cooperation between 
the two countries and demonstrate mutual trust. This 
enhanced Egypt’s image as a security provider to the UAE 
and signaled Egypt’s central place in the Sunni axis in the 
Middle East. The same reasoning applies to UAE’s and 
Egypt’s support for General Khalifa Haftar and the joint 
military intervention in Libya, where both are also fight­
ing Islamist forces.
5) Support for education, specifically for religious educa-
tion: The UAE is actively improving educational facilities 
and curricula that are intended to benefit more than 
67,000 Egyptians; a total of 100 new schools are planned 
to be built and new vocational training programs imple­
mented in all governorates.178 These efforts are portrayed 
as part of the UAE’s grassroots development projects, but 
Emirati companies working in Egypt will also benefit 
from the improved skills of the labor force.179 
In this sector, the UAE pays special attention to  
religious education. By exerting direct influence on  
Al Azhar through dialogue between religious experts 
from both countries and through financial support, the 
UAE wishes to encourage a form of Islam that is closer 
to UAE traditions over political and Wahhabi strands of 
Islamic thought. These efforts are also part of the UAE’s 
war on terrorism, which targets organizations of political 
Islam like the Muslim Brotherhood as much as it targets 
actual terrorism. Already in July 2012, a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) was signed with Al Azhar to pro­
vide 30 million USD in funds to support the university’s 
educational and cultural activities.180 In addition, the 
UAE is also supporting the Coptic Church to run educa­
tion and healthcare projects.181
6) Investments by UAE SOEs and private companies: 
Most UAE investments in Egypt in recent years were 
made by SOEs and SWFs and less so by private Emirati 
businesses. This reflects the strong political (rather than 
purely economic) calculation behind present investments 
in Egypt. As previously pointed out (see chapter 1, section 
3), however, many seemingly private UAE companies blur 
the line between public and private UAE investments due 
to the strong personal involvement of members of the 
ruling families. 
In the run­up to the EEDC in March 2015, a large num­
ber of projects were developed and discussed in the media 
that were officially announced during the conference 
itself. UAE­financed projects seem to focus on sectors like 
real estate and land development, energy, transport, and 
food and agribusiness and thus reflect a continuation of 
the UAE’s past investment strategy. (Information about 
each sector is detailed below.) The sectors promise quick 
and high returns on investments for the UAE. They also 
contribute at least partially to Egypt’s economic growth 
because real estate and construction projects are labor­
intensive; from an Egyptian perspective, however, they 
offer only short­ to medium­term solutions to the problem 
of creating jobs for Egyptians. Transport­ and food­relat­
ed investments also strongly reflect the UAE’s interests in 
regional trade. Investments in the energy sector as well 
as in the improvement of food storage are in keeping with 
UAE concerns about the untenable Egyptian subsidy sys­
tems for energy and food, which are currently financed by 
Egypt’s foreign creditors and donors. 
As far as Real Estate and Land Development are con­
cerned, the “new capital” project, with an overall volume 
of 45 billion USD (a third of the overall investments of 130 
billion USD announced during the conference) stands 
out particularly. The new capital city is planned to spread 
over 700 square kilometers east of Cairo and comprise 
more than one million residential units.182 An MoU was 
signed between the Egyptian ministry of housing and 
Capital City Partners, a private real estate investment 
fund created specifically for this project and led by 
Mohamed Alabbar, chairman of Dubai’s state­owned real­
estate company Emaar Properties. Alabbar described the 
investment as beneficial for both sides: “We’re in a part­
nership with the government. They will offer the land, we 
will invest, and we will split the profits.”183 Nevertheless, 
36 The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011
DGAPanalyse  / Nr. 9 / October 2015 DGAPanalyse  / Nr. 9 / October 2015
Chapter Two: Egypt after 2011: The Impact of Gulf State Engagement 37
led government was toppled by the Egyptian military. By 
then, Qatar’s support for the Egyptian MB had “turned 
into more of a liability than an asset,” as Kristian Coates 
Ulrichsen argues.203
Under Emir Hamad – that is until summer 2013 – Qa­
tar’s engagement in Egypt was led by three main motives: 
1) to brand Qatar to the West as a bridge and an interlocu­
tor with the MB, 2) to improve Qatar’s image in the Arab 
world by portraying itself domestically and regionally as 
a champion of the Egyptian people’s right to political self­
determination, and 3) to make inroads into the Egyptian 
market, which had thus far been dominated by other GCC 
states and their enterprises. A fourth motive – to dem­
onstrate a different, more moderate foreign policy under 
Emir Tamim – came into effect in 2013 and has since 
eclipsed the other three.
The new Egyptian government led by Abdel­Fattah 
el­Sisi, however, offers little room and potential for Emir 
Tamim to further pursue motives 1–3. While the prospects 
for Qatari engagement in Egypt will be discussed further 
on, it is important to highlight that keeping a low profile 
in Egypt since summer 2013 has also served Qatari inter­
ests by providing proof of Qatar’s less unilateral foreign 
policy under Emir Tamim – both to a domestic Qatari and 
to a regional Arab audience.
1) Branding Qatar to the West as an interlocutor with the 
Muslim Brotherhood: Long before the regional political 
upheavals of 2011, Qatar had already taken steps to carve 
a position as an independent interlocutor between the 
Middle East and Western states. It had strongly invested 
in nurturing good relations with various movements 
and actors, among them Islamists as well as secularists 
and Arab nationalists.204 It had relied on these contacts 
in multiple mediation efforts through which it sought to 
brand Qatar as a neutral, reasonable, and responsible 
player motivated more by the will to be “a good global 
citizen” than by interest politics, as Mehran Kamrava 
argues.205 Actively siding with one political current, that 
is, the moderate Islamists of the MB, during the regional 
upheavals marked an abrupt shift and was a risky ma­
neuver in the heretofore balanced Qatari power play. But 
apparently Qatari leaders expected the political Middle 
East to be about to change drastically, and it bet that the 
MB would become the future power in Egypt and in other 
Arab countries.206 According to most analysts of Qatari 
politics, the decision to throw Qatar’s full weight behind 
the MB in Egypt was fueled by calculations of possible 
benefits and power maximization – ranging from op­
portunities for economic investments to forms of direct 
political influence – that outweighed the costs of giving 
up its carefully crafted previous policy.207
Qatar portrayed its active engagement in ousting 
repressive autocrats – not just in Egypt but also in Libya 
and Tunisia – as a clear political stand against authoritar­
ian rule.208 This presentation was clearly geared toward 
a Western audience. Moderate Islamism was cast as a 
pan­Arab uniting concept and as the better alternative to 
Wahhabi and Salafi Islam.209 Qatar stressed its willing­
ness to use its contacts to apply moderating influence on 
these actors and thereby offered itself as a bridge and in­
terlocutor between the West and the Arab world’s alleged 
political powers of the future. In doing so, it expected 
it would strengthen Qatar’s international standing in 
its competition with GCC states like the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, by stressing its support for universal 
values like human dignity, social justice, and political and 
economic freedom, Qatar simultaneously tried to divert 
Western attention away from Qatar’s own poor demo­
cratic record. 
These calculations did not bear fruit, however. Not 
only did Qatar come to be perceived as a partisan player 
interfering in the domestic affairs of other nations, but it 
was also put under unprecedented international scrutiny. 
Here the controversy surrounding FIFA’s decision to ap­
point Qatar as host of the 2022 Football World Cup is but 
one example.210
2) Improving Qatar’s image in the Arab world: By siding 
with revolutionary forces in Egypt and in other Arab 
states, Qatar also sought to improve its controversial 
image in the Arab world. Already prior to 2011, Qatar had 
been increasingly perceived in the region to be “punch­
ing above its weight.” Expressing its engagement as a 
form of Arab solidarity was thus meant to foster Qatar’s 
claim for political leadership in the Arab world.211 Qatar’s 
mediation efforts had also led to accusations of interfer­
ing in the domestic affairs of other states. It thus used its 
engagement in favor of the revolutionary Arab street to 
portray itself as champion of the people’s right to political 
self­determination and to realize their democratic aspira­
tions. It stressed this approach as a continuation of similar 
efforts that Qatar had made on behalf of the Palestinian 
people. Qatari leaders stressed the fact that such support 
did not contradict the national sovereignty of another na­
tion but fully respected legitimate governments. Implying 
that the Mubarak regime had forfeited this legitimacy, 
Qatar portrayed its engagement as an effort to include all 
parties in the political process and as a measure to protect 
peaceful supporters against the use of force.212 Finally, 
Qatar had been perceived as a close ally of the US, which 
riculture, finance, and tourism that promise high returns 
on investment and simultaneously contribute to Egypt’s 
growth.193 Having learned in depth about the weaknesses 
of the Egyptian economy through the activities of the 
Egypt­UAE Task Force, the UAE has an interest in incor­
porating more donors into the effort to stabilize Egypt 
economically.194 It will thus help Egypt to secure FDI from 
countries like Russia and China, especially for projects 
that conform to the UAE’s economic strategy of remain­
ing a relevant regional transport hub for Asia, Africa, and 
Europe. Future UAE investments in Egypt’s infrastructure 
should also be seen in this wider context. 
Long­term financial support for Egypt is also likely 
because the UAE perceives Egypt as a field from where it 
can increase its sphere of influence in – and beyond – the 
region.195 
Financial support will not come unconditionally. The 
activities of the UAE since President Sisi came to power 
suggest that the UAE will not give its financial support 
unconditionally. While financial aid was necessary to 
stabilize Egypt, all of the Gulf states have realized that 
simply pumping more money into Egypt will only post­
pone solutions that are needed to effectively address seri­
ous underlying economic problems.196 In its effort to push 
for results, the UAE will continue to demand the imple­
mentation of more administrative and economic reforms. 
More than in the past, the UAE can be expected to use its 
economic power for such political leverage.
The UAE may be forced to reconsider its pace, how­
ever, for it increasingly realizes the Egyptian leadership’s 
difficulty in implementing reforms, which result from 
pressure coming from the population and from domestic 
stakeholders. Pushing harder for reform entails risking 
the currently good reputation of the UAE in Egypt, espe­
cially if the Egyptian leadership decides to blame “exter­
nal forces” for social hardships caused by these reforms. 
The UAE is thus likely to continue financing high profile 
projects for the poor to improve its reputation. However, 
it must also be careful not to fall back into its habit of pre­
senting itself as a donor for “miserable Egypt,” emphasiz­
ing instead that the partnership takes place on an equal 
footing.197
For the UAE, economic reforms and related political mea-
sures in Egypt enjoy priority. As long as stability in Egypt 
can be maintained without making implausibly high eco­
nomic commitments, the UAE is unlikely to change its bet 
on the current Egyptian leadership. For the time being, 
the UAE will thus continue to demand more economic 
reforms from the Sisi government while not pressing for 
other political reforms or for political reconciliation with 
the Muslim Brotherhood; the current UAE leadership may 
even discourage the Egyptian government from taking 
such steps. This decision will, however, depend more on 
Saudi than on Emirati deliberations on how to engage the 
MB and its international supporters, particularly Qatar 
and Turkey, within the context of other regional efforts 
and conflicts.
At the same time, it would damage the UAE’s inter­
national and regional political standing if the country 
continued long­term to support an Egyptian government 
that acted in an excessively repressive manner. Military 
dictatorship – and indeed, any other form of dictatorship, 
is not in the UAE’s interest, nor in the interest of the Gulf 
in general. For the time being, however, a certain reliance 
on the Egyptian military seems to many to be their best 
bet. The UAE and its Gulf partners will thus continue to 
make an effort to make Egypt’s government acceptable to 
Western powers, by supporting controlled elections, for 
example, among other things.198
4. Qatar and Egypt after 2011: Interests, Efforts, 
and Future Prospects
4.1 Qatari Interests in Egypt after 2011
Qatar, unlike its GCC neighbors, perceived the political 
developments that started to unfold in Egypt in 2011 more 
as an opportunity than as a threat.199 As noted in chap­
ter 1, section 4, Qatar was politically stable due to strong 
domestic support for the ruling family, while its compara­
tive social coherence made it more or less immune to the 
socio­political unrest that shook the wider Arab region.200 
Furthermore, the MB and other Islamist movements had 
never mobilized against the Qatari leadership, instead 
it enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with Qatar, 
which allowed it to use various Qatari channels for its 
external activities. Moreover, regular Egyptian expatri­
ates in Qatar, working mainly in law enforcement and in 
high­skilled sectors, were not prone to political activ­
ism.201 Finally, Qatar had not been engaged financially 
and politically in Egypt to a relevant extent before 2011, 
so that Egypt’s economic instability posed no threat to 
Qatari financial interests.202 In early 2011 there was there­
fore little reason for Qatar to join its GCC neighbors in 
their efforts to fight the growing political influence of the 
MB in Egypt and in other Arab countries. Instead, actively 
aligning itself with the demands of the Egyptian MB 
offered Qatar an opportunity to advance a number of its 
national interests. However, this calculation had changed 
by summer 2013, when power was handed over in Qatar 
from Emir Hamad to his son Tamim and when the Morsi­
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ing to 10 billion USD, a considerable amount of which it 
transferred between October 2011 and April 2013, when 
other Gulf states abstained from transferring most of 
their pledged support. According to Coates Ulrichsen, it 
is unclear how much money was actually provided, but 
Qatar deposited at least 1 billion as a grant and 4 billion as 
loans with the Central Bank of Egypt of which 3.5 billion 
was to be converted into bonds through a newly estab­
lished Medium­Term Note Program.227 In September 2013, 
2 billion were returned to Qatar after negotiations on the 
conversion had failed.228 In spring 2013, Qatar and Egypt 
had already failed to negotiate the conditions of a further 
loan of 3 billion at an interest rate of 5 percent. 
In addition, Qatar delivered five liquefied natural gas 
shipments meant to ease Egypt’s shortage of power in 
autumn 2013, that is, after the Morsi­government was 
removed from power, and thereby kept promises it had 
made earlier. After the change of government, however, 
there was no follow­up on negotiations for a long­term 
delivery contract for Qatari gas to Egypt that had al­
ready been concluded in a memorandum of understand­
ing (MoU).229
Pledges Qatar made in 2012 that were meant to “shore 
up the economy” consisted mainly of announcements of 
investments (to be discussed below) and did not involve 
financing macroeconomic stabilization. 
3) Larger and smaller business investments: In Septem­
ber 2012, members of the Qatari government and the 
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) announced plans to 
invest 10 billion USD over the course of five years in real 
estate and tourism projects near Alexandria and 8 billion 
for an integrated power project in Port Said.230 No details 
of these plans were publicized, and further negotiations 
broke down with President Morsi’s removal from power 
and the subsequent deterioration of Qatari­Egyptian 
relations. Furthermore, a partnership was announced be­
tween the Egyptian equity firm Nile Capital and a son of 
Qatar’s prime minister to create a 250­million USD fund 
to invest in education across the Arab world, but again no 
further information was provided.231
Several Qatari state­owned companies started to pen­
etrate the Egyptian market, among them the real estate 
enterprises Barwa and Qatari Diyar. While some projects 
in real estate are currently put on hold, most activities in 
this sector continue; apparently Egyptian consumers have 
not tied their private purchases to the political tension be­
tween Qatar and Egypt.232 Similarly, the business of Qatar 
National Bank (QNB), which had acquired the Egyptian 
Al­Ahly Bank, is said to have suffered only marginally due 
to the termination of official Egyptian clients while the 
majority of private clients remained with the bank.233 
Mehran Kamrava mentions that, on the whole, QIA 
invested 543.8 million USD in Egypt and thereby created 
4,000 jobs.234 This amount seems minor compared to the 
support and the investments shored up by the UAE, Ku­
wait, and Saudi Arabia since the summer of 2013. Indeed, 
most negotiations between Qatari and Egyptian private 
businesses do not seem to have come to fruition, despite 
numerous Egyptian business delegations that visited 
Qatar.235 Nevertheless, skepticism about Qatar’s objec­
tives in Egypt were strong and rising, even before 2013, 
signaling the strained relations between Qatar and Egypt 
even before Morsi was removed from office.236 Other GCC 
states were also greatly concerned about Qatar’s business 
activities in Egypt, much more than about Qatari involve­
ment in Tunisia, as Coates Ulrichsen notes.237
4) Technical assistance for development: According to 
annual reports on Qatar’s foreign aid that are published 
by Qatar’s foreign ministry, Qatar has been financing a 
number of development projects in Egypt. Amounts have 
been extremely inconsistent, with 500 million USD in 
2010–11, just 1 million in 2012 and 168 million in 2013.238 
Qatar’s development cooperation thus does not seem to 
reflect the closeness of the countries during this period. 
The reports do not go into great detail about the projects 
themselves, but minor parts of the overall amount seem 
to have gone into projects of Qatari development organi­
zations providing technical assistance in Egypt.239 Silat­
ech, a Qatari organization established in 2008 by Sheikha 
Mozah that focuses on youth employment in Middle 
Eastern and North African countries, has been active in 
Egypt to improve youth employment in cooperation with 
Microsoft Egypt’s CSR department. Together, they ran the 
online platform “Masr Works,” which matched job seekers 
with job providers. Silatech also offered training in youth 
centers and universities in all governorates. Together 
with the German GIZ, Silatech also had a project to devel­
op bank saving accounts for Egyptian youth.240 Reach Out 
to Asia (ROTA), a Qatari organization under the umbrella 
of Qatar Foundation, was planning to venture into Egypt 
in 2013 in order to improve primary and secondary educa­
tion. While ROTA initiatives never seemed to have made it 
off the ground, other Qatari projects apparently contin­
ued even after the summer of 2013, although mediated by 
local Egyptian and international NGOs and by local and 
international businesses.241
itself does not enjoy good standing in the Arab world. 
Qatar thus saw its engagement in favor of what increas­
ingly seemed to be an Arab majority as a step to improve 
its reputation.213
One instrument the country used to present its 
position on the political uprisings was Al Jazeera. The 
network’s reporting on the uprisings led to the so­called 
“Al Jazeera effect,” which not only raised Qatar’s profile 
but simultaneously also those of the uprisings them­
selves.214 Protestors and especially protagonists of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood received ample airtime to 
comment not only on the events in Egypt but also on the 
position of other GCC countries. The Egyptian preacher 
Yussuf al­Qaradawi’s criticism, aired on Al Jazeera, of 
the crackdown on MB members in the UAE aggravated 
the looming conflict between Qatar and the UAE, but 
also angered Saudi Arabia.215 So while Qatar was able 
for a certain time to improve its image in the countries of 
the uprisings, especially among moderate Islamists, its 
engagement further infuriated its neighbors as well as 
Arab secularists.216 
3) Winning over the Egyptian market: Qatar expected 
that changing power structures in Egypt would provide 
new investment opportunities for Qatar’s Investment 
Authority and for private Qatari businesses. It hoped 
thereby to increase Qatar’s efforts of economic diver­
sification but also to reduce the economic and political 
influence of its GCC neighbors on Egypt.217 It expected 
to capitalize on the long­nurtured relations with the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, e.g. by receiving prefer­
ential treatment from the Morsi administration. Good 
relations with the new government were also expected 
to settle the Qatari­Egyptian conflict regarding both 
countries’ economic and political interests in Sudan, as 
Egypt considered Qatar’s involvement there as med­
dling in Egypt’s backyard.218
4) Branding Emir Tamim as different from his father: 
Today, Qatar is able to provide evidence that Emir Tamim 
has readjusted Qatar’s foreign policy, thanks to the new 
emir’s political reconciliation with Egypt’s new govern­
ment beginning in late 2014 as well as to the fact that it 
now keeps a low profile in Egypt in general. Tamim has 
ceased his father’s policy of outright intervention and re­
turned to mediation by offering Qatar’s offices as an inter­
locutor with the Muslim Brotherhood (with whom Qatar 
had not broken despite considerable external pressure.)219 
While on the whole Qatari interests in Egypt remain simi­
lar to those pursued under Emir Hamad, the strategies of 
following these interests have been adjusted.
4.2 Qatari Efforts in Egypt since 2011 
After the outbreak of political tensions in Egypt in early 
2011, Emir Hamad reacted swiftly with a number of  
measures. These measures included 1) support for the  
political opposition, especially for the Muslim Brother­
hood, 2) financial support for macroeconomic stabilizati­
on, 3) business investments, and 4) technical assistance 
for development purposes.
1) Immaterial and presumably also material support for 
the political opposition: Qatar supported the Egyptian 
opposition and especially the MB through its political 
rhetoric against the Mubarak regime and by championing 
the Egyptian people’s right to political self­determination. 
The various TV channels belonging to the Qatari Al­
Jazeera network, especially Al Jazeera in Arabic and  
Al Jazeera Mubasher Egypt, provided considerable 
airtime to highlighting the demands and activities of the 
opposition and the government’s crackdown on the oppo­
sition.220 While on air, commentators like the MB pro­
tagonist Yussuf al­Qaradawi also criticized the UAE for its 
domestic actions against Islamists. Al Jazeera was thus a 
thorn in the flesh of the Egyptian regime and military but 
also caused anger in the UAE and Saudi Arabia.221 While 
Qatar argues that Al­Jazeera works independently of the 
Qatari government, the network’s financial dependency 
on the state undermines this argument.222 
Allegations of direct Qatari financial support for the 
MB have not been substantiated. The issue, however, 
loomed large in the media, not least because all groups 
accused each other of receiving foreign funding.223 Ferry 
Biedermann also points out that there is no evidence 
showing that material support was used for violence 
against the Egyptian state, even though the Egyptian dis­
course on the MB as terrorist organization implies this.224
The ups and downs of official Qatari­Egyptian relations 
were also demonstrated through the withdrawal of their 
ambassadors at different stages, even as the embassies 
continued their diplomatic and consular work.225 While 
relations took another downward dip right after Emir 
Tamim took power in Egypt, the ambassadors did finally 
return in the spring of 2015 after the political reconcili­
ation within the GCC, the release of Al Jazeera journal­
ists from Egyptian prisons, and the closure of Al Jazeera 
Mubasher Egypt.226
2) Financial support for macroeconomic stabilization: 
Qatar provided financial support for macroeconomic 
stabilization mainly via grants and loans to the Egyp­
tian Central Bank. Financial transfers after 2011 were 
meant to shore Egypt up economically against looming 
insolvency. In 2011, Qatar had pledged support amount­
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reconciliation with the MB are at least partially met. For 
Qatar itself, this would mean losing face, even though in 
regional and international media Qatar’s current exclu­
sion from Egyptian politics is depicted as a defeat of Qa­
tar’s regional aspirations. If Qatar were asked to resume 
its activities, this might mean a substantial win for Qatar, 
as it may demand in exchange either a visible mediating 
role in Egyptian domestic reconciliation or measures that 
would strengthen Qatar’s role within the GCC. Such a 
development would in fact turn into a win­win­situation 
for Qatar, as its current inactivity in Egypt saves Qatar 
money. Despite Saudi and especially UAE opposition to 
such political inclusion of the MB in Egyptian politics, the 
two countries might still press for more Qatari financial 
support for Egypt’s stabilization in order to share this 
financial burden. 
Qatar’s relatively few financial investments in Egypt 
do not merit any forced moves to return to the Egyptian 
scene. Qatar’s main economic ties are currently with Asia. 
The country signaled its independence from Egypt’s eco­
nomic future by sending only a small and not very high­
ranking delegation to the 2015 EEDC. For the moment, 
only profitable business activities of Qatar in Egyptian 
real estate (Qatar Diyar) and banking (QNB) will con­
tinue, for these are unlikely to be harmed even if political 
tension between Qatar and Egypt increases. 
Unlike the UAE and Saudi Arabia, moreover, Qatar 
has never reached out to Egypt as a security partner. For 
Qatar, it made little sense to evoke a Sunni axis because 
it did not face challenges from its own Shia population 
and because it needed to maintain good relations with 
Iran. The effects of the recent nuclear deal with Iran on 
Qatar remain to be seen, but Qatar’s foreign minister has 
already made clear that Egypt’s stability – and good rela­
tions with Egypt – are both in Qatar’s interest as well.255
5. The Impact of Gulf State Financial Support  
on Egypt’s Political and Economic Development 
since 2011
5.1 General Remarks
In general, the financial assistance Gulf states provided to 
Egypt after 2011 indisputably had both an economic and a 
political impact on the country’s subsequent development. 
Despite the lack of real insight into the restricted political 
decision­making circles in Gulf states, it is safe to argue 
that all Gulf states intended to stabilize Egypt economi­
cally in order to forestall economic collapse with severe 
socio­political consequences and to thereby protect their 
investments in Egypt.256 In addition, they also sought to 
strengthen, if not to install, political actors who followed 
an agenda close to the respective Gulf state’s regional 
policy outlook. Preventing Egypt’s collapse and keeping 
the region as a whole under control were of highest prior­
ity to all of the Gulf states, whereas helping Egypt trans­
form its political system into a more open and democratic 
one was certainly not. (It should be noted, however, that 
Qatar did argue that its support for the protests expressed 
the importance it attached to the people’s right to self­
determination.) Gulf assistance might thus not have led to 
fulfilling the hopes and demands of the Egyptian protest­
ers who had sought deep socioeconomic and political 
changes, but it certainly played to the interests of the Gulf 
states that sought to contain future uprisings.257
Assistance from the Gulf enabled both the Morsi and 
the Sisi governments to perform along well­established 
lines, for example by continuing to finance subsidies for 
energy and bread. Thus the question arises of whether or 
not Gulf assistance allowed the Egyptian government to 
avoid reforms that addressed the root causes of the politi­
cal and social unrest of 2011. Such root causes have been 
identified for example in the need to provide more and 
better job opportunities, to offer more democratic par­
ticipation and secure personal freedoms, to fight corrup­
tion, to reform the bloated bureaucracy, and to break the 
overwhelming economic and political influence of certain 
economic elites and individuals as well as the military.258 
The answer to this question is complex. As the handling 
of the uprisings in several other Arab countries has shown, 
first steps toward reforms were only taken after the situ­
ation had calmed down – for which salary increases were 
introduced in many countries of the region.259 In retro­
spect, it was unrealistic to expect Egypt’s new leaders to 
possess sufficient political will or competence to quickly 
introduce reforms, when these measures were expected 
both to enrage former elites and power brokers and be to 
the disadvantage of the poor. 
A critical assessment of the impact of Gulf state as­
sistance to Egypt also calls for a critical assessment of 
Western approaches and measures of support, which 
were intended to foster Egypt’s transition to democracy 
and the market economy. Over time, the political and 
administrative conditions that went along with most 
large­scale Western financial pledges fostered the impres­
sion among Egyptian decision makers and bureaucrats 
that these pledges were mainly rhetorical and were 
never actually going to be disbursed.260 Unlike the Gulf 
states, most Western states and donor organizations 
never really applied their leverage via financial assistance. 
Furthermore, the coordination among Gulf and Western 
4.3 Future Prospects for the Egyptian-Qatari Relationship
The GCC Summit in Doha in December 2014 marked not 
only Qatar’s reconciliation with its GCC neighbors but 
also opened a new page in Qatari­Egyptian relations. 
While most experts argue that it is still difficult to predict 
the foreign policy line Emir Tamin will be following, a 
number of developments seem likely with regard to 
Egypt.242 In order to strengthen its ties and relations with 
Saudi Arabia and reduce tensions with its direct neigh­
bors, Qatar is pressed to reconcile politically with Egypt 
and to refrain from unilateral approaches. Having to 
navigate a “post­Arab spring” regional landscape, Qatar 
is also pressed to reach out to other political actors and to 
diversify its networks and contacts in Egypt. Nevertheless, 
Qatar will continue to demand the political inclusion of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, Qatar’s economic sup­
port for Egypt is likely to remain limited and its invest­
ment to be restricted to certain sectors.
Cautious Qatari-Egyptian political reconciliation is un-
derway. Emir Tamim seems to act with the understanding 
that the political Middle East has undergone structural 
changes that do not allow him to antagonize Saudi Arabia 
as his father did. This pertains not only to the situation 
in Egypt, where Qatar lost its short­lived political influ­
ence when the Morsi government was toppled, but also 
to developments in the Persian Gulf itself. As a result of 
the recent US­Iranian rapprochement, Iran is now less de­
pendent on Qatar, a country that has long drawn strength 
from being a bridge linking Iran, the GCC, and the US. 
This leaves Qatar pressed to reach out to Saudi Arabia 
to secure its claims to the gas field it shares with Iran.243 
Under Emir Tamim, Qatar is thus less likely to pursue 
unilateral initiatives, but to seek and influence GCC con­
sensus on regional strategies. It has consequently taken 
a number of steps to reduce tensions with its neighbors, 
both with regard to Egypt and to other regional conflicts, 
although it stressed that it would not compromise on 
certain fundamental principles.244
With regard to Qatar’s Egypt policy, this has translated 
into a careful rapprochement since late 2014. While Qatar 
did not expel members of the MB from Qatar or express 
any kind of apology for its political involvement in Egypt 
during the uprisings, it did suspend its Egypt­focused 
TV channel Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr.245 Consequently, 
Egypt released three Al Jazeera journalists who had 
been held in jail since December 2013. Another sign of 
reconciliation was President Sisi’s personal reception of 
Emir Tamim at the Arab League Summit at the end of 
March 2015 in Sharm el Sheikh, where the two also held 
bilateral talks.246 Two weeks earlier, however, the Emir 
had not participated in the EEDC investment conference 
but only sent a small delegation headed by an official 
from the ministry of the economy. Qatar’s media similarly 
ignored the conference and instead published an opinion 
piece by Azmi Bishara, one of the Emir’s closest advisers, 
in which he strongly criticized the Sisi government.247 
Moreover, the conflicting Qatari and Egyptian responses 
to the Egyptian military attacks on Libya in February 2015, 
which led to yet another temporary withdrawal of the Qa­
tari ambassador from Egypt, prove that tension between 
Qatar and Egypt is still simmering. 
There is a need to diversify relations with Egyptian politi-
cal actors. Qatar is likely to reach out to political parties 
and movements beyond the MB and to thereby widen 
its political partnerships in Egypt. This is a pragmatic 
step for Qatar to “navigate a ‘post­Arab spring’ regional 
landscape,” as Coates Ulrichsen put it, but it is also neces­
sary in order to shed some of the “baggage” that it had 
acquired in recent years relating to its one­sided position 
in favor of the MB.248 In that regard, the growing political 
influence of Azmi Bishara on Emir Tamim is noteworthy. 
Bishara is a Christian Palestinian and former member 
of the Israeli Knesset with pan­Arabist inclinations and 
a wide network of contacts throughout the entire Arab 
world.249
Qatar makes ongoing demands for politically integrat-
ing the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite Qatar’s need to 
reach out to new partners and to establish new contacts 
in Egypt, Qatar has not cut its ties with the MB, although 
the rhetoric of outright support was downgraded in order 
to calm tensions within the GCC and especially with the 
UAE. But Qatar continues to provide refuge to represen­
tatives of the MB and presents itself as “the destination 
of the oppressed.”250 Yussuf al­Qaradawi continues to be 
courted by Emir Tamim and still heads the Doha­based 
International Union of Muslim Scholars.251 Furthermore, 
Emir Tamim and members of the Qatari government con­
tinue to stress the importance of finding a “political solu­
tion” in order to settle the social and political conflicts 
in Egypt.252 In other words, Qatar continues to demand 
the inclusion of the MB into a national political dialogue. 
This demonstrates that Emir Tamim has not shredded all 
attributes of his father’s foreign policy but instead holds 
on to some elements as part of a longer­term strategy.253 
Keeping its contacts with the MB might eventually enable 
Qatar to become useful again as an interlocutor, not only 
for GCC members, but also by the EU and the US.254
Qatar’s economic engagement in Egypt will remain lim-
ited. It is unlikely that Qatar will return to Egypt politi­
cally and economically before demands for the political 
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turn on investments for Gulf businesses, thereby benefit­
ing the economic diversification of Gulf economies. While 
these investments might not directly harm Egyptian 
interests, most of them are not orientated toward Egyp­
tian goals such as creating jobs or providing more social 
security. (It is noteworthy, however, that several projects 
financed by the UAE are specifically designed to cater to 
the needs of the poor, thereby presenting the UAE not 
only as an influential power in Egypt but also as a gener­
ous partner of the Egyptian people.)
Most business investments from the Gulf are conserva-
tive in nature. Business investments from Gulf enterprises 
are risk­averse when it comes to innovative solutions or 
know­how based projects. Therefore, Gulf investments 
are unlikely to trigger developments that could lead 
Egypt from an agricultural and service­oriented economy 
toward a know­how­based technological economy. How­
ever, significant differences between the Saudi and the 
UAE approach can be identified. While the Saudi private 
business community is investing heavily in real estate, 
agribusiness, tourism, and infrastructure projects, the 
UAE’s state­owned enterprises practice more diversified 
economic investment. This is also related to sustainable 
approaches such as support for small and medium­size 
enterprises, demands for political reforms in order to 
improve social inclusiveness, and long­term economic 
development.272
Trade and investment relations lack diversity. The 
general Egyptian perception of Gulf business invest­
ments is surprisingly positive.273 Gulf investments need 
to be complemented to increase foreign direct invest­
ments (FDI), however. There is a growing awareness 
that although Saudi and UAE investments comprise 
a significant share of FDI in Egypt in general, Egypt’s 
economy needs to expand and diversify its trade and 
investment partnerships in order to overcome the depen­
dence on Gulf FDI and to enhance Egypt’s economic 
performance.274 New partners such as China and Russia 
are already being approached (see fig. 8).275 For political 
reasons, Qatar currently plays a rather marginal role as 
a potential investor, although it continues to pursue a 
number of financially rewarding projects, especially in 
real estate and banking.276
states and donor organizations deteriorated over time, 
particularly following the removal of Morsi from power. 
The questions will thus remain open of whether the Gulf 
states could have been engaged more actively to push for 
reforms that went beyond mere stabilization and whether 
they could have been persuaded to moderate their ap­
proaches to certain political forces. 
The following section outlines the concrete ways in 
which assistance from the Gulf States had an impact on 
political and economic developments in Egypt after 2011.
5.2 Impact on Political Developments in Detail
The Muslim Brotherhood was excluded from political par-
ticipation. The wish of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to politi­
cally marginalize the MB coincided with the interests of 
Egyptian military actors and of those Egyptians who had 
become increasingly critical of the Morsi government.261 
To them, Saudi and Emirati support for Morsi’s removal 
from power was seen as supporting the political will of 
the Egyptian majority that wished to free itself from a re­
pressive Islamist regime, even though this did not happen 
through elections.262
Civil-society organizations and political activists were 
further marginalized. Emirati and Saudi financial and 
political support for President Sisi’s government contrib­
uted to a marginalization and repression not only of the 
MB, but also of civil­society organizations and political 
activists in general.263 It helped to re­consolidate the pre­
2011 political order – a strong army, marginalized civil so­
ciety, and lack of political freedoms – even though some 
of these developments should be seen as unintended, if 
welcome, side effects instead of an outcome that Gulf 
assistance directly sought. In any case, further margin­
alization of political actors left unsolved the problem of 
restricted political freedoms – one of the root causes of 
the 2011 uprising.
Gulf assistance undermines President Sisi’s political 
standing. A growing number of Egyptians view Gulf as­
sistance with ambivalence.264 Sisi is facing criticism from 
various political and social camps for being a “puppet” of 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with whom his government 
has to consult on most political decisions.265 This hurts 
Sisi’s political reputation and his government’s image in 
the Egyptian public and does thus not foster trust in the 
government. 
Dependency on Gulf assistance affects a wide range 
of Egyptian policies. Sisi’s power currently depends on 
continuous support from the Gulf states. But this support 
cannot be taken for granted, due to the increasing reluc­
tance of Gulf states to assist Egypt financially in the long 
term if certain political demands remain unfulfilled.266 As 
long as no other donors step in to provide this assistance, 
the government of President Sisi will be under pressure 
to conform to new and even more sweeping political 
demands from the Gulf states. This might also continue to 
hamper initiatives to integrate the Muslim Brotherhood 
into political dialogue, unless Saudi Arabia as the leading 
Gulf power changes its position in this regard.
Saudi support fuels Egyptian fears of “Wahhabization” 
and widens rifts within Egyptian society. Not only do 
secular Egyptians fear the influence of Saudi­Wahhabi 
thinking in general and its influence on Al Azhar universi­
ty in particular, which contrasts with what is domestically 
perceived as a more tolerant Egyptian form of Islam. The 
widespread discourse on the threat of a “Wahhabization” 
of Egypt is also widening the deep rift within Egyptian 
society.267
5.3 Impact on Economic Developments in Detail
Bilateral financial assistance prevented an economic col-
lapse. Government­to­government financial support from 
Gulf states to Egypt has helped to balance the budget 
deficits and substituted for the lack of financial assistance 
from Western donors and international institutions such 
as the IMF.268 Such financial assistance was widely sup­
ported by Egyptian elites like the business community, 
the traditional political elites, and the army, because 
Gulf assistance helped preserve the existing economic 
structures. From an Egyptian economic perspective, this 
assistance was indispensable to overcoming the economic 
crisis that Egypt faced after 2011.269
Gulf business investments are not aimed at inclusive 
economic growth. In addition to bilateral financial assis­
tance provided by the governments of Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, and Qatar, public and private enterprises from these 
countries made business investments in Egypt. These in­
vestments are based on business calculations, not on long­
term vision for inclusive economic growth in Egypt.270 
Rather, Gulf businesses seek to secure and enlarge their 
market shares in Egypt and protect their investments.271 
Given the limited sectors in which Gulf businesses are 
competitive, Gulf investments are geared toward a small 
number of sectors only, especially real estate, tourism, 
energy, agriculture and agribusiness, and transport. Most 
of these investments currently do not promise to lead to 
any serious trickle­down effects or major employment op­
portunities, especially not for better educated Egyptians. 
Most real estate projects do not benefit the poor, and 
energy, agriculture, and agribusiness, as well as transport 
projects are mainly conceived with an eye on expected re­
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1. Gulf Support for Tunisia prior to 2011
There were a number of root causes of the Tunisian upris­
ing of 2011. These included low economic performance in 
general (see fig. 1), high unemployment (figs. 6 and 9) and 
corruption, pronounced dependency on migrant workers’ 
remittances (fig. 5), on revenues from tourism (fig. 10), 
and on foreign direct investment (FDI) in the energy sec­
tor (figs. 7, 8, 11), and the failure of the economy to create 
jobs that matched the aspirations, needs, and skills of the 
growing number of educated youth. Economic opportuni­
ties were largely geographically confined to the coast and 
thereby prevented relevant parts of the population from 
sharing the benefits of economic growth. In addition, an 
inefficient state subsidy policy did not solve the imbalance 
of job opportunities and economic productivity between 
the coastal areas and the rural hinterland.1 According to 
the World Bank, “Tunisia was unable to advance beyond 
the low­skill, low­wage economy because it did not in fact 
open up its economy (to domestic investors, as well as 
internationally) and did not change the underlying state­
controlled economic model. It was this lack of change, in 
the face of the demographic time bomb of educated youth, 
which rendered the economic model increasingly inad­
equate.”2
Prior to the uprising in 2011, the Gulf states focused 
their official financial support for Tunisia on energy 
and transport­related infrastructure projects, financed 
through loans provided by bilateral and multilateral 
Arab development funds. Because it was perceived as a 
middle­income country, Tunisia did not receive financial 
grants from Gulf states in relevant amounts.3 Thus, Gulf 
investments only played a minimal role in creating new 
job opportunities for Tunisian youth and in assisting the 
country in overcoming the fundamental economic crisis it 
had suffered from since the 1990s. Furthermore, eco­
nomic investments from Gulf states in Tunisia had been 
limited in the past due to the closed and highly state­
controlled nature of the Tunisian market, its “narrow 
strategic significance,” and the domination of European 
investors (see figs. 2–4).4 Unlike most European business­
es, Gulf investors were not and are not active in Tunisia’s 
offshore sectors.
Development assistance provided to Tunisia was 
hindered by the fact that coordination between Western 
and Gulf Arab donors was and continues to be a chal­
lenge. This is because Gulf Arab donor organizations have 
no local presence and are thus not able to attend regular 
coordination meetings. Their embassies do not engage in 
coordination work.5 
On a political and societal level, fears of political influ­
ence from the Gulf countries started to emerge within Tu­
nisia prior to the 2011 uprisings, when the share of Gulf in­
vestments began to rise. The UAE and Qatar in particular 
started to invest in real estate and the telecommunication 
sector during President Zine el­Din Ben Ali’s last years in 
office. After his removal from power, these projects were 
put on hold or cancelled. Nevertheless, most Tunisians 
remember them vividly because they caused fears within 
the population of a “Gulf buy­out” of Tunisia.6 This shows 
that Tunisian concerns about the growing influence of 
Gulf states on the country were already circulating before 
2011. However, foreign funding from Gulf states for politi­
cal parties was non­existent (because illegal) and Gulf 
funding for NGOs was minimal prior to the uprisings 
(also because their activities were limited by law to social 
and cultural issues).7 
In a regional context, Tunisia served as a gateway 
to Libya under UN and US sanctions when Gulf states 
started to invest in Libya over the past decade. Today 
Tunisia serves as a “safe haven” for Libyan political and 
militant players who are receiving support from differ­
ent Gulf states. Thus, “competition between the UAE and 
Qatar led to continued support of both states to opposing 
sides, with Qatar supporting Misrata and the Islamists, 
and the UAE supporting the anti­Islamist current” under 
the leadership of General Khalifa al­Haftar.8 
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Figure 8: Average percentage of FDI by industrial sector 
in Tunisia, 2006–12 
Various Industries 6.0%
Agro�food 5.5%
Construction materials 16.0%
Mechanical, electrical, and 
electronic 28.6%
Chemical and rubber 21.7%
Textiles and garments 11.7%
Leather and shoes 4.9%
Plastics 6.7%
Source: The World Bank, “The Unfinished Revolution. Bringing Opportunity, Good Jobs And 
Greater Wealth To All Tunisians,” Development Policy Review, May 2014, p. 37
Figure 9: Unemployment rates among Tunisian youth, 
aged 15 to 29, in 2005, 2010, and 2011 �in percent)
Source: The World Bank, “The Unfinished Revolution. Bringing Opportunity, Good Jobs And 
Greater Wealth To All Tunisians,” Development Policy Review, May 2014, p. 39
Figure 10: Tourism receipts and arrivals, 2000–11
Source: The World Bank, “The Unfinished Revolution. Bringing Opportunity, Good Jobs And 
Greater Wealth To All Tunisians,” Development Policy Review, May 2014, p. 92
Figure 11: Distribution by sector of FDI inflows and  
job creation in Tunisia in 2012
Source: The World Bank, “The Unfinished Revolution. Bringing Opportunity, Good Jobs And 
Greater Wealth To All Tunisians,” Development Policy Review, May 2014, p. 248
2. Saudi Arabia and Tunisia after 2011: Interests,  
Efforts, and Future Prospects
Saudi Arabia’s former government under the late King 
Abdullah was concerned by the fall of Ben Ali in 2011. In 
recent decades Ben Ali had served as a strategic ally for 
Saudi Arabia, as a partner in the fight against terrorism, 
in securing North African stability, and in countering 
Iranian influence in the region. In political and economic 
terms, however, Tunisia has been far less important than 
Egypt to Saudi Arabia.9 Although Ben Ali was a trusted 
friend to Abdullah (who died in 2015) and to the former 
Minister of Interior Prince Nayif bin Abdulaziz (who died 
in 2012) – and although he found asylum in Saudi Ara­
bia after his ouster in spring 2011 – Saudi Arabia did not 
criticize the Tunisian uprisings in the same harsh terms it 
used to condemn those in Egypt. Vice versa, the matter of 
Ben Ali’s Saudi asylum has not become an issue for Tuni­
sian interlocutors, nor has it fed political tension between 
Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. In fact, many Tunisians might 
Figure 2: Share of exports to Gulf Cooperation Council 
�GCC) countries and Euro�Area countries, 2013
Source: The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects Middle East and North Africa, June 
2015, http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2015b/Global­Economic­
Prospects­June­2015­Middle­East­and­North­Africa­analysis.pdf (accessed August 3, 2015)
Figure 3: Export by leading destination in 2014 
Source: International Trade Centre, General Trade Performance: Tunisia, http://www.intracen.
org/country/Tunisia/General­Trade­Performance/ (accessed August 3, 2015)
Figure 4: Import by leading destination in 2014 
Source: International Trade Centre, General Trade Performance: Tunisia, http://www.intracen.
org/country/Tunisia/General­Trade­Performance/ (accessed August 3, 2015)
Figure 5: Annual officially recorded remittances to  
Tunisia, 1976–2013
Source: Katharina Natter, Revolution and Political Transition in Tunisia: A Migration Game 
Changer? Migration Policy Institute, May 28, 2015, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
revolution­and­political­transition­tunisia­migration­game­changer (accessed August 3, 2015)
Figure 6: Tunisian unemployment rate in active  
population, 2004�14 �in percent)
Source: Katharina Natter, Revolution and Political Transition in Tunisia: A Migration Game 
Changer? Migration Policy Institute, May 28, 2015, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
revolution­and­political­transition­tunisia­migration­game­changer (accessed August 3, 2015)
Figure 7: Average percentage of FDI by sector in  
Tunisia, 2006–2012 
Source: The World Bank, “The Unfinished Revolution. Bringing Opportunity, Good Jobs And 
Greater Wealth To All Tunisians,” Development Policy Review, May 2014, p. 37
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market. As one Tunisian opposition politician put it, they 
“do not want to obey to the rules and do not want to be 
bothered by administrative bureaucracy.” Furthermore, 
“Gulf states want to implement their projects really fast, 
while the Tunisian administration is inefficient, which 
hampers timely implementation to some extent.” Thus, 
doing business with Gulf states is a “totally different 
story.” Furthermore, Tunisian decision makers have 
clearly signaled that they are not willing to grant Saudi 
business partners preferential treatment when it comes to 
easy market access, for increasing Saudi investment on a 
low level could go hand in hand with a tremendous rise in 
political influence, which is undesirable on the Tunisian 
side.16 
2.2 Saudi Efforts in Tunisia after 2011
Saudi Arabia’s engagement in Tunisia since 2011 has en­
compassed religious, economic, and political dimensions.
1) Religious influence and the public’s perception thereof: 
The ambivalent perception of Saudi engagement in Tu­
nisia is also based on the increased influence of religious 
Wahhabi and Salafi prayers in Tunisia since 2011.17 Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf states are perceived by the public 
as being mainly responsible for this negative ideologi­
cal impact on the political transition process. Especially 
under the government of Ennahda, the idea of the spread 
of Salafism across the country was at the center of contro­
versy.18 Mosques and kindergartens have been accused 
of hiring Arab preachers from the Gulf who have set up 
Salafi­based curricula, fostered pro­Wahhabi ideology in 
their sermons, and established close ties to famous Tuni­
sian Salafi preachers like Khatib Idrissi.19 Furthermore, 
Tunisian Salafi preachers have been educated in Saudi 
Arabia’s mosques and religious universities such as the 
Islamic University in Medina.20 Mosques, other institu­
tions, and individuals have not been under the control of 
the Tunisian authorities under the Ennahda government. 
This has created a vacuum of state influence and fostered 
pro­Salafi activities within rural areas of the country. In 
2014, around 150 of Tunisia’s 5,100 mosques were beyond 
the state’s control, and 50 of them were controlled by radi­
cal imams.21 After a widespread crackdown campaign by 
the state, it is said that only 14 mosques remained under 
the influence of non­state controlled imams.22 
Despite Tunisian allegations of strong Saudi involve­
ment in the “Salafization” process in recent years, no 
direct impact of Saudi government financing of religious 
institutions such as charities and mosques can be substan­
tiated – although private businessmen or religious leaders 
are presumably channeling money for Salafi groups via 
Muslim charities and humanitarian organizations.23 In 
addition, Saudi Arabia has not officially supported the 
Tunisian Salafi Hizb al­Tahrir. Nonetheless, in Tunisian 
public discourse, Saudi Arabia has been blamed for sow­
ing anti­democratic and even radical opinions within the 
Tunisian population since Ben Ali’s removal from power 
– although, as one political observer stated, “Tunisia 
forgot about Wahhabism” after the assassinations of both 
opposition politicians, Mohamed Brahmi and Chokri 
Belaid, and after Qatari leadership changed in 2013.24 
Instead, Qatar alone, with its supposed links to Ennahda 
was blamed for everything, whereas Saudi Arabia has 
been “treated more softly.”25 This can also be attributed 
to the positive image of Saudi Arabia as the “custodian 
of the two Holy Shrines,” Mecca and Medina. Every year, 
between eight and ten thousand Tunisian pilgrims are 
permitted to visit Saudi Arabia.26 These factors may have 
contributed to softening initial criticism. 
Furthermore, public discourse about the Gulf states in 
Tunisia generally does not differentiate between Wah­
habism and other Islamist tendencies. Noteworthy in this 
regard is a story that circulated about an alleged Saudi 
Salafi preacher who denounced the Tunisian “way of 
laicism” and demanded circumcision for Tunisian girls 
while touring Tunisia. This was surprising given that 
Saudi Wahhabism typically condemns female genital 
mutilation. In fact, the preacher, Wajdi Ghanim, was not 
of Saudi origin but a famous Egyptian TV cleric.27 This ex­
ample shows that knowledge about the different currents 
of Wahhabism as a political and Islamist ideology is very 
limited – at least among secular Tunisians. This further 
fuels the politicization of activities of Islamic charities. 
But it also causes many Tunisians – even in more edu­
cated circles – to miss the deep political and religious 
differences between Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf 
states. Today, rumors about Saudi Arabia’s negative im­
pact on the Tunisian transition process and the country’s 
“Salafization” are commonplace in the Tunisian business 
and political elite and are thus part of a “phenomenon of 
perception” rather than a reality.28
2) Economic efforts: The economic efforts of Saudi Ara­
bian businesses have remained limited in Tunisia since 
2011. The major contracts were awarded under Ben Ali: a 
total of 391 million USD in 2014 invested in four projects 
in the power and water sector (fig. 12, p. 54). 
In addition, 39 Saudi companies with a total of 6,184 
employees have been active on the Tunisian market with 
FDI of 283 million USD in 2013 in the agriculture, indus­
trial, service, and tourism sector (fig. 13, p. 56).29 More 
than one fifth of the workforce employed in Saudi com­
not object to Ben Ali’s return, as feelings are on the rise 
that the upheaval did nothing to improve the economic 
and security situation. Even the subject of the recovery 
of assets and funds embezzled by Ben Ali and his in­laws 
does not figure prominently when the Saudi role for Tuni­
sia’s state budget is discussed.10 
2.1 Saudi Interests in Tunisia after 2011
While the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was per­
ceived as a real threat to Saudi Arabia’s political stabil­
ity and the royal family’s legitimacy, Tunisia’s Ennahda 
party – itself an ideological cousin of the Egyptian MB 
– has shown more pragmatism and an inclusive approach 
toward non­Islamist party rivals. This made it less threat­
ening to Saudi leaders.11 Unlike the administration of Mo­
hamed Morsi in Egypt, which stirred up Saudi animosity 
by initiating a cautious rapprochement with Iran between 
2012 and 2013, Tunisia’s various governments did not 
reach out to Iran. Tunisia has thus remained an important 
part of the Saudi government’s strategy in fighting Iran 
– an effort in which it considers Algeria and Egypt to be 
important allies. In this regard, Ennahda had the advan­
tage of learning from the mistakes made by Egyptian 
Islamists. Instead of implementing a Morsi­style “winner­
takes­all” policy after winning the elections, the party’s 
leaders fostered an inclusive strategy, integrating all 
important political decision makers into its government. 
Especially after Morsi’s fall, Ennahda became concerned 
that it would be excluded from the political scene if it did 
not adapt to the Tunisian political culture of inclusion and 
constructive dialogue.12 
This more pragmatic and integrative course coincided 
with the Saudi assessment that a successful Islamist 
government in Tunisia would not cause spillover ef­
fects, threaten the monarchy’s legitimacy, or destabilize 
Saudi regional supremacy. There were no worries that 
the Tunisian democratic model could influence political 
aspirations and developments in any other Arab countries, 
especially as several Tunisian political actors (including 
Ennahda) have proven their capacities for reconciliation 
and compromise since 2011. As a former Tunisian politi­
cian put it in an interview, “we have to stand together” in 
times of crisis.13 
To consolidate this impression, the current govern­
ment led by the Nidaa Tunes party has chosen to pursue 
different arguments to convince its European and Gulf 
partners of its legitimacy. As one Tunisian politician put 
it, “In our dialogue with the Gulf we do not use the same 
words as [we do] with Europe, e.g. ‘Tunisia as the demo­
cratic exception’ in an autocratic Middle East. Instead, we 
speak of ‘our democratic approach, which we do not wish 
to export.’”14 This is presumably to appease Gulf concerns 
regarding an export of Islamist ideology.
On an economic level, there are no major Saudi stakes 
in the Tunisian economy that would need to be protected 
against economic instability. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia is 
perceived as “far away” – and as “part of Europe,” being 
also considered “a European problem” from a Saudi eco­
nomic perspective when it comes to business activities.15 
The Saudi business community’s presence in the Tunisian 
market is comparatively invisible. Bilateral networks are 
not well established, and interest in market entry is no­
ticeably low. This is due to the fact that Saudi Arabian pri­
vate companies regard the Tunisian market as less attrac­
tive due to its small size and the domination of European 
companies compared to other North African countries 
such as Egypt. While Tunisia’s economy is mostly based 
on industries, low­price tourism, and the service sector, 
Saudi Arabia’s business community is rather interested in 
investments in real estate, infrastructure, and the energy 
sector. Therefore, large margins of return on investment 
are not guaranteed in Tunisia, which has prevented large­
scale Saudi investment in the past. 
From a Tunisian perspective, however, FDI from the 
Gulf is perceived as necessary. Economic decision makers 
are aware of the urgent need for economic diversification 
in order to overcome the strong dependence on the EU 
as the main trade partner, which has negatively affected 
domestic economic growth in recent years. However, the 
highly bureaucratized Tunisian administration and the 
insecure legal and political framework since 2011 have 
kept risk­averse Saudi investors away from the Tunisian 
Figure 12: Saudi Arabian Projects in Tunisia in the power and water sector
Project Name Sub sector Net project value �in million USD) Award year Completion year
La Skhira Sufuric Acid Fertilizer Plant 173 2008 2011
Tyna Power Plant Oil/Gas Power Plant 92 2007 2012
Sud Meliane II Water Treatment Plant 34 2004 2008
Feriana Power Plant Oil/Gas Power Plant 92 2007 2012
Source: MEED Projects 2014
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loans have been provided since Ben Ali’s removal, mostly 
by the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD), while in 2015 
an additional 500 million will be spent for the last time.40 
Only a few official visits from Saudi political representa­
tives have taken place in recent years.41  
The Saudi leadership is cautiously watching the deterio­
rating situation in Tunisia due to increasing jihadism and 
radicalism, however.42 The situation at the Libyan border 
in particular has caused widespread discussion of Tuni­
sia’s future stability.43 Approximately 1,000 Tunisians are 
fighting in Libya,44 additional 1,500­3,000 have been re­
cruited by ISIS,45 and 600 Tunisian jihadists have returned 
home from Iraq and Syria.46 In addition, 7,000 Tunisians 
have been prevented from leaving the country to join 
fighting in Iraq and Syria. Thus, Tunisian security experts 
estimate the number of possible supporters of jihadi ideol­
ogy at about 100,000, which would mean ten percent of 
the total population.47 The terrorist attacks on the Bardo 
Museum in March and on a hotel resort in Sousse in June 
2015 dramatically showed the fragility of the domestic 
security situation. 
2.3 Future Prospects of the Saudi-Tunisian Relationship 
Tunisia is of limited geostrategic relevance to Saudia Arabia. 
On a political level, Saudi engagement is likely to remain 
limited unless the situation in – and, more importantly, 
around – Tunisia changes in any (unforeseen and maybe 
unlikely) way that makes Saudi political or even military 
intervention necessary to protect Saudi interests. As the 
new King Salman has shown in Yemen, his foreign policy 
is based on ad hoc actions toward acute hot spots nearby, 
whereas Tunisia seems to be beyond the Saudi scope.  
The strong role that Tunisian jihadists play in countries 
like Syria is not yet an issue that has triggered a Saudi 
response. 
       However, the more the situation in Tunisia deterio­
rates, the more Saudi Arabia’s new King Salman may con­
sider additional financial or logistical support in order to 
stabilize Tunisia, secure the border to Libya, and prevent 
Tunisian jihadists from entering Saudi Arabia.48 In this 
regard, Tunisia needs support in securing its borders  
and in creating jobs in rural areas and along the border. 
Both could become future fields of Saudi­Tunisian coop­
eration.
Tunisia is of limited economic relevance to Saudia Arabia. 
From an economic perspective, Saudi Arabia’s business 
activities in Tunisia will not increase extensively in the 
future. This is due to the absence of investment opportu­
nities as well as to cultural reservations and bureaucratic 
reluctance on the Tunisian side. Albeit on a small scale, 
Saudi companies might engage more intensively in the 
mid and long term. The new Tunisian government is in 
strong need of additional FDI and is thus working on 
improving the investment climate for foreign partners. In 
this context, an investment conference entitled “Invest in 
Tunisia” took place in Tunis in November 2014. Some 22 
projects were presented to European, Arab, and multi­
lateral donors. However, the follow­up remained lim­
ited, and Gulf partners showed reluctance for increased 
engagement because Tunisia’s interim government was 
not considered a reliable partner. After the victory of 
Nidaa Tunes and the completion of the political transi­
tion process in spring 2015, Tunisia is again organizing an 
investment conference at the end of 2015 in order to pres­
ent tenders for projects in all sectors aiming at attracting 
international investors. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the new Tuni­
sian government is willing to design special concepts and 
strategies to attract FDI from Saudi Arabia. This would 
entail a more investment­friendly and sensitive approach 
to the Gulf state similar to Lebanon’s approach. In this 
case Saudi Arabia might change its economic policies 
toward Tunisia. Lobbying must therefore be concentrated 
on the political players within the kingdom to present 
Tunisia as a hub connectning Saudi companies to Africa 
and Europe. This could be fostered by bilateral institu­
tions, chambers of commerce, and even the embassies. If 
the generational shift within Saudi Arabia’s political and 
economic elite takes place quickly, there is a chance that 
bilateral business relations might advance, for both sides 
share a similar mindset on economic progress and “the 
American way.” Both new generations have been educat­
ed in the US or in European countries and are thus more 
globalized than previous generations.49
Saudia Arabia has limited understanding of Tunisia’s 
multifaceted political culture. Saudi Arabia’s political de­
cision makers have little understanding of or trust in the 
Tunisian democratic and institutional structures, which 
are evolving as part of the Tunisian transition process. 
They are consequently grappling to identify potential 
religious, political, and economic partners with whom 
they can cooperate, which hampers the development of 
a concerted policy approach to the country.50 
At the same time Tunisian political and economic 
players face domestic challenges, including widespread 
cultural prejudices against Saudi Arabia. These need to 
be overcome if closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia is 
to take place. A lack of insight among Tunisian policy 
makers and bureaucrats into Saudi decision­making 
processes further contributes to this problem.
panies works in the chemical sector with a FDI volume 
of 18 million USD. This is followed by 991 workers in the 
construction material industry with a total FDI volume of 
35 million. In total, 3,100 foreign companies are present in 
Tunisia (including 1,200 from France, 500–600 from Italy, 
350 from Germany, 80 from UK, 80 from The Netherlands, 
and 65 from the US) with an investment volume of 14 bil­
lion EUR.30
Figure 13: Saudi Arabia’s economic activities in Tunisia 
by sector
Sector
Number 
of com�
panies
FDI in 
million 
USD
Employees
Agriculture 2 3.91 35
Aquaculture 1 0.97 41
Agriculture 
services 1 2.00 20
Agribusiness 3 1.78 32
Chemical 4 18.03 1,139
Electronic 1 1.06 372
Pharmaceutical 
Industry31 1 2.16 362
Construction ma�
terial sector 3 35.24 991
Mechanical sector 2 27.41 382
Source: Foreign Investment Promotion Agency 2013
Since 2011, several Saudi Arabian companies have 
announced their intent to intensify their investments 
in Tunisia especially in the real estate and power sector. 
However, none of these projects has been implemented 
so far. In this regard, the most ambitious announcement 
was made by the Saudi company Hesham bin Abdulaziz 
Almousa Group from Riyadh, together with 50–60 Tuni­
sian and other Arab and international partners. These 
wanted to invest 118 billion USD in the Tunis Economic 
City in the Enfidha district near Sousse and Hammamet, 
which was predicted to help to attract Arab investors and 
contribute to the development of such sectors as tourism, 
finance, and healthcare.32 The city plan contains a port 
zone, an industrial and warehouse zone, and a free trade 
zone. Officially, the project aims to attract 5–7 billion 
USD in investments per year and two million visitors per 
annum by 2030. Its construction phase will extend over 
a period of 15 years and will contribute to the creation 
of at least 200,000 direct and indirect jobs. The city will 
cover a surface area of 90 square kilometers and will run 
along 18 kilometers of coastline. It will consist of 14 smart 
zones, four economic centers (tourist, academic, health 
and commercial) in addition to residential areas.33 In 2011, 
the project was initiated by the Saudi Prince Fahd bin 
Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, a Saudi businessman and 
son of the former Crown Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz.34 
However, the start of the project was delayed due to the 
fragile political and economic situation in Tunisia after 
2013, and it seems unrealistic that the ambitious vision 
will be realized on schedule, if at all. In addition to Tunis 
Economic City, a Saudi investment fund is said to be 
involved in financing the 210­km gas pipeline Tunis­Béja­
Jandouba­Dahmani with a project volume of roughly 78 
million USD. This was planned to be complete at the end 
of 2015.35 However, more information about the concrete 
Saudi financial involvement is lacking. 
In recent years, Saudi investors have sought to invest 
in such mega projects rather than in sustainable medium­
sized projects that are adapted to Tunisian economic 
needs. According to one Tunisian interlocutor, “Gulf in­
vestors do not take into consideration the reality.”36 Only 
one Saudi­initiated mega project in the real estate sector 
has been successfully implemented: the construction, 
under Ben Ali, of the new district of Tunis, Berges du Lac, 
and the rehabilitation of the lake Lac du Tunis, financed 
by the Saudi business mogul Salih Kamil. Both projects 
started in 1985 and were administered by the Saudi­Tu­
nisian company La Société de Promotion du Lac de Tunis 
(SPLT).37 However, this Saudi­initiated project caused 
tremendous controversy in Tunis, as a ban on alcohol 
was introduced at Saudi demand. This further damaged 
the public image of Saudi Arabian investors among parts 
of the secular population of Tunis. As one Tunisian put 
it, Saudi “investments as such might not be harmful, but 
they come with conditions attached.” 38 With regard to 
their competitors, the ban on alcohol has also negatively 
affected the local restaurants and bars. 
In the agricultural sector, Saudi investments remain 
minimal because Tunisia only rents instead of selling 
land to foreign investors. This has prevented Gulf invest­
ment in recent years. In addition, Tunisia’s agriculture is 
dominated by the cultivation of olives, dates, and wine, 
products that do not serve Saudi Arabia’s import interests. 
Closely linked institutional networks are missing, and 
Saudi Arabia’s business community and Tunisia’s invest­
ment promoting agencies often lack detailed information 
about possible opportunities for bilateral cooperation. 
While a Saudi­Tunisian Business Council and a bilateral 
development bank do exist, their activities to foster Saudi 
investment remain significantly low.39
3) Political efforts: Unlike Egypt, Tunisia has received 
only minimal financial support from Saudi Arabia in  
comparison to international donors and European coun­
tries. Roughly 120 million USD per year in the form of 
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axis – joining anti­Islamist forces such as Egypt’s Sisi and 
Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar – to counter the Qatari­
Ennahda alliance.”61 It is important to note, however, that 
a relevant number of Nidaa Tounes representatives favor 
a different approach to Libya, causing serious rifts inside 
the party.62 The need to balance these different interests 
inside the party are reflected in a remark by a high­
ranking party official who said: “Our best friend are the 
Emiratis, but our direct neighbor [Libya’] is supported by 
Qatar.”63 The UAE seems to have placed particular trust in 
Beji Caid Essebsi, with whom UAE leaders enjoyed close 
personal relations because he had allowed Emirati (and 
Qatari) weapons to be shipped to Libya through Tunisia 
during his term as prime minister in 2011. As a result, the 
UAE offered Essebsi two armored cars during the presi­
dential election campaign, which he quickly announced 
to have turned over to the state.64 Relations seem to have 
suffered, however, when the party invited Ennahda to 
join the government coalition – apparently against the 
will of UAE leaders.65 If true, such outright interference 
in Tunisian political affairs highlights Emirati inexperi­
ence in engaging in party politics in the Arab world – or at 
least in Tunisia. Such interference is generally vigorously 
opposed by the populace. A Tunisian political analyst 
argued that such popular outcry contributes to confusion 
in the UAE and other Gulf states, and to an “uncomfort­
able feeling about how to engage in Tunisian politics,” 
which in turn makes future investments and other forms 
of engagement less likely.66
3) Business Investments: The Tunisian Foreign Invest­
ment Promotion Agency (FIPA) calculates that Emirati in­
vestments in Tunisia by the end of 2014 created or secured 
around 11,500 jobs, of which 2,100 were in industrial sec­
tors, 1,200 in tourism, and 8,000 in telecommunications. 
The latter most probably stems from the UAE purchase 
of 35 percent of Tunisie Telecom’s stakes in 2006.67 This 
shows the limited extent of UAE investment since 2011, 
which is probably at least partially a result of lingering 
disputes over the various UAE real­estate projects in 
Tunisia that had been agreed before 2011 and either put 
on hold or cancelled after Ben Ali was toppled. Recently, 
however, both countries have expressed their interest in 
increasing UAE investments in Tunisia, especially after 
Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa’s visit to Abu Dhabi in early 
2014 and the participation of the UAE’s minister of inter­
national cooperation and development, Sheikha Lubna Al 
Qasimi, in Tunisia’s investment conference in September 
2014.68 The UAE­based private equity firm Abraaj has a 
small number of Tunisian companies in its investment 
portfolio, especially in the health sector.69 Moreover, the 
UAE is rumored to have an interest in getting more in­
volved in the Tunisian harbor business – a step that would 
resemble similar activities in Egypt.70 On the whole, UAE 
investments seem to attract less popular criticism in Tuni­
sia than, for example, Qatari investments.71
4) Humanitarian assistance and limited official develop-
ment assistance: UAE official development assistance for 
Tunisia had been very limited for many years even prior 
to 2011, with the main development focus on the water 
and agricultural sector and minor financial support for 
building dams for water irrigation. Since 2011, the UAE 
focus has been on humanitarian assistance, for example 
medical assistance for refugees coming from Libya 
and food and clothing for around 10,000 poor Tunisian 
families during the winter season. Most funding came 
from the Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation, and 
projects were implemented in cooperation with the 
Tunisian Red Crescent and the Tunisian Union of Social 
Solidarity. Altogether, 11.6 million USD was disbursed in 
2011, around 2 million in 2012, and 5.8 million in 2013. In 
2013, the foundation also provided the Tunisian Ministry 
of Health with 12 ambulances and other medical equip­
ment for health centers in various cities.72 In winter 2015, 
the foundation continued its support for more than 4,700 
families. 
3.3 Future Prospects for the UAE-Tunisian Relationship
Further UAE business investments in Tunisia are likely. The 
UAE has an interest in investing in Tunisia as part of its ef­
fort to increase the UAE’s economic diversification. Due to 
the small size of its market, however, Tunisia should not 
expect a major inflow of investment from the UAE. UAE 
investments are likely to come from the country’s state­
owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds, whose 
investments are largely driven more by economic than 
by political calculations. While such investments may ac­
company political efforts, as the Egyptian example shows, 
they will not be geared toward increasing social security 
for Tunisian workers, an important factor in tackling 
Tunisia’s pressing socioeconomic problems. Future invest­
ments also seem to depend on a settlement of current 
legal disputes against members of the UAE ruling families 
and of Tunisians close to them.  
Political cooperation will be closest in the security sector. 
Future relations between Nidaa Tounes and the UAE 
depend as much on the UAE as on the party itself. In order 
not to compromise its political standing among Tunisian 
voters, the party must not be seen as a puppet of the UAE. 
For its part, the UAE must come to terms with the less per­
sonalized way of doing politics in Tunisia – in contrast to 
3. The United Arab Emirates and Tunisia after 2011: 
Interests, Efforts, and Future Prospects 
Relations between Tunisia and the UAE prior to 2011 
were good, but they were neither particularly close nor 
of strategic importance for either side. Bilateral trade 
had been limited, but it increased during the last years of 
the Ben Ali government. Between 2009 and 2010 alone, 
there was a growth in non­oil trade of 69 percent from 
68 million USD in 2009 to (still very modest) 153 million 
in 2010.51 During those years, a number of major real­
estate projects had also been agreed upon that have never, 
however, been implemented. While the global financial 
crisis caused the first delay, most projects were eventually 
cancelled or put on hold after the 2011 uprisings due to 
pending legal cases against these contracts. The planned 
investments of 25 billion USD in the Mediterranean Gate 
Real Estate Project (widely known as “Sama Dubai”), of 
5 billion in Tunis City of Sport, and of 1.9 billion in a tour­
ism project in Marina al­Qussor are vividly remembered 
in Tunisia and are largely responsible for fueling the 
popular feeling of a “Gulf buy­out of Tunisia” that had 
spread during those years.52 
On the other side of the relationship, there seems to 
be no precise information available about the number of 
Tunisians living and working in the UAE nor about the 
volume of remittances, but Tunisian interview partners 
have argued that the UAE has attracted a large number 
of Tunisian engineers and similar academically trained 
people who have not shown inclinations toward political 
activities in the UAE.53
3.1. Emirati Interests in Tunisia after 2011
The UAE’s engagement in Tunisia seems to be guided 
mainly by political interests pertaining to the wider Arab 
region. Since it has no major financial investments in Tu­
nisia, the UAE is not overly concerned about the stability 
of the Tunisian economy, which is in stark contrast to the 
rationale of the UAE’s engagement in Egypt. The UAE’s 
economic interests are more geared toward Libya, for 
which Tunisia serves as a political and geographic gate­
way. Similarly, the UAE is less concerned about instability 
in Tunisia than about the spillover effects of the Libyan 
conflict, where the UAE supports the camp of General 
Khalifa Al­Haftar.54
The UAE’s main interests in Tunisia relate to its fight 
against terrorism and the spread of political Islam. While 
the Ennahda party is not perceived as following the 
same transnational agenda as the MB in Egypt, the UAE 
is still interested in limiting its political influence. This 
should, however, also be seen as an expression of the 
UAE’s interest in weakening Qatar’s political role in the 
region, thereby strengthening its own role and image as a 
regional power.
3.2. Emirati Efforts in Tunisia after 2011
Emirati efforts in Tunisia since 2011 have been most pro­
nounced in 1) security sector cooperation and 2) mainly 
rhetorical support for those representatives of Nidaa 
Tounes like Beji Caid Essebsi. Unlike its engagement in 
Egypt, the UAE has not provided macroeconomic support 
for Tunisia’s economic stabilization in the form of loans 
or grants, presumably because the UAE did not fear major 
spillover effects from Tunisia on the wider region and ex­
pected European countries to take the lead in stabilizing 
Tunisia economically.55 Other efforts such as 3) business 
investments and 4) financial assistance for development 
and humanitarian causes have in fact been extremely 
limited. Tunisians see the comparatively small scale of 
support as proof that there is no political will in the UAE 
to help Tunisia.56
1) Material and political support in the fight against 
terrorism: The UAE is providing support to Tunisia to 
fight terrorist activities inside the country and to secure 
the Libyan­Tunisian border against the influx of militant 
Islamists and weapons. Personal links and cooperation 
between the UAE and Tunisian security apparatuses 
are said to be strong.57 This is expressed in the loan of 
a dozen Black Hawk helicopters to Tunisia, which will 
last until the country receives new helicopters from the 
US in 2016.58 Moreover, the UAE is said to have financed 
Tunisian purchases of French military equipment in much 
the same way it participated in trilateral deals involving 
the UAE, France, and Egypt.59 Support for the Tunisian 
fight against jihadi movement terrorism is also expressed 
symbolically, as could be seen in the participation of a 
UAE delegation led by the UAE minister of youth and 
culture, Sheikh Nahyan bin Mubarak Al Nahyan, in the 
demonstration in Tunis after the attacks on the Bardo 
Museum in March 2015.60 The UAE portrays itself through 
such measures as a reliable partner of the new Tunisian 
government. Stressing that it shares Tunisia’s political 
concerns over terrorism and Islamist extremism, the UAE 
also uses activities in this policy field to contrast itself 
with Qatar.
2) Support for Nidaa Tounes and its representatives: 
With regard to Tunisian political parties, the UAE seems 
to have focused its attention on Nidaa Tounes, with 
whom it shares a number of foreign policy concerns. As 
Youssef Cherif argues, “Nidaa leaders, in their animos­
ity toward Ennahda, have willingly entered the Emirati 
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ments regardless of their political background, because 
a “successful transition in Tunisia would help boost the 
image of the small Gulf state at a time when its reputation 
was already suffering from accusations of funding ter­
rorism.”79 Indeed, Emir Hamad, in personally attending 
the first anniversary of the Tunisian uprising on January 
14, 2012, made it undoubtedly clear that Qatar wished 
to be associated with Tunisia’s democratic transition.80 
The same message was sent by providing a significant 
contribution to Tunisia’s Martyr’s Fund (for families 
of the dead and injured) and by helping the Tunisian 
government recover 28.8 million USD in funds embezzled 
by the former president Ben Ali and his family.81 Cherif 
notes, however, that Ennahda – due to its lack of support 
among rich Tunisians and due to the opposition of other 
Gulf states to movements of political Islam – was highly 
dependent on Qatar, for example on Qatari media outlets 
such as Al Jazeera and Qatari­owned Arab newspapers 
like Al­Araby al­Jadid and Al­Quds al­Arabi. This made it 
most likely to praise Qatar locally and abroad in the name 
of the Tunisian state in the case of an electoral victory.82 A 
Tunisian interlocutor has referred to the Qatari approach 
in reaching out to different Tunisian political players as 
having started as a “trial and error strategy” that eventu­
ally resulted in a “hit and run.” 
In fact, Qatar’s wish to be so strongly associated with 
the uprising and to claim the victory over the Ben Ali 
regime as its own might be among the main reasons why 
Qatar’s image ultimately suffered more. It is noteworthy 
that some Tunisians blame Qatar for activities that other 
countries had undertaken without attracting similar criti­
cism. For example, Qatar and Al Jazeera are criticized for 
their activities training journalists, presumably because 
such training is believed to have a negative impact on the 
journalists’ ability to report objectively. At the same time, 
Deutsche Welle and other Western media and NGOs are 
spared criticism for similar activities.83 Similarly, the fact 
that Al Jazeera had already aired programs critical of Ben 
Ali before 2011 – a scandal that resulted in the withdrawal 
of Tunisia’s ambassador from Doha at the time – has not 
burnished Qatar’s – and Al Jazeera’s – reputation among 
Tunisians today.84 
Against this background, the rumor is plausible that 
Emir Tamim expressed to President Essebsi the wish 
for a “new beginning” in his country’s relations with 
Tunisia.85 Unlike Qatar’s relations with the MB in Egypt, 
those with Ennahda have not become an outright liabil­
ity and are thus likely to be pursued further. But Qatar 
can be expected to reach out even more than in the 
past to other political actors in Tunisia, too, rather than 
focusing exclusively on Ennahda.
2) Financial support for macroeconomic stability: In 
spring 2012, Qatar deposited 500 million USD with the 
Tunisian Central Bank in the form of a five­year­loan at 2.5 
percent interest. The purpose of this loan was to help the 
country overcome external balance problems.86 Another 
loan in the same amount was announced in Novem­
ber 2013, but it is unclear if it actually came through.87 
Qatar is the only Gulf country to have supported Tunisia 
through such a measure.
3) Business investments: After 2011, Qatar started to 
invest in various sectors, among them telecommunica­
tion, tourism, banking, and petrochemicals. Although 
these investments exceed 6 billion USD, former President 
Marzouki had called them “relatively low” and called for 
trade relations to be improved.88
Qatar invested the most in building an oil refinery in 
Skhira and in a phosphate project in Sra Ouertane.89 Ac­
cording to Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, the Skhira refinery 
will allow Tunisia to refine oil from Libya and thereby 
develop its potential as an export hub for refined products, 
massively expanding capacity beyond the existing older 
refinery in Bizerte.90 Already in summer 2012, the Qatari 
real estate company Qatar Diyar, owned by Qatar’s sov­
ereign wealth fund QIA, had announced investments in 
the Tunisian tourism sector for a luxury hotel in Touzeur 
worth 80 million USD and another in Mahdia.91 While it 
seems that these projects are still in the planning phase, 
partly for security concerns especially in Tozeur, the Qa­
tari­owned La Cigale hotel chain has in the meantime re­
furbished a luxury hotel in Tabarka. Furthermore, Qatar 
National Bank (QNB) purchased more than 99 percent of 
the Tunisian Qatari Bank, whose name was consequently 
changed into QNB.92 The Qatari mobile company Oore­
doo/QTel purchased 90 percent of shares of the mobile 
company Tunisiana, whose name was likewise changed 
into Ooredoo. Further investments were discussed during 
numerous bilateral business delegations visiting Doha 
and Tunis that often involved high­ranking politicians 
from both sides. These included President Marzouki and 
Prime Minister Jumaa of Tunisia, and Foreign Minister 
Al­Attiyah of Qatar.93 
According to FIPA, Qatari investments created or se­
cured 850 jobs, 800 of them through the aforementioned 
Tunisiana purchase. Several interview partners men­
tioned that investments in Tunisia’s agricultural sector 
would create a large number of jobs. This sector is indeed 
of general interest to Qatar, also as part of its efforts to 
Egypt. Tunisia thus poses a challenge as well as an oppor­
tunity to the UAE – and to other Gulf states – to learn how 
to engage with political parties in a post­revolutionary 
Arab world. 
The UAE will make geostrategic use of Tunisia as a gate-
way to Libya. The current Tunisian government is eager to 
protect its “neutral” status in order to avoid being drawn 
further into the conflict in Libya. It is aware of the diverg­
ing interests of the UAE and Qatar in this area. Currently, 
Tunisia’s open borders with Libya seem to be in every­
body’s interest. For the moment, the UAE will therefore 
not push the Tunisian government to take sides.
4. Qatar and Tunisia after 2011: Interests, Efforts, 
and Future Prospects
4.1 Qatari Interests in Tunisia after 2011
Among the Gulf states, Qatar was probably the most deci­
sive political and economic player in Tunisia after 2011. Its 
engagement was motivated by precisely the same motives 
behind its engagement in Egypt (see chapter 2, section 4).
In Tunisia, too, Qatar perceived the political develop­
ments that began in 2011 more as an opportunity than a 
threat, also because the estimated 20,000 Tunisians work­
ing in Qatar posed no political challenge in Qatar.73 Here 
too Emir Hamad wished for the West to perceive Qatar as 
an interlocutor and a bridge – in this case to Ennahda, as 
part of a larger network of Islamist movements that were 
expected to be the future powers in the Middle East. He 
presumed that strong influence on the new governments 
in Arab countries provided the potential to strengthen 
Qatar’s role in the GCC, especially in its competition with 
the UAE. By politically supporting Tunisian protesters he 
also sought to improve Qatar’s image in the Arab world 
and divert attention from Qatar’s own authoritarian rule.
As in Egypt, considerations of economic diversifica­
tion were at work in Tunisia as well. Qatar expected that 
changing power structures in Tunisia would provide new 
investment opportunities for Qatar’s Investment Author­
ity (QIA) and for private Qatari businesses. It hoped to 
capitalize on relations it had long nurtured with Ennahda 
and receive preferential treatment. More than other Gulf 
states, Qatar also seems to see Tunisia as a potential gate­
way to sub­Saharan African markets.
Finally, Qatar also sees Tunisia as a gateway to Libya, 
where it wishes to increase its political influence and 
make additional investments.74
Under Emir Tamim, the new Qatari emir, the general 
line of engagement in Tunisia did not change consider­
ably. This is because Ennahda, unlike the MB in Egypt, 
remained integrated in the political landscape and 
because the various Tunisian governments were eager to 
attract investments from all Gulf countries, regardless of 
their political outlook. Nevertheless, in Tunisia, too, Emir 
Tamim has opted for less political visibility and is eager to 
keep a lower political profile than his father. 
4.2 Qatari Efforts in Tunisia after 2011
Qatar’s engagement in Tunisia since 2011 has included 1) 
political support for Tunisian governments and for En­
nahda, 2) financial support for macroeconomic stability, 
3) business investments mainly by state­owned enterpris­
es, and 4) official development assistance.
1) Political support for Tunisian governments and for 
Ennahda: Qatar is widely held to be a strong supporter 
of Ennahda. Indeed, relations between Qatari officials 
and members of the party seem to be cordial. Rached 
Ghannouchi himself, the intellectual leader of Ennahda, 
is said to have called Qatar a “partner in Tunisia’s revolu­
tion,” and Rafik Abdessalem, son in­law of Ghannouchi, 
served as head of the Research and Studies Office at the 
Al Jazeera Center for Studies before joining the cabinet 
of Hamedi Jebali as foreign minister in December 2011.75 
While Tunisians seem to take it for granted that En­
nahda receives funding from Qatar, there is a lack of hard 
evidence to substantiate such claims. The British news­
paper The Independent even had to issue a formal apol­
ogy for claiming that Ennahda’s election campaign had 
been funded by Qatar.76 Among Tunisians and especially 
Tunisian politicians, however, this claim is still generally 
treated as a fact.77 
Focusing on Qatar’s links with Ennahda, however, 
risks overlooking the fact that Tunisian politicians from 
various positions on the political spectrum enjoyed good 
standing with the Qatari leadership. Mohsin Marzouk, 
the secretary general of Nidaa Tounes, for example, 
worked for several years at the Doha­based Arab Democ­
racy Foundation, a project close to the heart of Sheikha 
Mozah, wife of Qatar’s former Emir Hamad, and is said 
to still be on good terms with Foreign Minister Khalid al­
Attiyah and Emir Tamim’s advisor, Azmi Bishara. Moncef 
Marzouki, Tunisian president between 2011 and 2014 and 
former leader of Tunisia’s leftist opposition party Congrès 
pour la République (CPR), is also said to have been close 
to Emir Hamad. During his presidential term, he repeat­
edly defended Qatar against popular criticism and called 
the country’s “very very good relations” with Qatar a 
“win­win relationship.”78 
Youssef Cherif rightly points out that Qatar had an in­
terest in supporting post­revolutionary Tunisian govern­
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On the whole, Qatar can be expected to continue 
its political support for Ennahda while simultaneously 
increasing its efforts to diversify its political contacts. 
Personal links between the Qatari leadership and Tuni­
sian politicians of various parties provide a good basis for 
reaching out to new political partners. However, this will 
also depend on the Tunisian parties how much influence 
Qatar will be able to exert, for parties have to be careful 
not to compromise their political standing with Tunisian 
voters. Like the UAE, Qatar will have to come to terms 
with the less personalized way of doing politics in Tunisia. 
As with the UAE, Tunisia thus offers an opportunity for 
Qatar, too, to learn how to engage with political parties in 
a post­revolutionary Arab world. 
More Qatari investments in Tunisia are likely. The 
Tunisian government is open to investments from all 
Gulf states. Qatar is thus very likely to remain an ac­
tive economic player in Tunisia through its state­owned 
enterprises. While the operations of such enterprises are 
driven more by economic than by political considerations, 
they could easily be used to accompany political efforts. 
They will not provide the necessary impetus for sharing 
economic benefits more fairly or for more effective protec­
tion for the country’s poor and vulnerable. 
Qatar will make geostrategic use of Tunisia as a gateway 
to Libya. As already noted in this chapter’s section on the 
UAE, the current Tunisian government is eager to avoid 
being drawn further into the Libya conflict and to main­
tain its “neutral” status. It is aware of how the interests 
of the UAE and Qatar in particular diverge on this matter. 
Tunisia’s open borders with Libya seem at present to be in 
Qatar’s interest as well, also because at least for the mo­
ment Qatar is neither in the position to push the Tunisian 
government further into taking sides nor interested in 
doing so. 
5. The Impact of Gulf State Financial Support  
on Tunisia’s Political and Economic Development 
since 2011
5.1 General Remarks
The assistance provided by the Gulf states to Tunisia since 
2011 has been limited, especially compared to what the 
same states have provided to Egypt. The economic and 
political impact of this assistance has thus been commen­
surately limited. The small scale of assistance reflects the 
comparatively smaller concerns of Gulf states about Tuni­
sia’s political uprisings and the ensuing transition there. 
Politically, the UAE and Saudi Arabia were and are less 
worried about Ennahda’s role in Tunisia’s political future 
than about the MB’s role in Egypt. The Ennahda party 
was not seen as having a transnational agenda, and it 
proved willing to cooperate with other Tunisian political 
players and movements in the political transition process. 
Economically, the Gulf states were not as anxious 
about Tunisia’s economic stability as they were about 
Egypt’s, as they had relatively few investments in Tunisia. 
In their eyes, an economic collapse of Tunisia would not 
have had a significantly negative impact on the region as 
a whole, nor would it today. Indeed, only Qatar has thus 
far taken measures to stabilize the Tunisian economy – in 
the form of loans to Tunisia’s Central Bank.
While the poor condition of the Tunisian economy 
may not have an overwhelmingly negative impact on the 
region, it still represents the core problem. Insufficient 
economic performance and unevenly shared economic 
benefits were, after all, at the root of the 2011 uprisings in 
Tunisia.101 
Nevertheless, despite an impressive, if occasionally 
rocky, political transition process since the uprisings 
of 2011, the economic system that existed under Ben Ali 
remains largely intact. Certainly, the Tunisian public’s 
strong demands for access to economic opportunity are 
far from being met. The current state­controlled eco­
nomic model has not yet been reformed into an inclusive 
and sustainable model that promotes investment, enables 
firms to increase their productivity and competitiveness, 
and accelerates the creation of quality jobs throughout 
the country. In order to successfully tackle the existing 
socioeconomic and political challenges, Tunisia urgently 
needs to create a healthier economic environment and 
ensure more effective protection for the poor and vulner­
able.102 This will take time. Certainly, no recent push for 
such reforms has come from Gulf business investments or 
from Gulf political initiatives. Nor can it be expected in 
the future. 
Beyond the very modest direct engagement of the 
Gulf states in Tunisia itself, the country could also be 
affected economically and politically by their engage­
ment in neighboring Libya, especially that of the UAE and 
Qatar.103 The Tunisian government is well aware of the 
extent to which negative developments in the conflict in 
Libya threaten its own future political and social stability. 
The international community needs to coordinate with 
the Gulf states to ensure that the Libyan conflict does not 
hamper Tunisia’s economic and political transition pro­
cess and endanger the domestic security situation.
The following sections outline the concrete ways in 
which assistance from the Gulf states had an impact on 
political and economic developments in Tunisia after 2011.
strengthen its domestic food security, but Tunisia is only 
willing to lease rather than to sell land.94 
Most interview partners in both countries argued that 
profit was the major motivation behind Qatari invest­
ments in Tunisia, especially those related to QIA, which 
conforms to the strategies followed by all Gulf state sover­
eign wealth funds. Given the close connections between 
QIA and the ruling family, however, it seems plausible 
that political interests were also at work, some of which 
go beyond interests in Tunisia itself. On the one hand, in­
vestments in Tunisia are part of Qatar’s regional outreach 
in the Maghreb and sub­Saharan Africa.95 On the other 
hand, there are rumors circulating that tie promises of 
Qatari investments in Tunisia to Tunisia’s recognition of 
Libya’s National Transitional Council.96
Like Qatar’s efforts in other fields, its investments meet 
more popular opposition in Tunisia than those of other 
countries do. One example of strong anti­Qatari senti­
ment was the popular campaign against Tunisiana/Oore­
doo, which resulted in the cancellation of a large number 
of subscriptions after its sale to Qatar. This is especially 
noteworthy when compared to the Tunisians’ apparent 
lack of interest in the Emirati ownership of Tunisie Tele­
com since 2006. More than the other Gulf states, Qatar 
is criticized for bringing “only money but no know­how,” 
although the country’s investments hardly differ from 
those of other GCC investments in this regard.97 Many 
interview partners were also more suspicious about 
QNB activities in the banking sector than about those of 
other Gulf­owned banks. When analyzing such negative 
response, one should recall that other countries do not 
tend to accompany their activities and investments with 
as much publicity as Qatar does. Again, strong anti­Qatari 
reactions among Tunisians may not only be a response 
to Qatar’s political line in Tunisia but also to its tendency 
to spotlight itself. As a result, Tunisians also overlook 
the positive side effects for the Tunisian labor force, for 
example from the cooperation between Qatar Diyar and 
Silatech, a Qatari development organization, in the tour­
ism project in Tozeur, which is meant to create new jobs 
in this impoverished area. 
4) Official development humanitarian assistance: Qatar 
provided financial assistance for a number of development 
projects that were implemented by Tunisian, Qatari, and 
international NGOs and charities. Reports of the Qatari 
foreign ministry on foreign aid state around 10 million USD 
in 2010–11, 135 million in 2012, and 3 million in 2013.98 The 
large amount stated for the year 2012 seems to include a 
100 million loan provided by the Qatari Friendship Fund 
for projects benefiting employment and education. This 
loan is managed from afar by the Qatari foreign ministry 
in Doha with the help of the Qatari embassy in Tunis. 
Several Qatari organizations working in Tunisia seem 
to receive part of their project funding from this loan, 
among them Silatech and Qatar Charity. While Silatech 
focuses on employment and job creation for youth in 
cooperation with local and international partners like 
the World Bank and the Japan Social Development Fund 
(JSDF), Qatar Charity is involved in a 5­year project total­
ling 10 million USD that focuses on agricultural projects 
and housing in rural areas.99 Also the Shaikh Thani Bin 
Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services (RAF) is 
said to run humanitarian projects in Tunisia. Qatar also 
provided funding for two housing projects, one of them a 
project in Sejoumi that had been initially started by Libya 
but ran out of funding after 2011.  
According to Tunisian government employees, Qatar 
was the most generous provider of development as­
sistance among the Gulf states until 2013, after which 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait increased their official assis­
tance. Western development organizations in Tunisia and 
even Tunisian government officials have little information 
about Qatar’s activities in this sector because employees 
of Qatar’s organizations in Tunisia do not participate in 
coordination meetings. 
This lack of information fuels rumors about the activi­
ties of Qatari charities in Tunisia. As a result of growing 
anti­Qatari sentiment within the Tunisian population, 
Silatech and Qatar Charity took different measures to 
protect their projects and their local partners against 
political hijacking. While the implementation of Silat­
ech’s projects is mostly mediated by international NGOs 
that are not required to use Silatech’s logo, Qatar Charity 
has decided to coordinate the projects with the help of 
consultants. This has the effect of taking  local partners 
out of the spotlight and playing down the extent of their 
participation.100 
4.3 Future Prospects for the Qatari-Tunisian Relationship
Qatar is likely to remain an active political player in 
Tunisia. Under Emir Tamim, the general line on engage­
ment in Tunisia did not change considerably. This is also 
because the current Tunisian government remains com­
mitted to attracting investments from all Gulf countries, 
regardless of their political outlook. It is interesting to 
note that several Qatari organizations reacted to grow­
ing anti­Qatari sentiment in Tunisia by taking measures 
to divert attention from Qatar and the organizations 
themselves as well as to protect local Tunisian partners 
and their work. 
Tunisian public
62 The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011
DGAPanalyse  / Nr. 9 / October 2015 DGAPanalyse  / Nr. 9 / October 2015
Chapter Three: Tunisia after 2011: The Impact of Gulf State Engagement 63
5.2 Impact on Political Developments in Detail
Foreign funding for charities had an impact on overall 
political discourse. Post­revolutionary Tunisia has been 
considerably more open to foreign contributions to 
help build its new political and economic order. This is 
because suspicions about the “agendas” of foreign donors 
were less pronounced there in 2011 than in countries such 
as Egypt, which had received sizable foreign assistance 
and support for civil society for decades. Kristina Kausch 
argues that this has led the new government to adopt a 
legal and political framework after 2011 that was broadly 
favorable to such foreign assistance.104 However, while 
foreign funding for associations and charities was legal­
ized, foreign funding for political parties remained illegal. 
Supporting charities as proxies for ideologically close po­
litical parties provided a ready solution to this problem.105 
As many Gulf states handed out more financial support 
to religious charities than to secular NGOs, allegations 
of Gulf funding for political parties via related charities 
and associations quickly arose. This in turn led to rising 
concerns about any financial funding coming from the 
Gulf, concerns that are further manipulated in political 
debates both by Tunisian political players and by the Gulf 
states themselves.
The Tunisian fight against terrorism is in danger of being 
coopted. Terror attacks on Tunisia pose an indisputable 
threat. However, supporting the country’s fight against 
terrorism has provided especially the UAE with a plat­
form to balance Qatar’s influence on domestic Tunisian 
politics. By supporting Tunisia’s security sector, the UAE 
also manages to increase its leverage on the Tunisian 
government’s stand on Libya, where the UAE has its own 
political agenda, while the Tunisian government is inter­
ested in being perceived as a neutral player. 
5.3 Impact on Economic Developments in Detail
There is potential for more foreign direct investment from 
Gulf countries. The various Tunisian governments in 
office since 2011 seem to have worked with Gulf inves­
tors and investments much as they have worked with all 
others: without preferential treatment. In doing so, they 
could well have lost some Gulf investments. The current 
Tunisian government wishes to increase Gulf investment 
to strengthen the Tunisian economy and simultaneously 
achieve more independence from its most important trad­
ing partner, the EU. However, convincing the population 
of the benefits of Gulf investments is a political chal­
lenge. The population has widespread concerns about the 
motivations of Gulf states and about the political, social, 
and cultural consequences of their increased influence on 
Tunisia.106
Most Gulf business investments are not aimed at inclu-
sive economic growth. Business investments from the Gulf 
are said to have created or secured more than 21,000 jobs, 
but the small number and size of planned and imple­
mented projects have not provided widespread trickle­
down effects. With a few exceptions, most projects did not 
target rural areas or the needs of socially and economi­
cally marginalized Tunisians. It must be noted, however, 
that development organizations from Qatar in particular 
are showing interest in youth employment, rural develop­
ment, support for small and medium­sized enterprises 
(partially via Sharia­compatible loans), and the renew­
able energy sector.
Most Gulf business investments target sectors with high 
returns on investments. With investments in the banking, 
telecommunication, and real estate sectors, Gulf state 
companies and SWFs have shown particular interest in 
sectors that have been rather closed to competition in 
the past and dominated by Tunisian state­owned enter­
prises.107 Telecommunication and financial services are 
especially important for the overall competitiveness of 
the Tunisian economy, as they are intensely used in value 
chains.108 The World Bank has noted that breaking the 
state’s monopoly in these sectors could decrease prices 
for consumers and thereby boost the economy. However, 
it remains to be seen if Gulf investments in these sectors 
will actually contribute to such developments. At present, 
they benefit from high prices paid by consumers, which 
gives them high returns on their investments.109 
Tunisia’s trade deficit with the Gulf states is continuously 
increasing. Tunisia’s foreign trade deficits have been rising 
in general and have almost doubled with the Gulf states, 
from 188 million USD in 2010 to 325 million in 2013.110 
As this deficit is mainly due to rising prices for energy 
imports, it is noteworthy that – in contrast to the Egyp­
tian case – Gulf investments in Tunisia’s energy sector and 
especially in renewable energy projects are still limited.111 
Only Qatar seems to be investing in this sector. This is 
somewhat surprising, as the Gulf states have increasingly 
been targeting other Middle Eastern energy markets, not 
only to increase their exports but also to ensure regional 
energy security via energy efficiency.
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1. Summary
1.1 Shifts and Deeper Changes in the Gulf States’ Foreign 
Policies since 2011
With the political uprisings in Arab countries that started 
in early 2011, the wealthier Gulf states quickly responded 
by leveraging considerable political and economic power 
to shape regional politics according to their own interests. 
Political upheavals in the region left a void, as did the 
ongoing reluctance of Western states to offer these coun­
tries meaningful political and economic incentives that 
could help them undertake radical political and economic 
reforms. The smaller Gulf states in particular now saw an 
opportunity to substantiate their demands for more politi­
cal influence, which had grown out of their increased 
economic influence. 
The Gulf states’ engagement in North Africa was fueled 
by the perception that they would have to shoulder the 
main burden of responsibility for the region. This was the 
result of decreased trust in Western powers as providers 
of stability for the region. Though arms sales to the Gulf 
states by Western states have increased, Western powers 
are perceived as paying too little attention to Gulf inter­
ests. This has been compounded since the 5+1 negotia­
tions on Iran’s nuclear program and the West’s reluctance 
to intervene effectively in Libya and Syria. The Gulf states 
thus started to use their enhanced international profile 
and clout for regional power politics in North Africa with­
out seeking prior consent from their Western allies. They 
consequently and increasingly tend to align themselves 
with emerging powers, especially in Asia. 
As a result of the paralysis of the Arab League, the 
role of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in intra­Arab 
conflict mediation has risen. Discord among its members, 
especially between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, 
still simmers below the surface. That tension is currently 
muted due to pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia, which 
wishes to form a united front against the Houthis in  
Yemen and against the so­called Islamic State (ISIS) on a 
regional level. Despite the recent rapprochement between 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, tension between Qatar and the 
UAE is likely to erupt again, for example on the Libyan is­
sue, whereas Saudi Arabia under the new king is expected 
to focus its attention mostly on Yemen.
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy: For decades Saudi foreign 
policy was based on three pillars: 1) safeguarding the 
domestic power of the royal family as the only legitimate 
ruler of the kingdom, 2) safeguarding the influence of 
Saudi economic players in the region and beyond, and 
3) safeguarding the supremacy of religious leadership 
based on Wahhabism, with strong anti­Shia tendencies. 
After the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, as democrati­
cally legitimized forms of Islamic rule, especially in Egypt, 
directly undermine the raison d’être of the Saudi regime, 
these pillars have come under pressure. Thus, Saudi Ara­
bia shifted its foreign policy strategy from a non­interven­
tionist, mediating policy toward a counter­revolutionary 
policy aiming at the stabilization of allied regimes like 
Egypt. In comparison to his predecessor’s policy, the new 
King Salman’s military action in Yemen indicates again a 
shift in Saudi regional policy toward a more intervention­
ist and non­diplomatic approach. King Salman’s foreign 
policy is thus focused on nearby hotspots such as Yemen, 
while North African countries are of decreasing interest 
and will only be prioritized if security in these countries 
deteriorates. Regarding traditional Saudi allies such as 
the US, King Salman is diversifying external alliances in 
order to prove his ability to act as a sovereign regional 
power. Although the US remains a reliable ally, ad hoc 
partnerships – for example with Russia – will become 
more important.
The foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates: The 
UAE’s foreign and security policy is guided by its vital in­
terests: securing the state’s territorial integrity and main­
taining the regime stability of its constituent emirates 
(with the ruling family of Abu Dhabi’s Al Nahyan at the 
top, followed by Dubai’s house of the Al Maktoum). Saudi 
Arabia and Iran both pose direct and indirect threats 
to these vital interests, as they have in the past exerted 
influence on the smaller and poorer emirates, causing 
internal unrest within the UAE. To maintain internal 
stability, the UAE has gone to great lengths to diversify 
its economy. Foreign policy played a central role in these 
efforts, as reflected in the UAE’s large­scale foreign direct 
investments over the past two decades – mainly on the 
part of the ruling families, state­owned enterprises, and 
sovereign wealth funds. Securing UAE investments was 
therefore a major concern driving the country’s reaction 
to the political upheavals in the region that began in 2011. 
Furthermore, there was deep concern that branches of 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the UAE would instigate 
unrest in the less wealthy emirates, thereby threaten­
ing the federation’s stability and the power of the ruling 
families. The UAE has been using a range of incentives 
as well as sanctions to promote UAE interests and influ­
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Like other Gulf states, the UAE responded immediately 
after the outbreak of political unrest in 2011 by promising 
large­scale financial support to Egypt. By the end of 2012, 
however, only 50 million USD had been delivered. Since 
Morsi’s removal from power, the UAE has provided grants 
and loans to Egypt’s Central Bank in order to prevent 
Egyptian insolvency as well as petroleum to finance 
energy subsidies. The UAE also provided considerable 
manpower via the so­called UAE­Egypt Task Force, which 
was essential for the timely organization of the 2015 EEDC 
investment conference in Sharm el Sheikh. Hundreds 
of millions of dollars have been disbursed since 2013 to 
implement social and economic projects in order to brand 
the UAE as a generous supporter of the Egyptian people. 
According to the OECD, the UAE’s support for Egypt made 
it the most generous donor of development assistance 
globally in 2013 and 2014, which further contributed to 
the UAE’s international standing.
As the UAE does not face the same domestic financial 
constraints as Saudi Arabia, it will be able to support 
Egypt as long as there is political will in the country to 
do so. Financial support will not come unconditionally, 
however. The UAE pushes for results and will continue 
to demand the implementation of administrative and 
economic reforms. The UAE will not, however, be en­
couraging political reforms or the inclusion of additional 
domestic actors into Egyptian politics, as this is currently 
not in the UAE’s interest. This decision will, however, de­
pend more on Saudi considerations of how to engage the 
MB and its international supporters, Qatar and Turkey, in 
other regional efforts and conflicts.
Qatar’s support for Egypt since 2011: Under its former 
leader, Emir Hamad, Qatar’s engagement in Egypt after 
2011 was strongly guided by the wish to brand Qatar in 
the West as a bridge and an interlocutor with the MB, 
which it anticipated would become the future power in 
the Middle East, as well as to improve Qatar’s image in 
the Arab world. By siding with the opposition in Egypt, 
Qatar portrayed itself as a champion of the people’s 
right to political self­determination and as a supporter of 
their democratic aspirations. It was also hoped that pro­
revolutionary rhetoric by Qatar’s emir would divert public 
attention from Qatar’s own authoritarian rule. Qatar also 
expected that changing power structures in Egypt would 
provide new opportunities for investment, thereby further 
increasing Qatar’s efforts to diversify economically. Good 
relations with the new Egyptian government were also 
expected to settle the Qatari­Egyptian conflict over both 
countries’ economic and political interests in Sudan. 
Under Emir Hamad, Qatar provided large­scale imma­
terial support to the MB in particular. This took the form 
of anti­Mubarak political rhetoric and extensive airtime 
on the various TV channels belonging to the Qatari Al 
Jazeera network highlighting the demands and activities 
of the opposition and covering the government crack­
down on the opposition. Allegations of direct financial 
support for the MB cannot be substantiated. 
Qatar provided financial support for macroeconomic 
stabilization via grants and loans to the Egyptian Central 
Bank. Shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) helped 
ease Egypt’s shortage of power. Negotiations on large­
scale investments totaling 18 billion USD broke down 
with the removal of President Morsi from power. How­
ever, several Qatari state­owned companies active in real 
estate and banking continue their activities in Egypt; ap­
parently Egyptian consumers have not tied their private 
purchases to the political tension between Qatar and 
Egypt. Similarly, the work of Qatari development organi­
zations continues, although mediated by local Egyptian 
and international NGOs and companies. 
Under the new leader, Emir Tamim, the first steps have 
been taken toward political reconciliation with Egypt. 
This is also the result of the intra­GCC reconciliation of 
December 2014. Tension is still simmering, however, as 
could be seen in the conflicting Qatari and Egyptian 
responses to the Egyptian military attacks on Libya in 
February 2015. On the whole, Qatar’s current low profile 
in Egypt helps support the claim that Emir Tamim is 
readjusting Qatari foreign policy. Qatar’s relatively few 
financial investments in Egypt do not merit any forced 
moves to return to the Egyptian scene. 
Like his father, however, Emir Tamim demands that 
a political solution be found for the conflict with regard 
to the conflict over allowing the MB to participate in 
Egyptian political life. It is unlikely that Qatar will return 
to Egypt politically before such demands are at least par­
tially met, as this would involve losing face. Despite Saudi 
and especially UAE opposition to the inclusion of the MB 
in Egyptian politics, they might still press for more Qatari 
financial support for Egypt’s stabilization in order to share 
this financial burden. 
The impact of Gulf State engagement on Egypt’s political 
and economic d development: The financial assistance pro­
vided by Gulf states to Egypt has had both economic and 
political impact on Egypt’s development since 2011. Eco­
nomically, government­to­government financial support 
from the Gulf states has helped balance budget deficits 
and substituted for the lack of financial assistance from 
Western donors and international institutions such as 
ence politics in the countries of the Arab uprisings. These 
efforts center on furthering economic liberalization and 
politically marginalizing the Muslim Brotherhood and 
similar movements in these countries.
The foreign policy of Qatar: For twenty years, Qatar’s 
leadership has relied heavily on foreign policy to pursue 
its vital interests: territorial integrity (threatened mainly 
by Saudi Arabia and Iran) and regime stability (chal­
lenged mainly from within the Al Thani family itself). 
The cornerstones of that strategy have been to foster close 
political relations with various, often rival, international 
and regional actors and to diversify Qatar’s economy 
and its economic partners. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE, Qatar interpreted the 2011 regional upheavals as a 
unique opportunity to increase its political and economic 
leverage in and beyond the MENA region. This led Qatar 
to shift abruptly toward a strategy of proactive interven­
tion. Qatar was able to portray itself as champion of the 
people’s right to self­determination, particularly since it is 
not challenged domestically by Islamist forces. Qatar’s in­
terventionist foreign policy strategy was short­lived, how­
ever. After power was handed over from Emir Hamad bin 
Khalifah Al Thani to his son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, 
in June 2013, the strategy was readjusted. Today Emir Ta­
mim acts on the realization that Qatar’s leaders needed to 
seek closer approval from Saudi Arabia and that Qatar’s 
main political allies were coming under increasing pres­
sure. The country’s foreign policy is nevertheless likely to 
remain somewhat unpredictable to outsiders. This is due, 
for one thing, to its aspirations to be a regional power 
and ultimately a player in international politics and, for 
another thing, to the fact that outsiders have little insight 
into tight­knit Qatari decision­making circles. Leverage 
of Western states on Qatar is limited because the coun­
try’s main economic partners – and, as a consequence, its 
political partners – are in Asia. Even the Saudi influence 
on Qatar is restricted. For Qatar, much like the UAE, is 
interested in carving out its role as a regional actor inde­
pendent of Saudi Arabia’s influence. Qatar is thus likely 
to continue to pursue – to a certain extent – policies that 
question Saudi political hegemony and Saudi claims to 
represent the GCC as a whole.
1.2 Egypt after 2011:  
The Impact of Gulf State Engagement
Saudi Support for Egypt since 2011: Starting in 2011, Saudi 
Arabia became interested in 1) stopping the expansion of 
democratically legitimized political Islamic movements 
such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, 2) stopping 
the cautious rapprochement then taking place between 
Mohamed Morsi and Iran – in order to contain the re­
gional influence of Shiite Iran, and 3) in protecting Saudi 
economic interests in Egypt. For these purposes, Saudi 
Arabia became one of the most reliable and generous 
donors of financial assistance to the Egyptian Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces between 2011 and 2012,  
and – since July 2013 – to the government of General 
Abdel­Fattah el­Sisi. The country’s total financial support 
to Egypt since Sisi took power has been about 10–12 bil­
lion USD. 
Furthermore, the Saudi business community wanted 
to preserve its traditional, long­lasting economic interests 
in Egypt. Around 3,200 Saudi companies hold the largest 
proportion of investments from the Gulf states, with an 
investment volume of 5.2–5.5 billion USD in 2014 in the 
form of 2,743 projects. 
Saudi Arabia also feared that its own initiatives to 
spread Wahhabism throughout Egypt could be curtailed 
by initiatives undertaken by the Egyptian Muslim Broth­
erhood during its time in power. It is thus highly likely 
that Saudi Arabia pressured its Egyptian religious and 
political partners to refrain from curbing the influence of 
Wahhabism within Al Azhar – the leading Sunni theologi­
cal university in Egypt – although there is no concrete 
evidence that such steps were taken. Moreover, Saudi 
Arabia welcomed the fall of the MB, as it ended the strong 
influence of its rival, Qatar in Egypt. The country could 
thus reestablish itself as the “true leader” of the Muslim 
world and within the GCC.
It remains to be seen whether Saudi Arabia’s strong ties 
to the Sisi administration will continue under the new 
Saudi leader, King Salman. Faced with domestic chal­
lenges such as rising youth unemployment and low oil 
prices, King Salman is showing more reluctance to sup­
port Egypt’s government financially. On a political level, 
King Salman wants to integrate Turkey and Qatar into his 
anti­terror alliance against ISIS and, as part of the anti­
ISIS efforts, is also interested in reintegrating members of 
Egypt’s MB – against Sisi’s will. Thus, under the new king, 
unconditional financial assistance to Egypt might change 
into more conditional forms of support such as the financ­
ing of concrete investment projects.
Emirati support for Egypt since 2011: The UAE’s support 
for Egypt is led by 1) a desire to undermine the potential 
influence of political Islam as a conflicting political ideol­
ogy, 2) an interest in safeguarding the UAE’s security in 
the face of regional instability, 3) a wish to strengthen the 
role and image of the UAE as a power broker in the region, 
and 4) an interest in securing pre­existing investments 
and to open new markets.
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tral Bank and for development projects. It also invested 
strongly in tourism, real estate, telecom, banking, and 
petro­chemical industries. Qatar’s direct financial sup­
port for Ennahda cannot be substantiated, but is widely 
assumed among Tunisians. 
The decisiveness of Qatar’s engagement in Tunisia after 
2011 was motivated by precisely the same reasons behind 
its engagement in Egypt. Here, too, former Emir Hamad 
wished the West to perceive his country as a bridge to 
Islamist movements (in this case Ennahda), as a potential 
interlocutor and future power in the Middle East, in addi­
tion to improving Qatar’s image in the Arab world. As in 
Egypt, considerations of economic diversification were at 
work here as well. Like the UAE, Qatar also sees Tunisia 
as a gateway to Libya, where it wishes to increase its po­
litical influence and make additional investments.
Under Emir Tamim, the new Qatari emir, the general 
line of engagement in Tunisia did not change consider­
ably, partially because the various Tunisian governments 
since 2011 were eager to attract investments from all 
Gulf countries, regardless of their political outlook. It is 
interesting to note, however, that several Qatari organiza­
tions reacted to growing anti­Qatari sentiment within the 
Tunisian population by taking measures to take Qatar and 
its local partners out of the line of fire. 
Qatar is very likely to remain an active economic player 
in Tunisia through its state­owned enterprises. While 
the operations of such enterprises are driven more by 
economic than by political considerations, they could eas­
ily be used to accompany political efforts. On the whole, 
Qatar can be expected to increase efforts to diversify its 
political contacts there beyond the Ennahda party.
The impact of Gulf State financial support on Tunisia’s 
political and economic development: Since 2011 the eco­
nomic and political impact of Gulf assistance on Tunisia 
has been rather limited, especially compared to Egypt. 
Only Qatar seems to have provided loans to the Central 
Bank of Tunisia to stabilize the country. Business invest­
ments from the Gulf are said to have created or secured 
more than 21,000 jobs, but the small number and size of 
planned and implemented projects did not provide wide­
spread trickle­down effects. With a few exceptions, most 
projects did not target rural areas or the needs of socially 
and economically marginalized Tunisians. Perhaps the 
Tunisian government and bureaucracy could have at­
tracted more business investments from the Gulf if they 
had been willing to offer Gulf investors the preferential 
treatment they requested. Nonetheless, the current Tuni­
sian government is interested in increasing investments 
from the Gulf. It is probably more challenging to “sell” 
investments from the Gulf to the public, however, due to 
concerns about the political but also the social and cul­
tural consequences of increased Gulf influence in Tunisia.
Socioeconomically, the major issue at stake remains 
how Tunisia will push for more equitable distribution of 
economic benefits in the future. Such a push for more 
social security is unlikely to come from or through Gulf 
business investments. It must be noted, however, that 
development organizations from Qatar and the UAE in 
particular are showing more interest in youth employ­
ment, rural development, support for small­ and medium­
sized enterprises (partially via Sharia­compatible loans), 
and the renewable energy sector. 
Politically and with regard to democratization efforts, 
allegations of Gulf funding for political parties and their 
related charities and associations have a strong impact on 
Tunisian political discourse. The dynamics of this discourse 
are, however, also fueled by the Tunisian law prohibiting 
foreign funding for political parties, whereas foreign fund­
ing for associations is legal. 
Beyond the direct engagement of the Gulf states in 
Tunisia, the country could also be affected economically 
and politically by the engagement of the UAE and Qatar in 
neighboring Libya, where negative developments form a 
considerable liability to Tunisia’s stability in every regard.
2. Conclusion
This study’s central question was whether the engage­
ment of the Gulf states in Egypt and Tunisia after the 
regime changes of 2011 had a largely positive or negative 
impact on those countries’ political and economic devel­
opment. Of course, judging this impact as “positive” or 
“negative” depends on what set of criteria one applies. For 
the sake of this project – and in light of the political strate­
gies pursued by Germany for Egypt and Tunisia since 2011 
– the two main criteria considered were democratization 
and inclusive socioeconomic change.
It is important to highlight that these criteria do not 
necessarily guide the strategies of the Gulf states for 
Egypt and/or Tunisia. Nor do they necessarily reflect 
the priorities of key actors within Egypt and Tunisia 
themselves. Indeed, different priorities – also relat­
ing to the sequencing of measures to support the two 
countries – could be observed both among European 
and Gulf providers of assistance as well as between key 
actors in Germany, on the one hand, and actors in Egypt 
and Tunisia on the other. Thus, Egyptian and Tunisian 
stakeholders sometimes considered certain Gulf state 
measures in positive terms, whereas the same measures 
the IMF. At present, however, the business investments 
in particular do not hold any promise of serious trickle­
down effects or large­scale employment opportunities, 
especially not for better­educated Egyptians. Prevent­
ing Egypt’s collapse and keeping the region as a whole 
under control was of highest priority to all of the Gulf 
states, whereas helping Egypt transform its political 
system into a more open and democratic one was cer­
tainly not – although Qatar did argue that its support 
for the protests expressed the importance it attached to 
the people’s right to self­determination. The Sisi gov­
ernment’s current dependence on UAE and Saudi finan­
cial and political support has helped to re­consolidate 
a return to the pre­2011 political conditions and even 
contributed to repression not only of the MB but also of 
civil­society organizations and political activists. 
In retrospect, it was unrealistic to expect that there 
was sufficient political will or competence among the 
new figures in power in Egypt to actively introduce 
reforms. The situation was made more complicated by 
the fact that most Western states and donor organiza­
tions never really applied their leverage through finan­
cial assistance and that coordination between Western 
and Gulf states remained insufficient throughout the 
period.
1.3 Tunisia after 2011:  
The Impact of Gulf State Engagement
Saudi Support for Tunisia since 2011: Compared to Saudi 
involvement in Egypt, Saudi support for Tunisia after 
2011 has been minimal. Saudi Arabia did not consider the 
Ennahda party as posing an ideological threat, as the 
party did not engage with Iran and, unlike the Egyptian 
MB, did not attract a massive number of followers within 
Saudi Arabia. 
From a business perspective, neither private nor public 
Saudi businesses are economically invested in Tunisia to a 
relevant extent. The small market and limited number of 
consumers, the domination of European companies, and 
the lack of traditional business networks makes Saudi 
Arabia’s private sector reluctant to invest in Tunisia. Only 
39 Saudi companies are listed as having been active in the 
Tunisian market, representing roughly 6,200 jobs, mostly 
in the agricultural, industrial, energy, and tourism sector. 
Since 2011 several Saudi companies have announced their 
interest in investing in Tunisia’s real estate and power 
sectors. However, no concrete pro jects have yet been 
implemented. 
Many Tunisians feel, moreover, that Saudi Arabia is 
influential in spreading its conservative understanding 
of Wahhabi Islam in Tunisia. In this regard, rumors exist 
that the Saudis are supporting Salafi charities in order 
to increase the impact of their Wahhabi ideology in the 
country. However, direct financial support for Tunisian 
mosques and charities by the Saudi government cannot 
be substantiated. 
Under the new king, Tunisia is likely to remain a low 
priority in Saudi regional policy, especially compared 
to Egypt, due to the country’s limited geostrategic and 
economic relevance and a limited understanding in Saudi 
Arabia of the respective political cultures. For now, Saudi 
Arabia considers Tunisia to be “under control” in terms 
of the role that political Islamist groups play and with 
regard to its overall economic and social situation.
Emirati support for Tunisia since 2011: UAE assistance 
to Tunisia since 2011 has been limited, especially com­
pared to the support it provides to Egypt. The UAE did not 
provide macroeconomic support in the form of grants or 
loans to the Tunisian Central Bank. Nor did it fund new 
development projects. Instead it limited its assistance to 
humanitarian channels. Via various state­owned enter­
prises, it did, however, make a number of investments, 
for example in the telecommunication and health sectors, 
while most real estate projects that had been agreed upon 
under Zine el­Abidine Ben Ali were put on hold or can­
celled altogether. The UAE provided political and limited 
material support to the Nidaa Tounes party and some 
of its representatives. On a bilateral governmental level, 
material and immaterial support was offered also to the 
Tunisian army in its fight against terrorism.
This assistance clearly reflects the UAE’s interests in 
Tunisia. The UAE’s fight against terrorism and political 
Islam is also taking place on Tunisian soil, and the UAE 
uses its engagement in Tunisia to strengthen its role and 
image as a regional power. Moreover, these efforts are 
also undertaken in order to limit Qatari influence on 
Tunisia and in the region as a whole. Beyond that, Tunisia 
is seen as a gateway to Libya, where the UAE wishes to 
increase its political influence and economic investments.
It is likely that the UAE will continue to invest in Tuni­
sia despite rumors that such investments are tied to the 
condition of the Tunisian government’s exclusion of Is­
lamists like Ennahda from political participation. A num­
ber of unresolved investment disputes from the pre­2011 
era and legal disputes regarding Tunisians closely con­
nected to the Emirati ruling families show that relations 
between the UAE and Tunisia are somewhat strained. 
Qatar’s support for Tunisia since 2011: Among the Gulf 
states, Qatar was the main provider of assistance for 
Tunisia after 2011. It provided loans to the Tunisian Cen­
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3. Policy Recommendations 
Several steps are necessary for Germany and its Western 
partners to leverage their economic and political influ­
ence in the region more effectively and constructively in 
the future. Given their stated long­term goals of promot­
ing democratization and inclusive socioeconomic change, 
this report’s policy recommendations and proposals need 
to be embedded in long­term strategies. However, strat­
egies must seriously consider the interests of the Gulf 
states as influential political and economic players in the 
MENA region. 
3.1 Recommendations for German and EU Policies  
toward the Gulf States
German and other European policy makers must 
acquire a more robust understanding both of the vital 
interests guiding Gulf states’ foreign policy and of the 
role the Gulf states play for the vital interests of Germany 
and its partners in order to develop long-term strategies 
of cooperation with the Gulf states. At present, Germany 
and the European Union as a whole lack a coherent for­
eign policy strategy toward the Gulf states. Unlike France 
and the UK – as former colonial powers that assertively 
pursue their interests via bilateral strategies – Germany 
has been more reactive than proactive in its policy toward 
the region. This atomization of European approaches to 
the Gulf states and to the wider Arab region is incommen­
surate with the region’s strategic importance for Europe, 
given its geographic proximity and its energy resources. 
German and other European policy makers must take 
much greater account of the Gulf states in considering 
European security strategies. This is all the more im­
portant in light of the strategic vacuum left by the US – a 
vacuum that other players are keen to fill. The upcoming 
reassessment of the European security strategy developed 
in 2003 is an opportunity to formulate an updated politi­
cal approach to the region. 
German and other European policy makers must give 
special attention to increasing the cooperation in mari-
time security. Europe’s foreign and security policy must 
include strategies for the Gulf. This is due to the impor­
tance of the security of naval passages through the region 
for Europe’s energy security but also because maritime 
security cooperation is a key instrument for containing 
transnational terrorist activities, human trafficking, and 
smuggling. However, security cooperation with the Gulf 
states and other Arab states poses a challenge; the Ger­
man constitutional prohibition against exporting arms 
into areas of conflict must be given much more consid­
eration, since several states have used military means to 
crack down on protesters in recent years. Balancing these 
conflicting vital interests needs a lengthy, well­informed, 
and transparent political debate that must seriously en­
gage the opinions of different camps.
German and other European policy makers need to 
account strategically for the limited leverage that Euro-
pean states enjoy in the Gulf region. This limited lever­
age is due to the strong economic ties of Gulf states with 
the emerging economies in Asia as well as longstanding 
political cooperation with the US. Economic coopera­
tion with Asian partners is gradually being transformed 
into stronger political cooperation with particular Asian 
countries, first and foremost China, but also India and 
South Korea.
German and other European policy makers need to 
identify new ways to engage with the Gulf states politi-
cally. The Gulf states expect to be treated as equals as 
befits their increased international standing and influ­
ence. They also wish to be complimented and praised for 
their efforts, both in staving off the economic collapse 
of countries like Egypt (which would have had severe con­
sequences for neighboring Europe) but also for their eco­
nomic support for Western economies during the global 
financial crises in 2008 and the years that followed.
German and other European policy makers must 
widen and deepen their political dialogue with the Gulf 
states. They should, moreover, seek out dialogue beyond 
issues regarding countries affected by the Arab uprisings 
and in all multilateral settings. UN meetings on global 
development and climate agendas provide such oppor­
tunities. Dialogue on topics of mutual interest and joint 
activities should also be sought via multilateral Islamic in­
stitutions such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC), the Islamic Development Fund, Arab multilateral 
development funds and bilateral funds such as the devel­
opment funds of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi.
German and other European policy makers need to 
identify sectors of mutual interest and areas of synergy. 
Renewable energy, energy efficiency, energy consump­
tion as well as international climate policies are issues of 
high domestic interest for the Gulf states. Also primary, 
secondary, tertiary education, and vocational training 
loom large on the domestic political agenda. The Gulf 
states consider Germany to have expertise in all of these 
could, in normative terms, be viewed as having a nega­
tive effect on democratization and/ or inclusive socio­
economic change in the two countries. Consequently, the 
input provided by the Gulf states as well as by Germany 
and other European states was also judged according 
to criteria and standards that differed from those set by 
Germany and its Western partners. It is therefore of little 
surprise that the various measures for support often did 
not complement each other and arguably sometimes even 
contradicted one another in terms of their impact.
Analyzing measures taken since 2011 by Gulf countries 
to assist Egypt and Tunisia – and looking at how these 
measures were (not) coordinated with actions taken by 
other providers of assistance – this project draws five  
major conclusions. Its policy recommendations are de­
rived from these conclusions.
1. Instead of mutually complementing each other in their 
support for Egypt and Tunisia, Western and Gulf coun­
tries have been insufficiently aligned – even though 
they supposedly operate under the same umbrella, the 
Deauville Partnership. There are many reasons for this 
lack of coordination. The chief one is a lack of mutual 
consideration for and/or knowledge of the respective 
interests pursued in – and for – MENA countries. The 
forums for discussing policies and strategies are inad­
equate. While some argue that the Deauville Partner­
ship succeeded in establishing such forums over time, 
this was certainly not the case in its beginning. 
2. All providers of support resorted to ad hoc measures 
that strongly reflected their respective interests. This 
led in turn to different priorities in the sequencing of 
measures. While the Gulf states were mainly concerned 
with establishing immediate political and economic 
stability, Western countries pursued longer­term goals: 
democratization and inclusive socioeconomic change. 
Instead of attempting to harmonize these approaches 
in long­term strategies for each country, the different 
“camps” of providers tended to pit themselves against 
one another – and to blame each other for failures and 
setbacks. On the whole, both Western and Gulf provid­
ers of support remained too general in their approaches 
to Arab countries. As such, they failed to respond to the 
individual needs of the beneficiary countries.
3. Fully comprehending the measures taken by the Gulf 
states in Egypt and Tunisia involves placing those mea­
sures within the context of the vital interests of the Gulf 
states themselves – that is, within the context of their 
general foreign policy concerns and their Middle East­
ern policies in particular. Most of the Gulf states were 
influential economic and political players in the region 
long before 2011. Their pre­2011 investments were not 
only meant to diversify their respective economies 
but also to influence the regional process of globaliza­
tion economically and politically. The overall lack of 
awareness among Western political actors of the Gulf 
states’ long­term engagement in the region compounds 
the risk of misunderstanding and misinterpreting their 
post­2011 actions. The policies Gulf states have pursued 
in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011 have been driven by a 
desire to keep their respective countries – and the Arab 
neighborhood as a whole – stable, or at least “under 
control.” Their agenda is thus longer­term than some 
of their political actions since 2011 might lead Western 
politicians and analysts to believe. Only with a thor­
ough understanding of these underlying domestic and 
foreign policy assumptions can the policies of Gulf 
states in the Mediterranean region become calculable. 
4. German and other Western policy makers have only 
limited influence on the Gulf states in general and on 
how they support Arab countries in particular. This is 
due for one thing to the comparatively limited financial 
assistance provided by Western states. For another, 
Western states’ political leverage on the Gulf states has 
been diminishing over the past 15 years, as Gulf states 
forge new economic as well as also political partner­
ships (geared increasingly toward Asian countries). 
Western states are thus not in a position to apply pres­
sure on the Gulf states to change the nature or extent of 
their engagement with Egypt and/or Tunisia. 
5. Better coordination and cooperation with the Gulf 
states is crucial for responding to the escalating con­
flicts in the region. Decreasing faith in the willingness 
of Western partners to stand up for the region’s security 
and stability has led the Gulf states to augment their 
own military means and reach out to new providers of 
security. This increases the likelihood of violence by 
proxy or even proxy wars in the region. Increased mili­
tarization is also fueled by the 5+1 nuclear deal with 
Iran; the Gulf states are likely to demand similar rights 
to develop nuclear capacity for themselves in order to 
keep pace with Iran. Forums for political dialogue like 
the Deauville Partnership are thus important spaces for 
rebuilding trust, enlarging networks of communication, 
and deepening mutual understanding.
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Develop suitable incentives for greater inclusion of the 
Gulf states into governance dialogue within the Deau-
ville Partnership. There seems to be wide consensus that 
the finance pillar of the Deauville Partnership is more 
successful in winning the attention of Gulf states than 
the governance pillar. This can be attributed to various 
factors, among them priorities in sequencing measures, 
diverging political goals for the region, and stronger 
capacities among Gulf institutions in matters of finance. 
European and other Western states should thus develop 
forums and settings that make dialogue on matters of 
governance more attractive to Gulf stakeholders. Given 
the ongoing exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood from 
Egyptian politics, such dialogue will be ever more impor­
tant in the future. In order to engage Islamists, both the 
EU and the Gulf states require contacts and channels of 
communication. These could be provided by Qatar, which 
enjoys good standing with the Muslim Brotherhood and 
organizations close to it. Oman could also be a suitable 
and potentially less controversial interlocutor.
Clarify German and European interests in North 
Africa and show a willingness to act upon those inter-
ests politically by mustering adequate financial means. 
As has been noted, the EU as a whole lacks a coherent 
foreign policy strategy toward the region. Because the 
deteriorating security situation in Libya also negatively 
affects the domestic stability of both Egypt and Tunisia, it 
is imperative to consider Libya when discussing security 
cooperation with both countries. Given the respective in­
volvement of Qatar and the UAE in Libyan political affairs, 
these countries’ interests need to be considered, especial­
ly since they seek to influence the Egyptian and Tunisian 
governments to act in a way that enhances Qatari and 
Emirati operations in Libya.
Identify shared interests regarding MENA countries in 
order to deepen cooperation with the Gulf states.  
Approaches need to be better aligned and strategies 
and instruments developed to suit the individual Arab 
countries that have been undergoing political change 
since 2011. Although German­Gulf interests differ in many 
aspects, mutual interests do exist. For example, both 
sides are vitally interested in keeping the Arab region 
economically and socially stable. Both in Egypt and 
Tunisia, there is also a shared interest in fighting politi­
cal violence, extremism, and terrorism despite different 
understandings of what is defined as such. There seems to 
be agreement on the necessity of economically strength­
ening those states affected by the Arab uprisings in order 
to offer their populations a perspective for a better future 
by decreasing unemployment, especially for youth. Good 
and transparent governance and sustainable economies 
that are less based on income from rent are thus impor­
tant pillars for a stable political order in the Middle East 
in the future. Germany and its European partners should 
thus engage with the Gulf states the question of how to 
make economic growth in these countries more socially 
inclusive and sustainable. Dialogue on these matters can 
also form part of discussions between Germany and the 
Gulf states on economic diversification within the Gulf 
states themselves. 
Seek out technical expertise and know-how from the 
Gulf states themselves when planning trilateral develop-
ment projects with Gulf states. Gulf states have increased 
their technical and administrative capacities over the past 
decades and do not like to be seen purely as providers of 
finance. This should be kept in mind when cooperation 
projects are under discussion – especially since the Gulf 
states can rightfully point out that they have already 
provided more financial support for countries like Egypt 
than European and other states. Based on interviews 
conducted for this project, such trilateral cooperation 
seems to be possible in the renewable energy sector, the 
industrial sector, as well as in SME support and microfi­
nance projects. Gulf, Egyptian, and Tunisian interlocutors 
showed interest in cooperating with Germany in voca­
tional training and in the development of a system based 
on the German “dual system.” In the absence of a burden­
sharing system with the private sector similar to the Ger­
man Sozialpartnerschaft, such a dual system would hardly 
be successful in Arab states at the moment. German 
interlocutors should highlight these systemic difficulties 
to manage and, if necessary, limit expectations.
Increase coordination and communication among 
Gulf and Western development organizations in Egypt 
and Tunisia. At present, since most development orga­
nizations from the Gulf states do not have local repre­
sentative offices in beneficiary countries, no constant 
coordination and dialogue takes place among Western 
and Gulf donors and implementing organizations. Little 
information on Gulf­funded projects therefore exists 
among German and European implementing organiza­
tions, which in turn hinders identification of potential 
fields for cooperation and synergy effects. As there seems 
to be limited willingness among the relevant Egyptian 
and Tunisian ministries to increase dialogue and coordi­
nation between Gulf and Western donors, Germany and 
sectors, so policy makers should actively seek dialogue 
on these issues, both in bilateral and multilateral settings, 
for example those provided by the UN. Also supporting 
more economic diversification of the Gulf states should be 
in the interest of Germany and other European states in 
order to ensure that suppliers of energy become economi­
cally and consequently politically less dependent on 
dividends from oil and gas exports. Although Germany’s 
current energy mix does include a large amount of energy 
provided by Gulf states, the stability of its energy mix 
and exports is affected by how other European neighbors 
develop their energy imports. For in some cases these rely 
quite heavily on energy from the Gulf region.
German and European policy makers should deepen their 
understanding of political decision making in Gulf coun-
tries and of the social and economic structures on which 
they are based. Meaningful political dialogue means 
identifying relevant stakeholders. This in turn requires 
a better understanding of the social and cultural mecha­
nisms that build political and social cohesion and balance 
interests in the Gulf countries. This knowledge is mainly 
acquired through personal contacts and interaction of 
interlocutors on the ground (for example diplomatic and 
business representatives, or members of the German 
expatriate professional community). Such practical in­
sights need to be complemented by research and analyses 
provided by academia and think tanks. Funding for such 
research on the Gulf states is thus of importance to take 
well­informed policy decisions.
Building trust requires time and additional resources. 
High­level political representation and the participation 
of political rather than merely administrative office 
holders would reflect the importance of such a dialogue. 
Interaction with the Gulf states within multilateral 
settings must also be expected to be more time­ and 
resource­consuming than with other states of similar po­
litical and economic clout. This is due to the fact that the 
Gulf states, despite their increased international political 
role, still lack both experience and manpower to par­
ticipate effectively in forums of multilateral governance. 
This also affects the performance and participation of the 
Gulf states in the framework of the Deauville Partnership 
as well as in GCC­EU settings. Political processes that 
include the Gulf states need to take these practical limita­
tions into account. 
One must engage German businesses and cultural 
institutions in order to widen political, economic, and 
social dialogue with stakeholders from the Gulf states. As 
German businesses enjoy an excellent reputation, their 
networks can open new windows for dialogue that could 
be tapped into by policy makers. Supporting such institu­
tions as the German Chambers of Trade and Commerce 
would help intensify their cooperation and extend the 
dialogue with Gulf Arab counterparts – e.g. the bilateral 
Saudi­Egyptian Chamber of Commerce – both in the Gulf 
states and in countries like Egypt and Tunisia. Given the 
absence of German political foundations in the Gulf coun­
tries, it is thus all the more important to include political 
and social stakeholders as well as researchers from Gulf 
countries in the activities of these foundations that take 
place in neighboring Arab countries and in Germany. 
Identifying issues of shared interest and mutual benefit 
is a necessary prerequisite to kindling the interest of Gulf 
participants in such activities. Also cultural institutions 
such as the Goethe Institutes and the cultural depart­
ments of the German embassies and consulates can serve 
as nodes of exchange and dialogue, as can the Robert 
Bosch Cultural Managers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In 
order to make the most use of the insights gained through 
the variety of possible encounters, however, cooperation 
and coordination between German institutions and min­
istries needs to be improved.
3.2 Policy Recommendations for German-Gulf  
Cooperation in Support of Egypt and Tunisia 
Continue to make use of the Deauville Partnership 
as a forum for multilateral dialogue involving key ac-
tors from Western, Gulf, and North African states and 
international organizations. The partnership continues 
to provide important space for relevant stakeholders to 
discuss strategies and instruments for Arab countries 
that have been undergoing political change since 2011, 
particularly in the absence of other multilateral forums. 
They should nurture and improve these spaces instead 
of abandoning them. Western stakeholders in particular 
should strive to increase trust and inclusivity if they wish 
to influence the future engagement of the Gulf states 
more effectively. They should pay more attention to ap­
proaches that go beyond stabilizing the existing system 
economically in order to stabilize the beneficiary country 
sustainably by offering more socioeconomic inclusion. 
Discussions on how to integrate the informal sector should 
figure more prominently. 
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its partners should seek to convince stakeholders in Egypt 
and Tunisia of the benefits of closer coordination and 
cooperation among the various providers of assistance. 
It is also important to include representatives from Gulf 
development organizations and Gulf states’ superordinate 
ministries in this process. 
The potential for trilateral business activities in Egypt 
and Tunisia is limited, but consider even small opportu-
nities. Private sector investments from Qatar and the UAE 
come from state­owned rather than private enterprises. 
Private investors from Germany and other Western states 
operate with different risks, which makes cooperation 
between Gulf and other investors and companies difficult. 
The perspectives for trilateral economic cooperation are 
thus currently limited. The sectors of renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, and energy consumption, however, do 
offer potential. Activities of German companies that are 
already investing or producing in countries like Egypt – or 
that show interest in using opportunities offered by the 
enlargement of the Suez Canal – offer fruitful grounds 
for dialogue. The same should be possible for German 
companies planning to invest in Tunisia.
Reach out more actively to the Gulf states on the mat-
ter of Tunisia. Individual European states as well as the 
EU as a whole should take the first step of reaching out 
to the Gulf states with regard to Tunisia. This is because 
of the dominance of European investors in Tunisia and 
the fact that instruments of the European Neighborhood 
Policy are widely regarded as suitable for meeting Tuni­
sia’s challenges. Together with the Tunisian government, 
mutual dialogue on political, economic, and social issues 
should be strengthened in order to identify potential for 
cooperation and areas of synergy.
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